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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last two decades, the electricity sector has been involved in a challenging 
restructuring process in which the vertical integrated structure (monopoly) is being replaced 
by a horizontal set of companies. The growing supply of electricity, flowing in response to 
free market pricing at the wellhead, led to increased competition. In the new framework of 
deregulation, what characterizes the electric industry is a commodity wholesale electricity 
marketplace. This new environment has drastically changed the objective of electricity 
producing companies. In the vertical integrated industry, utilities were forced to meet all the 
demand from customers living in a certain region at fixed rates. Then, the operation of the 
Generation Companies (GENCOs) was centralized and a single decision maker allocated the 
energy services by minimizing total production costs. 
Nowadays, GENCOs are involved not only in the electricity market but also in additional 
markets such as fuel markets or environmental markets. A gas or coal producer may have 
fuel contracts that define the production limit over a time horizon. Therefore, producers must 
observe this price levels in these other markets. This is a lesson we learned from the 
Electricity Crisis in California. The Californian market’s collapse was not the result of 
market decentralization but it was triggered by other decisions, such as high natural gas 
prices, with a direct impact in the supply-demand chain. 
This dissertation supports generation asset business decisions –from fuel supply concerns 
to wholesale trading in energy and ancillary services. The forces influencing the value chain 
are changing rapidly, and can become highly controversial. Through this report, the author 
brings an integrated and objective perspective, providing a forum to identify and address 
common planning and operational needs. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to present theories and ideas that can be applied 
directly in algorithms to make GENCOs decisions more efficient. This will decompose the 
problem into independent subproblems for each time interval. This is preferred because 
building a complete model in one time is practically impossible. The diverse scope of this 
report is unified by the importance of each topic to understanding or enhancing the 
  
xiii
profitability of generation assets. Studies of top strategic issues will assess directly the 
promise and limits to profitability of energy trading. Studies of ancillary services will permit 
companies to realistically gauge the profitability of different services, and develop bidding 
strategies tuned to competitive markets. 
 
  
1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Chapter overview 
Over the last two decades, the electricity sector has been involved in a challenging 
restructuring process in which the vertical integrated structure is being replaced by a 
horizontal set of companies. This new parading has not changed the philosophy of power 
system operation but evolving the way of making financial arrangements. This chapter 
describes the background and structures of the present research work. 
  
 
1.2 Introduction 
The vertical integrated supply-chain generally is solved as an optimization problem 
where the objective function is to minimize total costs and satisfy the demand with a 
satisfactory level of reliability. After the liberalization of the energy sectors, its operation has 
changed from a centralized process to a market ruled by the law of offer and demand. 
The different activities of the energy supply chain nowadays are organized through 
markets: fuel markets, electricity market and environmental market among others, as 
indicated in Figure 1.1.  
The left side in Figure 1.1 represents the supply side of the electricity sector, making up 
by electricity generating companies, owning power plants. Based upon the prices that they 
offer, the processes that occur in the market decide upon the quantity of electricity that each 
generation company is allowed to sell at each moment in time. The generating companies 
themselves however decide autonomously in their biddings, which plants they run and how 
they run them. 
The electricity generation portfolio is not only the distribution of the types of plants that 
GENCOs own but also the different services in they can participate. Among these services, 
ancillary services (AS) play an important role in a player’s decision in decentralized markets. 
  
2
By way of example, the lack of reactive power will reduce the amount of energy transferred 
through the power system. If such information is mined by a player, that player may make 
additional revenues, by probably exercising market power based on the locational 
characteristic of reactive power.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Energy market 
 
In order to improve the GENCOs decision-making, it is necessary to have detailed and 
reliable optimization models and methods available. However, finding the optimal plan for 
production power and ancillary services, possibly also taking into account the optimal use of 
storage, is a difficult optimization problem. This difficulty can be relaxed decomposing the 
problem in time and activity, where each time-step is solved independently. The time 
dimension is divided into discrete, one-hour time-steps. 
Producers and consumers of electricity could trade through multiple related markets. For 
instance, trade of large blocks of electricity mainly takes place in the bilateral market. This 
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3
means that the producers directly trade electricity to large consumers, traders or retail 
companies. Bilateral contracts are confidential, as a result of which there are no good data 
available regarding their price and duration. Small end consumers acquire their electricity via 
the retailers. Additionally, electricity can be trade on the spot market. Every day, each plant 
owner can bid a price and an amount he wants to produce for the next day, specified per hour 
of that next day. Hourly prices result from those bids together with the bids of the consumer 
side of the market. Prices are higher when demand relative to supply is larger. Bids are 
anonymous, but the market prices are public. Prices on the spot market can be highly 
volatile. Finally, the balancing market facilitates additional electricity generation to balance 
actual supply and demand in the moment due to the actual use of electricity is unpredictable; 
supply and demand of electricity must be equal at any moment. The extra electricity has to be 
obligatory sold on the balancing market to the parties that predicted and bought less than 
their actual electricity withdrawals. 
Due to the complexity of GENCOs decision making process we have decided to 
decompose the problem into independent subproblems, see Figure 1.2. This is preferred 
because building a complete model in one time is practically impossible. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Energy market decomposition 
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The Electricity Market 
With the deregulation of power industry, real power, which had been centrally dispatched 
and sold to customers in the traditional power systems, become the first product to be 
auctioned and sold in electricity markets. The purpose of an auction is to expose information 
about buyers’ and sellers’ respective willingness to pay or sell. Commodities like electricity 
often have no explicit fixed worth; instead, their worth is a function of current market 
conditions, and an auction attempts to define this worth [12]. Essentially, an auction allows 
discovery of the equilibrium price, defined as the intersection of the demand and supply 
curves of the buyers and sellers respectively. Electricity auctions are designed for simplicity 
and transparency. However, the physical constraints placed on the power system by the laws 
of physics are unique to electricity, and care must be taken to establish the most appropriate 
production, transportation, and consumption mechanisms for this commodity.  
Spot electricity markets1 operate repeatedly on the hourly basis, generation companies 
might learn from available historical market data to forecast or estimate the strategic 
behavior of competitors’. Expectations of market participants have to be assumed to get these 
dynamic learning. 
In the market information block in Figure 1.3, the market operator conducts a market-
clearing mechanism. Once market equilibrium and price-quantity are discovered, this 
information is made public. A GENCO observes this new market information and chooses 
from a finite set of actions. The market then enters into a new state and again the GENCO 
must make a decision. Its objective, therefore, is to select the sequence of actions that return 
the highest cumulative payoff. Any GENCO whose bid is accepted is obligated to provide 
the quantity of electricity accepted. This situation occurs for every period. Hence, each 
GENCO can study the past choices of its rivals. In addition, each GENCO may assess other 
information it gathers over time, and especially the data which will most likely influence its 
present choice. In other words, when the same bidder plays the same opponents multiple 
times, it can be expected that the bidding agents will adjust their own behaviors to maximize 
                                                          
1 The day-ahead hourly electricity market is referred to as the spot electricity market, but in reality, a true 
spot market for power exists with time horizons as short as 10 minutes and is named real-time market 
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their profits [5]. To accomplish with this learning process, we do consider that both GENCOs 
adopt Forward expectations. Forward expectation is valid when GENCOs anticipate a 
possible future equilibrium for competitors. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 GENCOs feedback information 
 
The transmission services provided by the system operators for system stability and 
reliability are still provided centrally and not yet being traded in the markets. With the 
further development of electric energy market and electricity financial market, more and 
more services are, or will be traded in the ancillary service market. 
Contingent markets have been introduced to reduce uncertainty by trading 
commodities/services at date t to be delivered sometime in the future [1]. The objective of 
contingent delivery contracts is to make the markets complete, one contract for every good in 
every state of the market. The introduction of complete markets, therefore, apparently 
permits the accounting of uncertainty with a large economy of means. Forwards and Futures 
markets are two of the additional markets in which contracts of contingent delivery can be 
traded. A Forward market reflects short term future system conditions. In the forward 
 
… 
GENCO 1 
Max π 
Decision Making 
Bidding ($, q1) 
GENCO 2 
Max π 
Decision Making 
Bidding ($, q2) 
GENCO N 
Max π 
Decision Making 
Bidding ($, qN) 
Market 
Information 
  
6
market, prices are determined at the time of the contract, but transactions occur at some 
specific date in the future. The settlement of forward contracts can be either physical or 
financial. Physical contracts consider it an obligation of the generation company to fulfill the 
specified amount of energy at the hours and network node arranged at the fixed price agreed. 
On the other hand, Financial Contracts do not imply a physical energy transaction but they 
pertain to a cash flow. Unlike forward contracts, where credit risk exists, in Futures contracts 
there are no credit risk. In a Futures contract, the counterpart is always the exchange-clearing 
house. The exchange guarantees that the term of the contract will be honored at maturity. 
Future contracts are financially derived contracts used to spread risk and they are a means of 
risk management. 
Options markets for electric energy are expected to be common and will be an important 
means of mitigating risk. An options contract is a form of insurance that gives the purchaser 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy (sell) a contract at a given price. This is the main 
difference between option contracts and forward/futures contracts, in which the holder is 
compelled to buy or sell the underlying commodity. 
In the swap market, the contract position can be closed with an exchange of physical or 
financial substitutes. The trader may find another trader who will accept delivery and end the 
trader’s delivery obligation. 
Figure 1.4 represents schematically the electricity-derivative markets. 
 
Figure 1.4 Electricity Market mechanism 
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Three interesting tangential derivatives for managing risk in the industry are also being 
used: emissions trading, weather derivatives, and insurance contracts. 
 
1.3 Literature review 
Energy models have been developed to support local energy planning and recently to 
observe the effects of interdependencies in the case of terrorist attacks [1][2][3]. However, 
analyses to date have focused mainly on the interrelation between the energy sector and the 
larger economy in the long-term. A useful example is the computer-based National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS) in the United States that models energy markets driven by the 
fundamental economic interactions of supply and demand [4]. Additional examples of large-
scale energy models include Electricity Markets Complex Adaptive Systems (EMCAS) and 
Energy and Power Evaluation Program (ENPEP) [5, 6]. EMCAS is an agent-based modeling 
system used to simulate various market operating rules [5] while ENPEP is a set of integrated 
energy, environmental, and economic analysis and planning tools [6].  
A supply chain network perspective for electric power production, supply, transmission, 
and consumption is presented in [6]. Various decision-makers operating in a decentralized 
manner such as generation companies, transmission companies and market consumers are 
taken into account. A generalized network flow model of a national, integrated energy 
system that incorporates production, storage, and transportation of coal, natural gas, and 
electricity in a single mathematical framework for a medium-term analysis has been reported 
in [7, 8]. The model focuses on the economic interdependencies of the integrated system 
along with a detailed characterization of their functionalities (supply, demand, storage, and 
transportation), within a single analytical framework that allows for their simultaneous study. 
A novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures 
both the economic network transactions in energy supply chains and the physical network 
transmission constraints in the electric power network is reported in [9]. The theoretical 
derivation and analyses are done using the theory of variational inequalities.  
We propose the Leontief model, also known as Input-Output model, to study market 
integration and agent participation in a multiple-market framework. The Input-Output model 
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is an equilibrium model that assumes no surplus production or consumption, having the 
advantage of providing an organizational framework. An input-output model is a convenient 
tool for description of action of market forces even when the model is a snapshot of the 
economy at one point in time. Specific limitations to the input-output model’s accuracy 
include: 
 
Constant coefficients 
Linearity 
Sector homogeneity 
No capacity constraints 
 
To overcome with some of these drawbacks we have developed two market models of 
integrated electricity and fuel markets. The first formulation is a closed form solution of the 
Cournot model represented by a set of linear equations. The second formulation is an 
equivalent of the first in a Discrete Event System Simulation (DESS) framework. The main 
advantage when formulating the energy market by using DESS is the possibility to expand 
the analysis to study market dynamics, and allow companies to tailor their strategic planning 
and forecasting. 
Electricity market design trends toward a decentralized self-scheduling model. A 
centralized auctioneer, Power Exchange (PX), is seen as the fictitious Walrasian Auctioneer 
in the Walrasian General Equilibrium model [10]. PXs normally provide bidding trading in 
contracts for power delivery during a particular hour of the next day, called day-ahead or 
spot market. The usual trading method varies from a daily single-side auction to double-side 
auction for every hour to match transactions at a uniform price [11]. In decentralized 
markets, price is adjusted dynamically based on the response of market supply-demand. 
GENCOs offer energy into the market at prices offered based on estimated future conditions. 
As market participants, GENCOs in single-side or double-side decentralized models, are not 
price takers but price setters. The aggregate quantity of electricity offered is a nondecreasing 
function of price. Depending on market rules, GENCOs may offer power in block contracts. 
This implies that the market supply curve has the form of a step functions. Similarly, buyers 
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may make bids into the market at prices that they are willing to pay. The aggregate demand 
curve is a decreasing step function of price. The market clearing price is commonly 
determined by the intersection of these demand-supply curves. In addition, the market 
clearing price must incorporate consideration of any transmission constraints. When the bulk 
system does not have transmission constraints, the spot market price of electricity can be 
computed by successively dispatching generation with the lowest price until the demand is 
met. 
Price dynamics can be analyzed from the bidding strategy that each player develops to 
maximize profits. A bidding decision is formulated as a Markov Process as reported in [12]. 
Those authors used bidding decisions to determine the price and amount of electricity for a 
supplier assumed to be risk-neutral. The same authors in [13] developed a systematic method 
to calculate transition probabilities and rewards for the Markov Decision Process model. All 
other suppliers are modeled by their bidding parameters with corresponding probabilities. 
The optimal strategy is calculated to maximize the expected reward over a planning horizon. 
The authors considered a simplified market in where the suppliers’ bids are chosen from the 
cheapest until the load that period is met. For all units that are called into operation, the last 
selected bid price defines the spot price in that load period. Security constraints and other 
market characteristics are neglected. The no-arbitrage-pricing principle is applied to the 
pricing of flexible electricity contracts in [14]. Pricing of flexible contracts involves a 
scheduling policy. By representing the spot price with an appropriate stochastic process, the 
scheduling policy can be found using stochastic dynamic programming. The mathematics of 
finding optimal bidding strategies in multi-period electricity market auctions of energy and 
reserve markets is presented in [15] and [16]. Generator costs, operating constraints, and 
exogenous price uncertainties are fully taken into consideration within the approach. These 
authors studied strategies for generators making offers into wholesale electricity markets 
when both demand and competing generators behavior is unknown but represented by a 
probability distribution in [17]. Their analysis is restricted to markets in which the supply of 
power in a given time interval is defined by generators of power in the form of offers of 
energy blocks. We propose to study market dynamics with interaction among participants by 
using a discrete linear system model. The model is a closed-loop dynamic system in which 
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current and previous information are use as a feedback signal into decision support systems. 
Price market dynamics is emphasized as the bidding iterative process associated to each 
trading period in game theory framework by using difference equations [18]. 
Also important is the change in the flow of information between various entities that now 
compose the revamped electric power industry [19]. Market pricing, capacity reservations, 
energy schedules and financial settlements data now dominate the data exchange for 
wholesale operation. Nearly gone are the days of operational information exchange, limited 
to engineering and system scheduling data, primarily between the utility control centers [20]. 
We discusses what additional informational is required such as firms’ strategic decision-
making is improved in the quest for profits. 
In a decentralized market design, price summarizes this information. Transmission 
system capacity information is embedded in the Locational Marginal Price (LMP). Market 
participants should have access to transmission system information. This information is 
needed to forecast the market state. Perfect information is not available as the contractual 
(trading) information is not revealed. LMP provides more than locational information based 
on transmission system losses and congestions. LMP provides insights to production fuel 
type dominance [21]. Observing fuel prices in their respective markets and the price of 
electricity, enable a player to identify price at a given point of time. Such a dependency is 
shown by spark contracts. Such contracts are beyond the scope of this thesis [22]. 
Most of the work applied to the electricity market analysis reported in the literature 
covered a single period. At the beginning most of these models were constructed as single-
node generation-only models [23]. A procedure to identify multi-period equilibria in an 
electricity market is important for market regulators who may use it for market monitoring 
[24]. A multi-period equilibrium in a pool-based electricity market that may include 
minimum profit constraints for on-line generating units is analyzed in [25]. An oligopoly 
with spatially dispersed generators and consumers as well as with multiperiod demand is 
modeled in [23]. We have studied GENCOs production decisions in the spot electricity 
market. The model developed is based upon static model equilibrium solved sequentially. 
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Later, basic representations and linear DC transmission network were introduced for 
modelling geographical distribution, also called spatiality [26][27][28][29]. Recently, AC 
network representation has been incorporated in a non-linear programming problem in order 
to systematically study for the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium [30]. 
Since GENCOs operate in a sequential-period market where, in each period, 
simultaneous output decisions are made, in most market scenarios, it may not be enough to 
maximize gain in the current and next period. Therefore, the GENCOs will seek to maximize 
total gain over the next several periods. However, not knowing (or being unaware of) their 
competitors’ future output decisions will make it difficult for any one GENCO to predict its 
rivals’ behavior [31][32]. Faced with this difficulty, a GENCO may adjust its own output 
expectation of the current period according to both the output of the last period and the 
expected output in the next subsequent period. In addition, each GENCO will probably rely 
upon other information it gathers over time, especially the data which will most likely 
influence its present choice. In other words, when the same bidder plays the same opponents 
multiple times, we would expect that the bidding agents will adjust their own behaviors to 
maximize their profits [32]. The earliest model of oligopolistic market behavior states that 
every firm in the market deducts some “expectations” about the reactions of all other firms in 
the play. Such expectations are best known as conjectural variations (CV), a term derived 
from game theory [33]. The concept of dynamic CV and its relationship to equilibrium 
behavior in a two-period Cournot model with imperfect information about the market 
demand is introduced by Riordan in [34]. Thus, changes in one firm’s output in the current 
period cause the market price to change, and therefore influence the rivals’ estimates about 
future demand. In this setting, a firm perceives that an increase in its output decreases the 
current market price, causing rival firms to estimate that demand has gone down and in 
reaction they reduce their output in the following period [35]. 
Recently, there has been considerable interest in oligopoly models with “consistent” 
conjectural variations. A conjectural variation is considered consistent if it is equivalent to 
the optimal response of the other firms at the equilibrium defined by that conjecture [36]. A 
general treatment of consistent conjectural variations in an oligopoly model with a 
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homogeneous product is reported in [37]. The existence and uniqueness of consistent CV 
equilibrium in electricity markets is investigated in [38]. By identifying the market’s 
optimum characteristics and applying an infinite horizon optimization model, it is shown that 
the consistent conjecture variation will satisfy a set of coupled nonlinear equations and that 
there will be only a single equilibrium. A CV-based learning method for a generation firm 
intending to improve its strategic bidding performance is proposed in [39]. Using this 
method, each firm learns and dynamically regulates its conjectures upon the reactions of its 
rivals to its own bidding in agreement with the available information, and only then makes its 
optimal generation decision based on the updated CV of its rivals. A parameter inference 
procedure based on two stages is proposed in [40]. The first stage infers historical values of 
the parameter by fitting the models’ results to historical market data. The second stage is 
based on a statistical time-series model whose objective is to forecast parameter values in 
future scenarios. 
A method for estimating the CVs of GENCOs is presented in [32]. Based on an actual 
electricity market, an empirical methodology is also proposed to analyze the dynamic 
oligopoly behaviors underlying market power. A new, unified framework of electricity 
market analysis based on co-evolutionary computation for both the one-shot and the repeated 
games of oligopolistic electricity market is reported in [41].  
The need to make adjustable market decisions in a rapidly changing environment has 
encouraged the development of new procedures [42]. Among them is the Forward 
Expectations (FE) model [43]. We have introduced Forward expectations to accomplish with 
this learning process. This integration is crucial for two reasons: forward expectations teach a 
GENCO how its current stock valuation is affected (since stocks are the physical link 
between successive periods, and the valuation will transform expectations about future 
trading into desires to exchange current goods), and they are based on available information, 
i.e., the stream of past and present price-quantity signals [44]. In today’s competitive, volatile 
markets, accurate modeling of both the operational and temporal constraints of all of its 
generating units may give a GENCO the “edge” over its competition.  
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Even what appears to be an insignificant constraint can quickly alter a GENCO’s market 
strategies [45]. For example, the strategic use of ramp rates beyond elastic limits in 
generation dispatch has been investigated in [46], because they incur ramping costs and also 
widen the possible range of energy delivery. A detailed formulation to model the power 
trajectories followed by a thermal unit during start-up and shut-down processes, as well as 
the ramping limitations when increasing or decreasing power is reported in [47]. In [48] 
intertemporal decisions related with maintenance decisions are reported. In an electricity 
market with only a few major competing GENCOs, maintenance plays a critical role that 
goes beyond traditional least-cost analysis. We have implemented a rigorous formulation of 
the ramping constraints to analyze the effect of intertemporal constraints on a GENCO’s 
decision-making process. 
 
1.4 Objective 
This dissertation supports generation asset business decisions, from fuel supply concerns 
to wholesale trading in energy and ancillary services. The forces influencing the value chain 
are changing rapidly, and can become highly controversial. Through this dissertation, the 
author proposes an integrated and objective perspective, providing a forum to identify and 
address common planning and operational needs. 
The objective of this dissertation is to propose and develop theories and ideas that can be 
applied directly in algorithms to make GENCOs decisions more efficient. This will 
decompose the decision-making problem into independent subproblems for each time 
interval. This is preferred because building a complete model in one time is practically 
impossible. The diverse scope of this dissertation is unified by the importance of each topic 
to understanding or enhancing the profitability of generation assets. Studies of top strategic 
issues will assess directly the promise and limits to profitability of energy trading, the 
business risks represented by overbuilding and the logic of determining how much to spend 
on power plants. Studies of ancillary services will permit companies to realistically gauge the 
  
14
profitability of different services, and develop bidding strategies tuned to competitive 
markets. 
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The algorithms and models developed and the conceptual ideas reported in this 
dissertation were useful in the preparation of the following conferences and journals articles 
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CHAPTER 2 SPOT FUEL MARKET’S INFLUENCE ON THE SPOT 
ELECTRICITY MARKET USING LEONTIEF MODEL 
 
A paper published in the 2003 IEEE Bologna PowerTech 
 
Guillermo Gutiérrez, Member, IEEE, and Gerald B. Sheblé, Fellow, IEEE 
 
Abstract 
Nowadays, the new electric industry has segmented the vertically integrated utility into a 
horizontally integrated set of companies. This segmentation promotes competition in the 
different sectors (Generation, Transmission, and Distribution). However, generation presents 
the highest level of competitiveness. Generation is not only involved in selling power but 
also ancillary services. Prices of energy are directly related with prices in fuel such that any 
variation in fuel prices will be reflected in energy prices to consumers. Therefore, the 
operation of the electricity market is related with other markets, such as fuel markets, 
transportation markets, and environmental markets. This document presents an overview of 
fuel markets impact in the electricity spot market. Leontief energy model is used to model 
the interaction among the different markets in a more global viewpoint. The interaction of 
markets is analyzed by simulating an energy market with small number of participants. 
 
Index Terms—Energy markets, electricity competition, electricity generation.  
 
 
I. NOMENCLATURE 
The main mathematical symbols used throughout this paper are classified below 
   x = vector of total output 
M, A = nxn matrix of input/output coefficients 
d = vector of final demand 
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I = identity matrix 
ty  = vector of final deliveries 
B = nxn matrix of nonnegative capital coefficients 
  h, k = 1, . . . , m regions  
s = 1, . . . , r fossil fuel types 
hd  = market demand for electricity in region h 
hsf  = supply of fuel s in region h  
hkst  = amount of fuel s sent from region h to region k. 
hksc  = per unit shipping costs of sending fuel s from region h to region k. 
hkw  = KWh of electricity sent from region h to region k 
hsx  = amount of electricity for region h produced by burning fuel s 
hsa  = amount of fuel s needed to produce one unit of electricity in region h. 
hsb  = unit operating cost for producing electricity at region k from fuel s 
hkg  = unit cost of power loss when sending energy (KWH) from region h to region k 
hsX  = upper bound of hsx  
 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Electric industry has segmented the vertically integrated utility into a horizontally 
integrated set of companies.  Therefore, the production decisions are decentralized as well as 
consumption decisions, and are made in fact by each one of the independent utilities [1].  
The operation of the electricity market is strongly related with other markets, such as fuel 
markets, transportation or environmental markets. Any decision of those markets will impact 
the electric energy market. Thus, for the analysis of the market interactions is necessary to 
understand energy market behavior. Partial equilibrium analysis is considered to 
understanding the market behavior itself, but it isolates markets, assuming that the changes in 
the equilibrium conditions in each market do not affect any of the other markets in the 
economy and that changes in other markets do not affect the market under consideration [2, 
3]. 
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With deregulation, the traditional plant merit-order base load generation is no longer 
guaranteed as such, because, now it is possible to have different fuel generation plants 
supplying base load demand according with fuel price variations and Generation Companies 
(GENCOs) marketing strategies. GENCOs must compete in a market environment where 
their decisions focus on activities over a month-to-month basis. The effort in such decisions 
is to manage effectively and efficiently the product flow in the strategically planned supply 
chain with uncertainties in both sides of the chain (inputs and outputs).  
Nowadays, each GENCO has to contract fuel in a most optimal way that permits them to 
participate in the electricity market without incurring any negative profits. Thus GENCOs 
must build a portfolio of contracts for fuel purchases [4]. Controlling fuel cost, then, becomes 
the essential input variable for GENCOs strategies. It must be controlled in order not to 
swamp the revenues of the project over the time. Fuel costs must be flexible not only with 
regard to fuel input markets, but also with respect to power sale output markets. Operating a 
portfolio of fuel types GENCOs add more flexibility in generation. But, to build such 
portfolio requires taking into account all potential fuel contracts characteristics, 
transportation contracts, storage/consumption commodity and other services (uncertainty in 
inputs). 
This paper presents an overview of the fuel markets externalities, embodied in fuel price 
variations, impacting the electricity spot market from GENCOs’ perspective. The Leontief 
energy model is used to model the interaction among the different markets in a more global 
viewpoint. Porter’s five forces bridge markets relationships in the Leontief model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section III describes briefly the Porter’s 
five forces to evaluate the potential profit of an industry in the competitive environment and 
the role of Fuel substitutes on the electricity production and hence in the electricity market. 
Section IV presents the storage model. Static and Dynamic Leontief Model are presented in 
Section V. In section VI the Static Input-Output (I-O) Model applied to the energy market is 
described. Section VII presents examples of the interaction of Fuel markets with the power 
exchange electricity market. Conclusions are given in section VIII. 
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III. PORTER FIVE FORCES MODEL 
In the new paradigm aggressiveness will depend on different factors such as number of 
competitors, competitor’s strategies, market substitutes, among others. Those factors are 
represented in the Porter’s five forces model [5, 6]. 
The Porter’s model brings the big picture to evaluate the potential profit of an industry in 
the competitive environment. 
The five forces are: 
 
1) Barriers to entry; 
2) Rivalry among existing competitors; 
3) Substitutes; 
4) Power of Buyers; 
5) Power of Suppliers. 
 
Each of those five forces collectively impacts the potential profit and jointly determines 
the intensity of the industry competition and profitability. In order to analyze the specific 
activities through which firms can create a competitive advantage, it is useful to model the 
firm as a chain of value-creating strategies taking in consideration the five forces. The goal 
of these strategies is to create value that exceeds the cost of providing the product or service, 
thus generating a profit margin. 
Clearly, there is a need for a mechanism through which these five forces can be 
integrated together. Supply chain management is a strategy through which such integration 
can be accomplished. The value chain describes the full range of required activities to bring a 
product or service from conception, through the intermediary phases of production, delivery 
to final consumers [7].  
Figure 2.1 represents seller’s bids as a function of Porter’s forces in the electricity supply 
chain. Note that substitutes are present and they influence customer behavior. Buyer’s bids 
are also function of the five forces. 
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Figure 2.1 Seller and consumer bids as a function of Porter’s forces in electricity supply chain 
 
Market prices will drive GENCOs’ decisions based on GENCOs’ expectations. In a 
perfect competition dynamic market, supply-demand will stabilize prices helped on 
substitutes. Fuel price variations -substitutes- would modify expected GENCOs’ strategies 
such as electricity price must be below the substitute prices, unless GENCO is involved in 
selling fuel. Under this condition, higher substitute prices, GENCOs face two different 
scenarios: 
 
1. Market clearing price below GENCOs’ price. When market clearing price is below 
GENCOs’ own price, implies that GENCOs’ are not delivering power since exits 
cheapest generators which impose the market clearing price. However, GENCOs will 
probably decide to continue generating (banking) given their expectations of demand 
behavior in the next hours as well as operational constraints such as minimum and 
maximum times up/down 
 
2. Market Clearing Price above GENCOs’ price. GENCOs are selling energy at a profit.  
 
Fuel Spot prices change in time and new possible scenarios are likely to turn up. When 
prices of substitutes are below of the market price, substitutes will be used by consumers, 
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such as natural gas for heating. Changes in electricity spot prices and other services, give real 
time value to each one of the services or product. We define this as real time option pricing. 
In the energy market, auctions are used for finding the equilibrium price-quantity each 
trading period for the different products or services. Since each trading period is carried out 
in advance -24 hrs in the case of electricity- auctions have a component for the future value 
of each product.  
During GENCOs participation and according with market behavior it is possible 
GENCOs make negative profits in several trading periods, however the whole expected 
profit should be positive. Figure 2.2 shows graphically the expected GENCOs’ Cash Flow 
Diagram, CFD. Negative profits can occur when GENCOs were not committed for a trading 
period and it keep generating according with its expectative behavior of the market demand, 
input prices variation, and its best response strategy. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 An example of GENCOs’ Cash Flow Diagram 
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given the future uncertainty, but it is only necessary to estimate it with enough accuracy to 
justify future investments. 
Strategic decisions, then, must integrate above mentioned aspects of the supply chain. 
Operational decisions address the day-to-day, month-to-month, operation of the supply chain 
where each product would contribute to total revenue. Strategic decision can be assisted by 
the use of financial markets. The ability to effectively manage price volatility through the 
financial market is important in determining the financial condition of market participants in 
the short term [8]. Price volatility is a key element of risk and therefore financial risk 
management.  
 
IV. STORAGE MODEL 
In a competitive commodity market subject to stochastic fluctuations in production 
and/or consumption, producers will hold inventories. Producers hold inventories in order to 
diminish costs of adjusting production over time. Industrial consumers of a commodity also 
hold inventories, to facilitate their own production processes. However, in the case of 
electricity, given that it cannot be stored, GENCOs will storage fuel (Oil, Coal, etc) for 
generating electricity [9].  
With deregulation, electricity becomes more of a commodity-driven business. The Plant 
becomes a merchant plant -it must compete in a market environment month to month to sell 
its output. Therefore the GENCO will compare wholesale electric prices to wholesale fuel 
prices to determine whether to operate a gas fired electric power plant or sell its gas fuel in 
the wholesale market. Some of the time, fuel and electric prices move in a similar direction, 
but in some markets, nearly half of the time they move opposite directions. This allows for 
arbitrage of fuel and electric commodities in volatile markets. Therefore, GENCOs must 
decide whether to produce [10]. In this document we restricted our study to the electricity 
market. 
The motives for storing fuel are similar to those for holding inventories. Those motives 
are: Transaction, Speculation and Precautionary Motives [11].  
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A Transaction motive bridges the gap between supply and demand since the time path of 
the commodity’s demand may not be synchronized with time path of the commodity’s 
supply. 
The possibility to sell or use the commodity later than now, if prices are expected to 
increase over time is represented by speculative motive. Precautionary motive becomes more 
intense because the uncertainty on the demand, sales prices and supplies prices. 
The use of storage plays an important role according with expected strategies of 
participants in each commodity market. The objective of the firm is to obtain the required 
amount of the commodity in such a way to minimize the difference between profits from 
speculation and the cost of obtaining the commodity for productive purposes. For instance, 
Natural Gas suppliers can speculate in the respective market, which may modify prices in 
other markets and consequently prices in electricity. The model in [11] is considered in our 
model. 
In any other commodity market the firm can buy, sell, deliver or store the commodity. 
This applies for the case of fuel but not for electricity. Storage is considered in this document 
as part of GENCOs’ decision variables and its effect is internalized in each period bids. 
 
V. THE LEONTIEF MODEL 
Wassily Leontief developed one of the most interesting theories in economics, the theory 
of input-output, I-O. This theory allows to represents the interdependencies among various 
productive sectors of an economy in which goods are produced in those industries by main of 
primary factor. A sector is an industry or group of industries. The desired result is the gross 
output needed to cover final and intermediate demands arising from other sectors given the 
final demand for the outputs of all sectors [11].  
The interdependence among the sectors of the given economy can be described by a set 
of linear equations expressing the balances between the total input and the aggregate output 
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of each commodity and service produced and used in the course of one or several periods of 
time [11, 12]. 
In our framework, the Leontief model is a spatial model of the flow of fuels to the 
generation utilities, and transmission and distribution of electricity. Unit fuel costs consist of 
the market price of the fuel at the point of delivery plus transportation costs. Depending upon 
its proximity to coal, gas pipelines, and oil distribution centers, each utility will choose a 
combination of activities for generating electricity that minimizes costs and allow them to 
diversify their energy services portfolio. Figure 2.3 represents a typical energy market 
structure. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Representative structure integration of the industries in the energy market 
 
 
A. Static I-O Model 
The static I-O model is characterized for one stage on which everything is needed to 
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This type of problem is one that involves the state of the economy and not process of change 
[11, 12]. 
The structure of each productive sector is represented by an appropriately defined vector 
of structural coefficients that describes quantitatively the relationship between the inputs 
from sector i required to support one unit of output of sector j, which can be expressed in 
matrix form as follows: 
 
x Mx d= +                                                                                                                               (1) 
 
The equation (1) implies that internal demand plus final demand must be satisfied. 
Rearranging equation (1) yields: 
 
( )I M x d− =                                                                                                                          (2) 
 
Assuming that ( ) 1I M −−  exists, then: 
 
( ) 1x I M d−= −                                                                                                                        (3) 
 
since 0x ≥   is required to yield economic interpretation, then 0d ≥ and ( ) 1 0I M −− ≥  
The Leontief system is often used to compute the economic impact of a given change in 
final demand. The initial conditions and the stimulus are propagated through the economy as 
each producer places orders for changes in inputs.  Note that total production must equal the 
sum of the final demands plus all intermediate stage demands, which can be represented as: 
 
2 3x d Md M d M d= + + + +K                                                                                                (4) 
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Comparing with the input-output relation above: 
 
( ) 1 2 3I M I M M M−− = + + + +K                                                                                         (5) 
 
Notice the triple effect throughout the economy. Using the vector of prices, p, for the 
various products, equilibrium is found when: 
 
( ) 0p I M x d− − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦                                                                                                              (6) 
 
B. Dynamic I-O Model 
Dynamic I-O model derives from the static through consideration of rates of change over 
time of industry interdependences. Dynamic model reflects changes in time and take into 
account model components that are constantly changing as a result of previous actions or 
future expectations. 
A primary distinction of a static model versus dynamic model is the scope of examining 
intra-period relationships. Dynamic economic modeling involves an understanding of how 
phenomena within an interval are related to activities outside the interval yet within the 
period of study [13]. 
 
( ) ( )1t t t tI A x B x x y+− − − =                                                                                                     (7) 
 
It is assumed that there are none changes in technology such as coefficients of A and B 
matrices remain constant over time. 
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VI. STATIC I-O IN THE ENERGY MODEL 
The production chain of the generation and delivery of electricity to consumers includes 
fuel transportation, generation, transmission and distribution of electricity through a 
transmission network. The optimization problem can be formulated mathematically as:  
 
Minimize 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
m r m m m m r
hs hs hk hk hks hks
h s h k h k s
b x g w c t
= = = = = = =
+ +∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑∑  
Subject to ( )
1 1
r m
hs kh kh h
s k
x w w d
= =
+ − ≥∑ ∑                                                                              (8) 
    ( )
1
m
hs hs khs hks hs
k
a x t t f
=
− − ≤∑  
                       hshs Xx ≤  
                  0,, ≥hkshkhs twx  
 
The objective function minimizes the production costs of each unit, the different fuel 
transportation costs, and transaction costs among participants. Transaction costs not 
necessarily refers to bilateral contracts of commodities but also financial. Constraints 
represent electricity balance, fuel balance, upper bounds, and minimum capability. 
The model takes into consideration fuel networks, but transportation costs are bearing for 
final consumers in each market. Moreover, we assume that networks externalities are 
internalized in each market by means of commodity prices. 
Since Leontief Model allows to representing intermediate products and services for the 
different sectors is possible to value each one of this products or services. The model can 
capture the revenue/cost for electricity production as well as Ancillary Services.  
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VII. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
The following examples illustrate the impact of the fuel markets in the electricity market, 
by using the Leontief Model. The energy market is consisted of oil, coal, natural gas, and 
electricity markets for sake of simplicity.  
In the electricity Market, 4 GENCOs compete for supplying the demand of 2 Distribution 
Companies, DISCOs (See Figure 2.3). GENCOs are participating in Power Exchange and 
their decisions are focused in level of production and time. For simplicity we assume that 
each GENCO produce energy base on one fuel type. 
The trading period demand is 53 MWh. Table 2.1 shows the complementary information 
of the system and the optimal generation output. Since prices are imposed directly from fuel 
markets and transportation fuel cost in our model, GENCO 3 presents the larger production 
cost and hence its output is zero. 
 
Table 2.1 Fuel type, fuel costs, capacity and optimal output generation 
GENCO Fuel Cost  
M-$/M-KWh 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Output  
(MW) 
1 N. Gas 280 22 22 
2 Coal 310 25 25 
3 Coal 420 20 0 
4 Oil 380 30 6 
 
 
Figure 2.4 represents the energy markets interaction in a matrix form. Fuel markets are 
linked trough GENCOs production to Electricity Market. In addition, given that our 
examples do not consider transactions among fuel markets and in order to make clear partial 
equilibrium, elements off the diagonal are displayed as zero in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.4 Seller Energy market structure in matrix representation 
The next section presents an extensive example of the previous one; we will extend our 
study for 32 (every 15 minutes) trading periods. The demand pattern is depicted in Figure 
2.5. 
Figure 2.5 Demand pattern 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the fuel prices. Fuel prices are considered to be settled hourly. 
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From Figure 2.6 we can observe how fuel prices are correlated. Prices of Oil and Coal are 
negatively correlated, prices of Oil and Natural Gas are positively correlated and prices of 
Coal and Natural Gas are negatively correlated. 
Variation in fuel spot prices will reach the electricity market almost instantaneously, 
since storability of fuel has been neglected, and therefore this would modify GENCOs’ 
strategies in the very short run.  
Figure 2.7 presents the generation output for the 32 trading periods. We can observe how 
output changes when fuel prices change. For instance, GENCO 4 resulted to be the cheapest 
and therefore produces during the 32 periods. It happens because GENCO 4 presents the 
lower production costs even when input prices vary.  However, this is not the case for the 
others. Given that GENCO 2 and 3 uses coal as input their behavior is positively correlated. 
GENCO 2 has lower production cost that GENCO 3, and hence GENCO 3 produces after 
GENCO 2 reaches its maximum limit. It occurs during the last 8 periods. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Generation outputs 
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During periods 4 and 18 prices in coal increases whereas prices in Natural Gas decreases 
–negatively correlated. As consequence of these price variations, GENCO1 produces its 
maximum power and GENCO 2 supplies the remaining demand. Throughout periods 19 to 
24 GENCO 1 produces small amount of power due to fuel prices variations -at that time 
results the marginal unit. 
The analysis allows us to observe the impact of fuel prices in the GENCOs’ strategies for 
participating in the electricity spot market. In our model we consider that unit commitment, 
UC, is part of GENCOs’ own strategies and GENCOs are participating to supply the market 
demand, this is a decentralized market structure.  
The next example illustrates the effect of storage in the electricity market. The storage of 
electricity is economically impractical; therefore storage has to be done in terms of fuel. The 
example considers 3 periods and the 4 GENCOs compete for demand in the market. This 
analysis considered initial storage and none final volume restriction. Each GENCO has a 
maximum capacity of 40 MWs. Table 2.2 reports the information used in this simulation. 
 
Table 2.2 Fuel prices and demand for the 3 periods 
Time 
Period 
Oil 
($/bbl) 
Coal 
($/ton) 
Natural Gas 
($/MMBTUs) 
Demand 
(MW) 
1 26.21 1.10 2.164 120 
2 26.16 1.16 2.210 150 
3 25.45 1.24 2.383 80 
 
Assuming fuel prices settled daily, the solution is presented in Table 2.3. Whereas Table 
2.4 presents results assuming fuel prices settled hourly. 
 
Table 2.3 Powers at each period (period = 1day) 
Time 
Period 
GENCO 1 
(MW) 
GENCO 2 
(MW) 
GENCO 3 
(MW) 
GENCO 4 
(MW) 
1 40 40 40 0 
2 40 40 40 30 
3 40 0 40 0 
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Table 2.4 Powers at each period (period = 1hr) 
Time 
Period 
GENCO 1 
(MW) 
GENCO 2 
(MW) 
GENCO 3 
(MW) 
GENCO 4 
(MW) 
1 40 40 40 0 
2 30 40 40 40 
3 0 40 0 40 
 
From tables 2.3 and 2.4, we can observe how prices affect GENCOs’ production. The use 
of storage provides flexibility for producing electricity. But, the use of storage is usually 
driven in contrary directions by reliability and economic considerations. Reliability 
recommends high storage capacity, whereas economics suggest low inventories, since 
inventories represents an investment of capital. 
Until now, we considered GENCOs produce based on a single sort of fuel and they just 
participate producing/selling electricity. However, in order to survive in the competitive 
market GENCOs must to diversify their energy production, based on fuel portfolio. Hence 
our analysis can be trap as a company consisting of 4 units with a diversified fuel portfolio. 
Moreover, GENCOs would be able to participating selling fuel. Figure 2.8 represent 
GENCOs’ I-O market participation. Electricity Market can be consisted of Power Exchange 
as well as several ancillary services. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 GENCOs’ I-O market participation 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper addresses market interactions in the electricity supply chain by means of I-O 
model. Partial equilibrium is considered for each market and its integration is represented by 
prices which embodied independent externalities. Hence, the constraints imposed in the 
electricity market by the other markets would influence the collapse of the Electricity 
Market. Evidently, it is important to define the markets to be included and why they are 
included.  
Nowadays, electricity markets have been decomposed into several markets, for instance, 
Power Exchange and Ancillary Services market. Our discussion has been focused just in the 
Power Exchange market, but ancillary services are provided such the power system allows 
the transactions committed in the market. GENCOs will need to find a value for each of the 
ancillary services which contribute to the economic profit every trading period.  
GENCOs’ best marketing strategy is not only based on outputs but also on inputs, where 
both are driven by markets forces. The expected profit is the contribution of the several 
products of services in where GENCOs are participating and this has to be positive. 
However, it is possible that GENCOs incurs in negative profits during trading periods. 
However the net expected profit should be positive. The estimation of the future cash stream 
is difficult given the future uncertainty, but it is only necessary to estimate it with enough 
accuracy to justify future investments. Future Cash Flow can be estimated by using I-O 
model given that it allows to representing and valuating intermediate products and services 
for the different sectors.  
In the examples presented we considered static conditions for each interval. Therefore, 
the use of static conditions as well as partial equilibrium permit us to observe the big picture 
of the interrelation markets in the production chain of the generation and delivery of 
electricity to final consumers by using Leontief model. 
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CHAPTER 3 MODELING ENERGY MARKET DYNAMICS USING 
DISCRETE EVENTS SYSTEM SIMULATION 
 
A paper submitted in the International Journal of Energy 
 
G. Gutiérrez-Alcaraz, and Gerald B. Sheblé 
 
3.1 Abstract 
This paper proposes the use of Discrete Event System Simulation to study the 
interactions among fuel and electricity markets and consumers, and the decision-making 
processes of fuel companies (FUELCOs), generation companies (GENCOs), and consumers 
in a simple artificial energy market. In reality, since markets can reach a stable equilibrium 
or fail, it is important to observe how they behave in a dynamic framework. We consider a 
Nash-Cournot model in which marketers are depicted as Nash-Cournot players that 
determine supply to meet end-use consumption. Detailed engineering considerations such as 
transportation network flows are omitted, because the focus is upon the selection and use of 
appropriate market models to provide answers to policy questions. 
 
Index Terms—Cournot model, energy market modelling, market dynamics  
 
3.2 Introduction 
The electricity industry operates by means of a supply chain that extends from generating 
station to end-users. Each link in the chain is crucial to the chain’s integrity. Actors at each 
level, organized as markets, make decisions that have ramifications throughout the chain. 
The quality of any given decision depends on the quality of the knowledge available to the 
decision-maker. As a result, the dissemination of accurate information is critical if the supply 
chain is to operate effectively [1][2]. Conventional optimization techniques are no longer 
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adequate to answer important questions about the stability and dynamic evolution of each 
supply chain activity because the behavior of each market participant is unknown.  
In recent years, the total number of available energy models has grown tremendously and 
the models themselves vary considerably. The question arises about how to select the model 
most suited to a specific purpose. A classification scheme will provide insights about the 
differences and similarities, thus facilitating the selection of the appropriate methodology 
[27]. Several models have been developed for policy analysis, forecasting, and to support 
global or local energy planning in an effort to better understand the interplay between the 
macro-economy and energy use. Generally, these models focus on a long-term planning 
horizon and their underlying methodology is based on macro-economic approaches and 
market equilibrium models. 
In general, the energy market has been studied separately because liberalization of the 
different markets (i.e. natural gas, coal, oil, etc) has occurred sequentially. Consequently, the 
markets present varying levels of maturity. Methodologies and tools developed for these 
previously liberalized markets are being applied to today’s electricity market. Market models 
for natural gas are numerous and varied. GRIDNET is a detailed model of the North 
American natural gas system but from the gas transactions and operational perspective [28]. 
The Gas Systems Analysis Model (GSAM) is another North American natural gas market 
model with a very detailed supply side representation consisting of over 17,000 production 
reservoirs with about 200 variables each. The Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution 
Module (NGTDM) simulates market equilibrium prices, flows, and quantities using a 
heuristic algorithm; previous versions of NGTDM used a linear programming formulation 
for computing market equilibria [29]. These models provided detailed level analyses based 
on a competitive market assumption and cover many aspects of the North American system. 
Energy models have been developed to support local energy planning and recently to 
observe the effects of interdependencies in the case of terrorist attacks [3][4][5]. However, 
analyses to date have focused mainly on the interrelation between the energy sector and the 
larger economy over time. A useful example is the computer-based National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS) in the United States that models energy markets driven by the 
fundamental economic interactions of supply and demand [6]. Additional large-scale energy 
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models include Electricity Markets Complex Adaptive Systems (EMCAS) and Energy and 
Power Evaluation Program (ENPEP) [7][8]. EMCAS is an agent-based modeling system 
used to simulate various market operating rules [7], while ENPEP is a set of integrated 
energy, environmental, and economic analysis and planning tools [8]. A supply chain 
network perspective for electric power production, supply, transmission, and consumption is 
presented in [9]. Various decision-makers operating in a decentralized manner such as 
generation companies, transmission companies and market consumers are modeled. A novel 
electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the 
economic network transactions in energy supply chains and the physical network 
transmission constraints in the electric power network is reported in [30]. The theoretical 
derivation and analyses use the theory of variational inequalities. In [10] the authors present 
market integration and agent participation in a multiple-market framework using the Leontief 
model. Static conditions for each interval and partial equilibrium analysis are considered. 
[11] shows how to replace the inter-industry component of the Leontief model by a few 
surrogate constraints corresponding to the industries associated with the sector of interest. 
A generalized network flow model of a national, integrated energy system that 
incorporates production, storage, and transportation of coal, natural gas, and electricity in a 
single mathematical framework for a medium-term analysis has been reported in [12][13]. 
The model focuses on the economic interdependencies of the integrated system along with a 
detailed characterization of their functionalities (supply, demand, storage, and transportation) 
within a single analytical framework that allows for their simultaneous study. 
This paper provides a dynamic model to study the interactions among fuel and electricity 
markets and consumers, and the decision-making processes of fuel companies (FUELCOs), 
generation companies (GENCOs), and consumers in a simple artificial energy market. We 
construct a simple artificial energy market to: (1) maintain tractability; (2) obtain theoretical 
results; and (3) develop intuitions about economic complexity. We assume the existence of 
hourly spot electricity and fuel markets where few producers compete to supply markets 
demand. The problem is formulated using Discrete Event System Simulation (DESS), also 
known as discrete control theory. DESS differs from agent-based computational simulation 
methods such as Multiagent Resource Allocation (MARA) in that time is represented in 
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discrete quanta or units called ticks. Participant behaviors that occur within a tick are 
reported in aggregate as a tick-final state. The aggregation of behaviors across ticks 
decreases the elevated importance of individualistic participant traits that confound agent-
based simulations when environments with few participants are examined. With DESS, it is 
possible to retain a focus on select variables or participant behaviors and these behaviors are 
seen to vary smoothly with time [14][15]. In our model, decision-makers, FUELCOs and 
GENCOs, utilize adaptive expectations to forecast their competitors’ actions [16]. When 
companies are willing to make trade-offs between present and future profits, it is critical to 
incorporate learning strategies in the decision-making. For example, GENCO i may 
understand so little about its rival’s past actions and the underlying rationales that GENCO i 
comes to believe (“static assumption”) and accept that the circumstances it observes in the 
immediate past will repeat themselves. Adaptive expectations posit that future values may be 
calculated on the basis of previous values. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the energy market supply chain 
and the role of information in the new market environment. Section III describes the energy 
market model considered in the development of its mathematical formulation. In Section IV, 
a case study is used to present our model using numerical data. Section V details a sensitivity 
analysis and Section VI discusses computational issues. Section VII offers conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
3.3 Energy Market Supply Chain 
Energy models generally tend towards an economic equilibrium between consuming and 
producing sectors: Raw materials flow in one direction; orders and money in the other; and 
the flow of information in both directions. These flows of capital, raw materials, and 
information link the individual components of the system to form a supply chain. 
In today’s liberalized markets where it is possible that end-users can also be suppliers, 
information and commodities can flow in both directions as shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Schematic information flowing in the electricity supply chain 
 
The new electricity markets allow consumers to sell power back to the market through 
contractual agreements that are usually components of demand-side management programs. 
Although some utilities are wary of demand-side programs that may affect revenue, in most 
cases, both the short- and long-term savings from demand-side programs outweigh costs. 
3.4 Energy Model 
Dynamic simulations allow the researcher to observe system changes over time so that 
s/he may understand how the system is likely to evolve, predict probable future system 
behaviors, and determine how to influence probable future behaviors [17][18].  
This section describes the dynamic model developed to study the interactions between 
two FUELCOs, two GENCOs, and an aggregated consumer within the following markets: 
(1) A fuel market for GENCOs, and (2) an electricity market and (3) a fuel market for 
consumers (Figure 3.2 below). Time is considered to be discrete [19]. In the discrete form, 
system state space model is: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1X k A k X k B k U k
Y k C k X k D k U k
+ = +
= +                                                                                       (1) 
 
Where k is the time period index, ( )X k is the vector of state variables, ( )U k is the vector 
of input variables, ( )Y k is the vector of output variables and , , ,A B C D are system matrices 
function of k [14]. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 An energy market system 
A. Consumer decision-making 
The consumer wants to minimize the total cost of energy:  
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where fcP is the price in the consumer fuel market, fcq is the fuel quantity the consumer 
purchased, ecP  is the price in the consumer electric market, and ecq is the electricity quantity 
the consumer purchased, fch  is the heat coefficient of fuel, ech  is the heat coefficient of 
electricity, Heat is the minimum amount of heat the consumer needs, min
ecQ is the minimum 
requirement for electricity, and min
fcQ is the minimum requirement for fuel. Consumption of 
fuel and electricity depends on fuel and electricity prices. The substitution effect of fuel and 
electricity is included. 
 
B. FUELCOs’ decision-making 
The two FUELCOs want to maximize total profit in both the fuel and consumer fuel 
markets: 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),fc f f fc fc f f fc fi i i i iq qMax k P k q k P k q k FC q k q kπ ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦                                     (3) 
 
where fP is the inverse demand function in the fuel market, fiq is the fuel quantity in the fuel 
market, and FC is the fuel production cost function. The FUELCOs’ decisions are based on 
their estimates of each other’s actions in both markets. We assume that both GENCOs know 
the inverse demand function. Consider that fcP  is a linear final-consumers fuel market-
demand function given by ( ) ( )( )fc fc fc fcP k a b Q k= −  where ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆfc fc fci jQ k q k q k= + , 
,fc fca b  are fuel market consumers’ demand parameters, and ( )ˆ fcjq k is fuel consumer i’s 
estimate of fuel consumer j’s output at period k. Similarly for the fuel market, 
( )( ) ( )( )f f f fP k a b Q k= − , where ( ) ( ) ( )ˆf f fi jQ k q k q k= + , ,f fa b  are fuel market demand 
parameters, and ( )ˆ fjq k is FUELCO i’s estimate of FUELCO j’s output at period k. 
When the fuel production function is linear, the fuel market and consumer fuel market are 
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decoupled. 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
ˆ ˆ
fc f
f fc fc fc fc fc f f f f f
i i j i i j i
q q
fc f
i i
Max k a b q k q k q k a b q k q k q k
FC q k q k
π ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
        (4) 
 
Assuming that the fuel production is quadratic, the fuel market and consumer fuel market 
are coupled: 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
2
0 1 2
ˆ ˆ
fc f
f fc fc fc fc fc f f f f f
i i j i i j i
q q
f fc f fc
f f i i f i i
Max k a b q k q k q k a b q k q k q k
c c q k q k c q k q k
π ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
       (5) 
 
where 0 1 2, ,f f fc c c are coefficients of the production cost function 
According to the first order condition, we have:  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2ˆ2 2 0
f
f f f f f f fci
i j f f i if
i
k
a b q k b q k c c q k q k
q k
π∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − + =⎣ ⎦∂                                (6) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2ˆ2 2 0
f
fc fc fc fc fc f fci
i j f f i ifc
i
k
a b q k b q k c c q k q k
q k
π∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − + =⎣ ⎦∂                             (7) 
 
Therefore, the FUELCOs will employ adaptive expectation and effective forecasting 
techniques to help them to learn from the past and to make more “profitable” decisions 
[20][21]. Under adaptive expectation, the FUELCOs adjust the output expectation of their 
competitors according to each competitor’s output and the forecasting error in the last period. 
As an example, when FUELCO i adopts adaptive expectation in two markets, it yields: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1f f f f fj j j j jq k q k q k q kβ= − + − − −                                                                      (8) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1fc fc fc fc fcj j j j jq k q k q k q kβ= − + − − −                                                                    (9) 
 
Where β  is adjusting coefficient and [ ]0,1β ∈ . 
By substituting these expectations into the profit, we can obtain the optimal fuel output in 
two markets for FUELCO i: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 2
ˆ2 1 1
ˆ 1 2 0
f
f f f f f f f fi
i j j jf
i
f f f f fc
j j f f i i
k
a b q k b q k b q k
q k
b q k c c q k q k
π β
β
∂ = − − − − −∂
⎡ ⎤+ − − − + =⎣ ⎦
                                                   (10) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 2
ˆ2 1 1
ˆ 1 2 0
f
fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fci
i j j jfc
i
fc fc fc f fc
j j f f i i
k
a b q k b q k b q k
q k
b q k c c q k q k
π β
β
∂ = − − − − −∂
⎡ ⎤+ − − − + =⎣ ⎦
                                                   (11) 
 
Simplifying previous equations (see appendix A for details), we can now express them 
as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ1 1f f f f f f f fc f fci i i j i j i i i iq k s s q k s q k s q k s q k= + − + − + +                                      (12) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ1 1fc fc fc f fc f fc fc fc fci i i i i i i j i jq k s s q k s q k s q k s q k= + + + − + −                                   (13) 
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Where 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4, , , , , , , , ,if icf if icf if icf if icf ifs s s s s s s s s and 4icfs are constants determined by fuel 
production cost function, fuel market demand, consumer fuel market demand, and 
expectation parameters. 
The fuel markets for GENCOs and for consumers are represented in matrix form 
(equations 8, 9, 10 and 13) by the following system state space equations: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 3 1 1 1 4 1 21
1 1 1 3 1 2 1 41
2 1 2 3 2 2 2 42
2 3 2 1 2 2 2 42
1 11
1 11
2
2
0 0 0 01
0 0 0 01
0 0 0 01
0 0 0 01
ˆ 0 0 0 1 0 0 01
ˆ 0 0 0 0 1 01
ˆ 1
ˆ 1
f f f ff
cf cf cf cffc
f f f ff
cf cf cf cffc
f ff
fc fcfc
f
fc
s s s sq k
s s s sq k
s s s sq k
s s s sq k
q k
q k
q k
q k
β β
β β
⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥ =⎢ ⎥ −+⎢ ⎥ −+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 01
1 01
2 02
2 02
1
1
2 2 2
2 2 2
ˆ 0
ˆ0 0
ˆ0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
ˆ0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
ff
cffc
ff
cffc
f
fc
f f f
fc fc fc
sq k
sq k
sq k
sq k
q k
q k
q k
q k
β β
β β
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
( )
( ) [ ]
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
0 0
0
ˆ0 0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
f
fc
f
f ff fc
fc fcfc f
fc
f
fc
q k
q k
q k
b bp k q k
b bp k q k
q k
q k
q k
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                  (14) 
 
C. GENCOs decision-making 
The GENCOs’ objective is to maximize profits. Assuming a linear electricity market-
demand function given by ( ) ( )( )e e e eP k a b Q k= − where ( ) ( ) ( )ˆe e ei jQ k q k q k= + , ,e ea b  are 
electricity market demand parameters, the profit of GENCO i is: 
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{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0ei g e e ei i ei i eiqMax k P k q k c q k cπ = − −                                                                          (15) 
 
Assuming the GENCOs use adaptive expectations to estimate their competitor’s actions 
[20] and according to the first order condition, we have  
 
( ) ( )1 1 ˆ1
2 2
e
e eei
i je
a cq k q k
b
−+ = −                                                                                              (17) 
 
Where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ .ej ej j ej ejq k q k q k q kβ= + −  Substituting in (16), reduces it to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 ˆ1
2 2 2
e ee
j je e eei
i j je
a cq k q k q k
b
β β−−+ = − −                                                                      (17) 
 
To describe GENCOs’ decision dynamics with adaptive expectation, choose 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1ˆ, , ,e e eq k q k q k and ( )2ˆeq k as state variables and market price as the output. The 
electricity market can then be represented by the following system (16)-(17). In the discrete-
time linear system we have: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1122
2111
1
22 21 1
1 1 1 1
1
2 2 22 2
2 22 2
1 0 0
ˆ ˆ1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0
ˆ ˆ1 0 0 1 0
e e
e
e e
e
a c
be e
e e
a c
e e b
e e
q k q k
q k q k
q k q k
q k q k
ββ
ββ
β β
β β
−−
−−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ + ⎤ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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( ) [ ]
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
2
2
ˆ
0 0
ˆ
e
e
e e e e
e
e
q k
q k
p k b b a
q k
q k
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= − − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                        (18) 
 
Since fuel price is a function of the fuel output of both companies in the fuel market, and 
it changes production cost for the GENCOs, it is a critical factor in GENCOs’ decision-
making; therefore production cost for both GENCOs can be represented as: 
 
( )' '1 0cost .fc e fci ei i eic p q k c p= −                                                                                                 (19) 
 
Next, we assume that the fuel price, for GENCOs, is given and is constant during their 
profit maximizing problem. Thus, we need only to modify the cost coefficient of the 
GENCOs’ production costs in the electricity market. The second term in the previous system 
is modified as: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
'
11 1 2
'
12 1 2
2
0
2
0
e f f f f
e
e
e f f f f
e
e
a c a b q k q k
b
a c a b q k q k
b
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                                 (20) 
 
We note that although fuel market outputs and electric market inputs are related, they are 
not necessarily equal because fuels such as gas and coal can be stored efficiently. Therefore, 
the total inventory of fuel is introduced as: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2 21f f f e e finv invq k q k q k h q k h q k q k+ = + − − +                                                           (21) 
 
where 1h  and 2h  are the heat rates of GENCO1 and GENCO2, and 
f
invq  is the quantity in 
inventory. 
 
D. Energy market model 
We can obtain the energy market system model by incorporating the consumer decision 
model, the fuel market model, and the electricity market model. The state variables 
are ( )1 ,eq k ( )2 ,eq k ( )1 ,fq k ( )1 ,fcq k ( )2 ,fq k ( ) ( )2 1ˆ, ,fc eq k q k ( )2ˆ ,eq k ( )1ˆ ,fq k ( )1ˆ ,fcq k ( )2ˆ ,fq k
( )2ˆ ,fcq k and ( )ˆ .finvq k  The energy market system can then be represented by the state space 
equations 22: 
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Using the energy market system models developed above, assists us in more effectively 
study and analysis of overall market performance and the interactions among market 
participants. 
 
 
E. N-FUELCOS and N-GENCOS Case 
In the previous sections we have developed the energy market equations for a specific 
number of players (2 GENCOS and 2 FUELCOS). In this section we generalize the 
expressions for .N number of FUELCOs and N number of GENCOs. 
 
 
N FUELCOs 
Recalling that FUELCOs want to maximize total profit from fuel and consumer fuel 
markets, then the profit of the FUELCO i at period k is equal to its revenue minus its 
production cost; mathematically its optimization problem can be formulated as: 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),fc f f fc fc f f fc fi i i i iq qMax k P k q k P k q k FC q k q kπ ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦                                   (23) 
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Substituting fcP , fP  and FC  we have: 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, 1 1
2
0 1 2
ˆ ˆ
fc f
N N
f fc fc fc fc fc f f f f f
i i j i i j i
q q j j
i j i j
f fc f fc
f f i i f i i
Max k a b q k q k q k a b q k q k q k
c c q k q k c q k q k
π
= =≠ ≠
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= − + + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
 (24) 
 
Where ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ
N
fc fc fc
i j
j
i j
Q k q k q k
=≠
= +∑  and ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ
N
fc f f
i j
j
i j
Q k q k q k
=≠
= +∑  
 
According to the first order condition, we have:  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 ˆ2 2 0
f N
f f f f f f fci
i j f f i if
ji
i j
k
a b q k b q k c c q k q k
q k
π
=∉
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − + =⎣ ⎦∂ ∑                         (25) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 ˆ2 2 0
f N
fc fc fc fc fc f fci
i j f f i ifc
ji
i j
k
a b q k b q k c c q k q k
q k
π
=∉
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − + =⎣ ⎦∂ ∑                       (26) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1f f f f fj j j j jq k q k q k q kβ= − + − − −                                                                    (27) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1fc fc fc fc fcj j j j jq k q k q k q kβ= − + − − −                                                                 (28) 
 
Substituting (27) and (28) into (25) and (26) yields: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2
1
ˆ2 1 1
ˆ 1 2 0
f N N
f f f f f f f fi
i j j jf
j ji
i j i j
N
f f f f fc
j j f f i i
j
i j
k
a b q k b q k b q k
q k
b q k c c q k q k
π β
β
= =∉ ∉
=∉
∂ = − − − − −∂
⎡ ⎤+ − − − + =⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑
                                              (29) 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2
1
ˆ2 1 1
ˆ 1 2 0
f N N
fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fci
i j j jfc
j ji
i j i j
N
fc fc fc f fc
j j f f i i
j
i j
k
a b q k b q k b q k
q k
b q k c c q k q k
π β
β
= =∉ ∉
=∉
∂ = − − − − −∂
⎡ ⎤+ − − − + =⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑
                                              (30) 
 
Simplifying previous equations, we can now express them as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4
1 1
ˆ ˆ1 1
N N
f f f f f f f fc f fc
i i i j i j i i i i
j j
i j i j
q k s s q k s q k s q k s q k
= =
∉ ∉
= + − + − + +∑ ∑                             (31) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4
1 1
ˆ ˆ1 1
N N
fc fc fc f fc f fc fc fc fc
i i i i i i i j i j
j j
i j i j
q k s s q k s q k s q k s q k
= =
∉ ∉
= + + + − + −∑ ∑                          (32) 
 
N GENCOs 
The profit of the GENCO i, at period k, is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0g e e ei i ei i eiMax k P k q k c q k cπ = − −                                                                          (33) 
 
Assuming the GENCOs use adaptive expectations to estimate their competitor’s actions [20] 
and according to the first order condition, we have  
 
( ) ( )1
1
1 ˆ1
2 2
e N
e eei
i je
j
i j
a cq k q k
b =∉
−+ = − ∑                                                                                          (34) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ .e e e e ej j j j jq k q k q k q kβ= + −  Substituting in (34), reduces it to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
1 1
1 1 ˆ1 1
2 2 2
e N N
e e e e eei
i j j j je
j j
i j i j
a cq k q k q k
b
β β
= =
∉ ∉
−+ = − − −∑ ∑                                                     (35) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
N N
f f e f
inv j j j inv
j j
q k q k h q k q k
= =
+ = − +∑ ∑                                                                             (36) 
 
 
3.5 Case Study 
This section presents numerical examples from our model.  
Consider that demand in fuel market is given by 6f fP Q= − while demand in electric 
market is 10e eP Q= − . Demand in consumer fuel market is 5fc fcP Q= − . Production cost for 
fuel companies is ( )20.6 3 2f f fi i iC q q= + + ; the production cost for both GENCOs 
is 3 2e ei iC q= + . The demand data has been taken from references [24, 25] and modified. All 
of the companies utilize adaptive expectations with 0.9β = . The heat rate for GENCOs is 
assumed as 0.2 (To simplify this discussion, we omitted delivery costs, transportation costs, 
etc.) 
The price dynamics in fuel market, consumer fuel market and electricity market shown in 
Figure. 3.3 represents the necessary adjustments between players and markets. We can 
observe that the system market is stable from an economic and physics perspective. In 
economic terms, equilibrium refers to market equilibrium, i.e. the equality of supply and 
demand, whereas in physics it describes a system’s resting state. 
We can observe that all three markets experience different dynamic transition processes 
(nevertheless, all are stable once the equilibrium price-quantity is reached and consumers do 
not change preferences in consumption). The highest market’s price is the price of electricity 
and the lowest market’s price is the price for fuel consumers. Table I presents the equilibrium 
for each market. 
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Figure 3.3 Energy market price dynamics 
 
TABLE I 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
MARKET PRICE QUANTITY 
ELECTRICITY  6.0000 ($/MWh) 4.0000 MW 
FUEL 4.4567 ($/MWh) 1.8760 
FUEL CONSUMERS 3.7901 ($/MWh) 1.2098 
 
The model provides unique market equilibria for each market considered rather than 
unique individual consumer solutions. As noted previously, since consumers are considered 
in aggregate. They are taken into account at the aggregate level in the market equilibrium 
solutions. 
Market quantity summarizes the combined contributions of each participant by market. 
Given the parameters for this simulation (same production costs for each participant within 
each market type, same β  for all participants, two participants per market), the contribution 
of each participant is half of the market quantity. 
In the next scenario, we consider the case in which the (1) fuel market and (2) aggregate 
consumer fuel demand are similar. The new equilibrium for each market is shown in Figure 
3.4. We observe that the market clearing prices converge slightly faster. 
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Figure 3.4 Energy market price dynamics with similar curves in the fuel and fuel consumers markets 
 
Table II presents the new equilibrium for each market.  
 
TABLE II 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
MARKET PRICE QUANTITY 
ELECTRICITY  6.0000 ($/MWh) 4.0000 MW 
FUEL 3.7654 ($/MWh) 1.234566 
FUEL CONSUMERS 3.7654 ($/MWh) 1.234566 
 
We observe that the electricity market price is the same as in the previous case. The 
market prices of fuel and fuel consumers are equal but different with respect to the previous 
case because the similar market demand curves are considered for both markets. No changes 
to the other parameters were made; therefore, each participant contributes half of the total 
market quantity to their respective market (e.g. each FUELCO contributes half of the total 
fuel market quantity). 
The next case considers a simplified large market with 18 GENCOS. For illustrative 
purposes only the electricity market has been modified. The market demand parameters are 
given in Table III. 
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TABLE III 
DEMAND PARAMETERS 
PARAMETERS ELECTRICITY FUEL CONSUMER 
ea  10   
eb  0.1   
fa   5  
fb   1  
fca    8 
fcb    1 
 
The production cost for each GENCOs is 4 2e ei iC q= + . All of the companies utilize 
adaptive expectations with 0.2β = . The heat rate for GENCOs is assumed as 0.3. Markets 
price dynamics are reported graphically in Figure 3.5 and numerically in Table IV. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Energy market price dynamics: 18 GENCOs with similar cost curves 
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TABLE IV 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM: 18 GENCOS WITH SIMILAR COST CURVES 
MARKET PRICE QUANTITY 
ELECTRICITY  3.3684 ($/MWh) 66.6 MW 
FUEL 2.1311 ($/unit) 1.6 units 
FUEL CONSUMERS 3.7675 ($/unit) 4.2 units 
 
Next, we assume that production costs are different from GENCO to GENCO. The 
production cost data, shown in Table V, is used arbitrarily for illustrative purposes. 
 
TABLE V 
GENCOS’ COST DATA 
 GENCO 
Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1eic  3.10 2.75 3.20 2.90 2.80 3.33 3.30 2.70 3.15 3.23 2.96 3.06 3.19 2.88 2.94 3.07 2.79 2.93
0eic  5 6 5 7 4 6 4 3 5 5 6 5 7 4 6 4 3 5 
 
Markets price dynamics are reported graphically in Figure 3.6 and numerically in Table 
VI. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Energy market price dynamics: 18 GENCOs with different cost curves 
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TABLE VI 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM: 18 GENCOS WITH DIFFERENT COST CURVES 
MARKET PRICE QUANTITY 
ELECTRICITY  3.3831 ($/MWh) 65.6 MW 
FUEL 2.1311 ($/unit) 1.6 units 
FUEL CONSUMERS 3.7675 ($/unit) 4.2 units 
 
The GENCOs’ outputs are reported numerically in Table VII. 
There is a unique price for each market but the quantities produced for each GENCO and 
FUELCO differ, given that their production costs differ. For instance, GENCO’s 8 output is 
6.80 MW and GENCO’s 6 output is 0.5 MW because GENCO 8 has the lowest production 
costs whereas GENCO 6 has the highest production cost. FUELCO market quantities do not 
change because market demand remains constant (similarly for consumers). 
 
TABLE VII 
GENCOS’ OUTPUTS 
  Quantity (MW) 
1 2.80 
2 6.30 
3 1.80 
4 4.80 
5 5.80 
6 0.50 
7 0.80 
8 6.80 
9 2.30 
10 1.50 
11 4.20 
12 3.20 
13 1.90 
14 5.00 
15 4.40 
16 3.10 
17 5.90 
GENCO 
18 4.50 
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3.6 Parameter Dependency 
A different choice of parameters will influence market outcomes. Market equilibrium 
depends on all system parameters except fixed cost, i.e. 0eic parameters. For β  values close 
to zero we observe less frequent oscillatory behavior in market equilibrium. Additionally, as 
long as β  increases, the market price decreases in all markets and consequently, market 
quantity decreases. The traditional Cournot equilibrium is achieved when both coefficients 
are 1. Any other combination of adjusting coefficients will fall between monopoly and 
Cournot models, and eventually one GENCO will act as leader in the market. 
For explanatory purposes we consider the case of an electricity market with two GENCOs. 
The intersection of the two reaction functions, equation (17), determines the market 
equilibrium in the Cournot model. This equilibrium represents a Nash equilibrium if each 
GENCO believes the other will not change output regardless of what its competitor does. 
Figure 3.7 portrays the reaction functions for the two GENCOs in a specific period. Here 
we observe that the classic Cournot outcome is achieved when both adjusting coefficients are 
set to 1, point A. Monopoly occurs when one of the adjusting coefficients is set to 1 and the 
other is equal to zero, whereas the Bertrand outcome, perfect competition, is achieved when 
the adjusting coefficients are set to 0, point B. 
This analysis is extended to the other markets. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Equilibrium market factible region 
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We note that storage does not affect market dynamics. Heat rates have direct impacts on 
inventory. As long as the combination of both heat rates increases, storage is more 
“negative” because storage in our model is only a balance equation in the entire energy 
market. Hence, the model does not guarantee that storage will be zero in the long-term. In the 
real world, however, storage will influence GENCOs’ decision-making, and therefore must 
be integrated in their optimization problem. 
In reality, markets can reach a stable equilibrium or fail. Market stability can also be 
affected by participants’ behavior. High demand produces higher prices, but spikes are also 
due to congestion/reliability issues. Nonetheless, since we are assuming the existence of 
hourly spot trading markets, the reliability aspect, transmission and transportation network 
contingency, is not reflected immediately. This aspect also may make the markets unstable. 
To prove stability we apply Greshgoring theorem to the A matrix. According to the 
theorem, every eigenvalue of a matrix lies in a circle centered at diagonal elements iia with 
radius of 
1
n
i ij
j
j i
R a
=≠
= ∑ . The radius is calculated as: 
 
1
1
n
i ij
j
j i
R a
=
≠
= <∑  
 
Therefore the eigenvalues lie in a circle centered at iia  with a radius less than one. This area 
is a subset of the unit, circle. Hence the system is stable. 
 
3.7 Computational issues 
The energy model is currently prototyped as a Matlab® code using DLSIM routine to 
solve the discrete state space system. The energy market simulation is solved on a Pentium 4, 
2.8 MHz with 512 MB of RAM. The solution time is 3 s for both simulations reported in 
Tables I and II. Since the energy market formulation is a representation of a linear set of 
equations [22], we use it to validate our model. Both models reach the same solution in all 
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cases reported; however, using a linear set of equations model results in much less 
computational effort given that the dynamic model requires a time domain simulation. Time 
simulation needs to be specified as part or input data. Additionally we use a modified model 
reported in [25] for validating the two market segments, electricity and fuel markets. 
The dimension of a large energy model is not trivial [24]. Similar problems exist when the 
dynamic model becomes larger [23]. The application of decomposition methods, sparsity 
techniques, and parallel processing should be the subject of future research efforts.   
The estimation of the adaptive expectations coefficients is a separate problem. Several 
approaches can be used to estimate each parameter for each market player, e.g., data mining, 
neural nets, and forecasting. 
 
3.8 Conclusions and future research 
In this paper, we have proposed a dynamic game-theoretic energy model based on Discrete 
Event System Simulation that can be used to study general market behaviors and dynamics. 
Our energy market consists of fuel, electricity, and consumer fuel markets. 
In the proposed model, decision-makers (electricity producers and consumers) utilized 
adaptive expectations to forecast their competitors’ actions. A valuable extension of this 
work would include consideration of other decision-making behaviors such as naïve, forward 
expectations, forward adaptive expectations, and adaptive moving average. 
The model also assumes that GENCOs understand the inverse demand function, and that 
when they do not know the actual demand function, they will estimate it. The effects on their 
expectations can be included in the demand function, but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Using DESS to model the markets provides unique market information, such as market 
stability, achievability of equilibrium, and dynamic transition processes. We suggest that 
incorporating the findings of a DESS approach can improve market design, market 
monitoring, and assist in defining appropriate market control schemes. 
The model presented omits some constraints that would be considered in production-
level simulation. Constraints such as transmission limits on each market network and upper 
limits in generating unit companies will be reported in future publications. 
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Appendix A  
This appendix details the coefficient k’s for expressions (12) and (13) 
Recalling (10) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 22
ˆ ˆ1 1 1 2
2 2
f f fj f fj fj f fj fj f f fci
fi
f f
a b q k b q k b q k c c q k
q k
b c
β β− − − − + − − −= +  
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Hence  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ1 1fi if if fj if fj if fci if fciq k s s q k s q k s q k s q k= + − + − + +  
 
Where ( )10 22 f fif f f
a c
s
b c
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b
s
b c
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( )2 2
1
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f
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f f
c
s
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From (11) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2ˆ ˆ2 1 1 1 2fc f fci fc fc fcj fc fcj fcj fc fcj fcj f f fib c q k a b q k b q k b q k c c q kβ β+ = − − − − + − − −  
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Hence  
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Abstract 
The restructured electricity industry moves toward more competitive environment in where 
the decentralized decision making model is persuaded in order to attain efficiency in 
commodity transactions. In the vertical integrated industry the decisions of production were 
centralized attaining minimum costs by executing global optimization approaches. In the 
restructured electric industry, under the assumption of liquid market, Generation Companies 
(GENCOs) would decide whether to produce energy, sell fuel, shut down the plant, or/and 
participate in fuel and electricity markets, depending upon the market spot prices. The effort 
in such decisions is to manage effectively and efficiently the product flow in the strategically 
planned supply chain. These changes in the energy sector in terms of trade between 
participants, seller and buyers, needs for energy modeling, either as a stand-alone or within 
the context of a complete system. The Input-Output model allows quantifying 
interrelationship among fuel markets and electricity market from the GENCOs viewpoint. 
Because the spot market settles hourly, the open static input-output model is considered in 
this document. 
 
Index Terms—Energy markets, Input-Output method 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The restructured electricity industry keep moving toward more competitive environment 
where decentralized decision making is strongly encourage to attain efficiency in commodity 
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transactions. In general, increased competition delivers increased benefits to society. 
Competitive markets provide lower prices, better quality, and more innovation than 
monopolistic markets [1,2]. 
Traditionally, business between electric utilities was conducted trough bilateral contracts 
or multiple interchange transactions. In the new framework of deregulation, a commodity 
wholesale electricity marketplace characterizes the electric industry. This new environment 
has changed drastically the objective of electricity producing companies. In the vertical 
integrated industry, utilities were obligated to meet all the demand for customers in a certain 
region at fixed rates. Therefore, the traditional understanding of risk was entirely about 
operational risk that might lead to supply of electricity falling below demand. Nowadays, 
risk does not only refer to operational risk but also price risk, and financial risk. Derivatives 
products such as options, futures or swap contracts have become a standard risk management 
tool that enables risk sharing and thus facilities the efficient allocation of capital to 
productive investment opportunities [3].  
This paper focuses in GENCOs’ participation in a market environment driven by market 
forces –supply and demand. The open static Input-Output, OSI-O, model illustrates the 
market interaction, input markets as well as output market, from GENCOs point of view. 
Due to the operation of the spot market (discrete and sequential snapshots) and short–term 
forecasting participation in the electricity market (unit commitment) OSI-O model provides 
enough accuracy to capture changes in both sides of the supply chain.  
Some commodities or services provided by GENCOs are not interdependent, however for 
sake of simplicity, we assume they are. This assumption will permit the decomposition of 
ancillary markets and others, from a GENCOs’ viewpoint. Under the same assumption, an 
independent stream cash flow associated to each commodity can be obtained. An additional 
consideration is a complete decentralized and liquid market. Thus, GENCOs would decide 
what and when to produce -voluntary participation. Exchange exists for every commodity 
traded and auction is the market clearing price mechanism.  
The rest of the document is organized as follow: The next section discusses the 
decentralization production decision making in the new electric industry. Section III presents 
the Input-Output theory developed by Leontief. The Open I-O model is briefly described in 
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section IV. In section V, the I-O model in the energy market is discussed. A case of study is 
given in Section VI. Conclusions and future work are presented in section VII. 
 
II. PRODUCTION DECENTRALIZATION 
Segmentation of the vertical integrated electric industry into a horizontally integrated set 
of companies make production decisions, by each one of the independent GENCOs, are 
decentralized. This new paradigm has introduced much uncertainty in the production-supply 
chain. The traditional understanding of risk under vertical integrated model was referred to 
the obligation of meet the demand at any moment. A fixed rate of return was established as 
payback. The operation of the GENCOs was centralized and a single decision maker 
allocated the energy services by minimized total production costs. 
Nowadays, the performance of the utility depends of the market forces in input suppliers 
and output customers. In addition they must compete strategically with other market 
producers [4,5]. Market forces will dictate the equilibrium price-quantity, subject to 
operational constraints. It is also possible that some of those constraints, operational 
constraints proper of the power system, would be relaxed by the introduction of demand and 
interrupted power programs. 
In a competitive market, no externalities exist and GENCOs goal is to maximize expected 
profits. Externalities must be internalized by the same participants into their market strategies 
in order to attain an optimal decision making. Optimal decision making refers to units output 
allocated on the frontier production function. Therefore, GENCOs, or other firms, out of the 
frontier do not make an efficient use of their inputs indicating that their performance might 
be improved by changing management procedures. 
 
III. THE INPUT-OUTPUT THEORY 
Wassily Leontief developed the Input-Output, I-O, theory which is a linear approximation 
of the Walrasian model that allows the general theory of equilibrium to be applied [1,6,7]. 
Economic I-O analysis is a method to systematically quantify the interrelationships among 
various productive sectors of an economy sector in which goods are produced in those 
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sectors by main of primary factors. The economic system may be as large as a nation or as 
small as the economy of a municipality area. The structure of each industry’s production 
process is represented by an appropriately defined vector of technical coefficients that 
describes quantitatively the relationship between the inputs it absorbs and the output it 
produces. The interdependence among the sectors of the given economy is described by a set 
of linear equations expressing the balance between the total input and the aggregate output of 
each commodity and service produced and used in the course of one or several periods of 
time [7]. 
In I-O analysis, a fundamental assumption is that the inter-industry flows from i to j 
depend entirely on the total output of sector j.  From this concept then a ratio of input/output 
termed a technical coefficient is formulated. Thus, there is an explicit definition of a linear 
relationship between input and output and there are no economies of scale (ES), rather the 
Leontief model represents constant return to scale (CRTS). Here the coefficients are the 
economic production function from sector i to sector j, which equates to the ratio of 
intermediate input to total output in value terms. This is equivalent to the fraction of price of 
commodity i / price commodity j, and the corresponding technical coefficient ratio: physical 
quantity of input from sector i / total physical quantity of sector j.  
Static models are confined to a single point in time and are concern with changes in social 
behavior, such as price and demand. On the other hand, dynamic models reflects changes in 
time and take into account model components that are constantly changing as a result of 
previous actions or future expectations [1,6,7,8,9]. 
Static I-O analysis describes the economic system in terms of mutually interrelated and 
structural conditioned, simultaneous flows of commodities and services. The Dynamic I-O 
model includes the same assumptions of the static model within a time period.  
In the Walrasian system of equilibrium, the static economy is in equilibrium, when all the 
individuals in it are choosing quantities they prefer to produce and to consume. Thus, for a 
given system, there are always a set of prices and a set of quantities that separately and 
simultaneously satisfies the technical structure of production. In the static I-O model the 
general principles of equilibrium are exploited to arrive at quantities produced based on the 
exogenously determined quantities of final demand [1,7]. Thus, for the static I-O model, as 
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intermediate production converges, the system is expected to achieve a new equilibrium. At 
this new equilibrium the static I-O model intrinsically represents the market clearing 
mechanisms of the Walrasian model [1,7]. 
 
IV. OPEN STATIC I-O MODEL 
In the open static I-O model final demand is exogenously determined. Given the final 
demand by the economy of all sectors, it is desired to compute for each sector the gross 
output necessary to cover final demand.  It can be expressed in matrix form as follows: 
 
( )I M X d− =                                                                                                                         (1) 
 
where X = vector of total output 
 I= Identity matrix 
 M = nxn matrix of input/output coefficients 
 d = vector of final demand 
 
if 0I M− ≠  then ( ) 1I M −− exists, and the unique solution is given by 
 
( ) 1x I M d−= −                                                                                                                   (2) 
 
The elements of M are: 
 
ij
ij
j
X
m
X
=  
 
where ijX = Intermediate input delivery from i o j 
 jX = Gross output of j 
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V. I-O IN THE ENERGY MARKET 
With deregulation of electricity markets, Generation Companies must compete in a market 
environment where their decisions focus on activities over a day-to-day, month-to-month 
basis. The effort in such decisions is to manage effectively and efficiently the product flow in 
the strategically planned supply chain. These changes in the energy sector in terms of trade 
between participants, seller and buyers, needs for energy modeling, either as a stand-alone or 
within the context of a complete system.  
Generation Companies who competes vigorously with each other in seeking to maximize 
their individual financial return must take their own market participation’s decisions. 
Competition between suppliers will drive down prices, but not supplier will be willing to sell 
at less than the variable cost. The competitive equilibrium is described by the optimal 
solution to an appropriate constrained optimization problem. Minimization of transportation 
cost is a necessary condition for competitive equilibrium if such cost were not minimized 
otherwise an extra profit could be earned by appropriate relocation of supplies [10]. 
The traditional understanding of risk in vertical integrated industry was entirely about 
operational risk that might lead to supply of electricity falling below demand. Nowadays, 
there is a volatile market price instead of a fixed rate at which electricity is provided. In 
addition, the markets for input products like coal or gas are liberalized, with the effect that 
fuel prices become volatile too [11].  
The power play may be made base upon the so-called Spark Spread a calculated value that 
compares wholesale electric prices to wholesale fuel prices to determine whether to operate 
the electric power plant or sell its fuel in the wholesale market. The practicality of applying 
the spark spread formula is limited due to the lack of liquidity of certain electricity options 
[11]. 
It is possible to consider additional products that the GENCO can sell, i.e. ancillary 
service, pollution rights, heating service. In the energy market, auctions are used for finding 
the equilibrium price-quantity each trading period for the different products or services. 
Hence, prices for every service must be provided by the market in order the GENCOs would 
find a value for each of the products and services contributing to the economic profit. The I-
O model is a spatial model of the flow of fuels to the generation plants as well as services 
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offered. Thus GENCOs must build a portfolio of contracts for fuel purchases in order to 
control fuel cost and a portfolio of services offered in the electricity market. Operating a 
portfolio of fuel types GENCOs add more flexibility in generation. However, to build such 
portfolio requires taking into account all potential fuel contracts characteristics, 
transportation contracts, storage/consumption commodity, among other uncertainty factors 
[12]. GENCOs’ output would be diversified in similar fashion. 
Figure 4.1 depicts GENCOs’ input portfolio as well as output portfolio. GENCOs sell 
energy under mill pricing and customers buy energy at delivery price. Transmission 
Company collects transportation costs. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 I-O GENCOs’ participation in the Energy Market structure inn 
 
The decision to produce depends strongly on market prices, fuel and electricity. Hence, if 
( )t GS C P>  then 0GP ≠ , where tS  is the spot price of electricity at time t, ( )GC P is the 
production cost, constant, and GP  is the power produced at time t. 
 
The GENCOs’ profit at period t is then ( )G t GP S C Pπ = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
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Environment plays an important role in the energy industry given that it will impose 
additional constraints to the participants –especially coal plants. Environmental constraint 
can be relaxed by buying rights to pollute in an environmental market. The matrix structure 
of the industry markets and environmental markets is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Fuel 
Market 
  
 Environmental 
Market 
 
  Electricity  
Market 
  • Real Power 
• Reactive Power 
• … 
• Spinning Reserve 
 
Figure 4.2 Matrix representation of the Energy market structure 
 
Figure 4.3 presents the spot market equilibrium for the 24 trading periods in the primary 
market (day-ahead). The submitted bids are collected in a sealed order book and are sorted 
according to the price and aggregated to get a market demand and supply curve for every 
trading period. 
 
Figure 4.3 Primary market equilibrium for every trading period 
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The revenue cash flow stream associated to primary market for a generation unit is shown 
in Figure 4.4. Zero values in the cash flow diagram depicted in Figure 4.4 represent time off, 
banking generation status, or participation in other markets. 
In case of different products are sold, these produce additional revenues. The same 
argument holds for emission rights, which might be an additional product that the GENCOs 
could sell. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Seller Revenue stream cash flow 
 
The net expected profit at period t is then: 
 
( ) ( )G t GE P S C P other products pollution rightsπ = − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
 
 
VI. CASE OF STUDY 
A three generation unit portfolio was considered for the problem formulation. Oil, coal, 
natural gas, and electricity markets constitute the energy market. Participation in the 
electricity market is restricted to the primary market in this numerical example. Their 
generation unit characteristics are shown in Table 4.1 as well as fuel spot prices. 
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Table 4.1 Generation data 
Unit Fuel Operating  
Cost 
M-$/M-KWh 
Rate of  
transformation 
(TBTU/$KWh) 
Fuel Cost 
 
1 N. Gas 16.325 0.01100 2.164 $/MMBTU 
2 Coal 31.818 0.01144 1.100 $/ton 
3 Oil 1.0780 0.01200 26.21 $/bbl 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the output power solution for a trading period demand of 68 MWh. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Optimal output 
Unit Capacity 
(MW) 
Output 
(MW) 
1 10 -- 
2 40 38.000 
3 30 30.000 
 
 
The results show that unit 3 produces the maximum amount of power whereas unit 1 result 
the most expensive due to the fuel spot price and transportation cost.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reports the open static I-O model in the GENCOs decision making process for 
strategic participation in the energy market. A discrete model is considered given the 
characteristics of the day-ahead spot market. 
The I-O model, by evaluating intermediate goods in the production-supply chain permits 
to observe the added-value of these goods. Therefore, a better approximation on the stream 
cash flow must be expected.  
Decentralized optimization is attained when GENCOs decide when and what to produce. 
However, in order to achieve such condition a liquid market in generation was assumed. 
  
74
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
Guillermo Gutierrez gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by 
CONACyT and Instituto Tecnologico de Morelia, Mexico 
 
IX. REFERENCES 
[1] Tjalling C. Koopmans, Editor, Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation 
Proceedings of a Conference, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1951. 
[2] Rebecca M. Blank, “When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets,” NBER 
Working Paper Series. April 1999. 
[3] Jonh C. Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall, 
2000. 
[4] Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors, Free Press 1998. 
[5] Guillermo Gutierrez, Gerald B. Sheble, “Spot Fuel Markets’ Influence on the Spot 
Electricity Market Using Leontief Model,” Proc. of the IEEE Bologna PowerTech 
2003 Conference, June 2003, Bologna, Italy. 
[6] Gary J. Koehler, Andrew B. Whinston and Gordon P. Wright, Optimization over 
Leontief Substitution Systems, North-Holland/American Elsevier, 1975. 
[7] Ronald E. Miller and Peter D. Blair, Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and 
Extensions, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1985. 
[8] Robert Doftman, Paul A. Samuelson, and Robert M. Solow, Linear Programming and 
Economic Analysis, 1986. 
[9] Thomas Gloria, "An Approach to Dynamic Environmental Life-Cycle Assessment by 
Evaluating Structural Economic Sequences," Ph.D. Thesis, TUFTS University, May 
2000. 
[10] Gerald L. Thompson and Sten Thore, Computational Economics: Economic Modeling 
with Optimization Software, The Scientific Press Series, 1992. 
[11] J. Hlouskova, M. Jeckle, S. Kossmeier, M. Obersteiner, A. Schnabl, “Real Option 
Models and Electricity Portfolio Optimisation,” Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, 
July 2001. 
[12] Jean-Michel Guldmann, Fahui Wang, "Optimizing the natural gas supply mix of local 
distribution utilities," European Journal of Operational Research, pp. 598-612. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
75
CHAPTER 5 GENCOS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE UNBUNDLED 
ENERGY MARKET  
 
A paper published in the 2004 IEEE PES Power Systems Conference & Exposition 
 
Guillermo Gutiérrez-Alcaraz, Member, IEEE, and Gerald B. Sheblé, Fellow, IEEE 
 
 
Abstract 
In this document we analyze market producers’ participation in the new unbundled energy 
market. The electricity market is in the process of unbundling the ancillary services. In a 
fully unbundled electricity market more extensive analysis needs to be performed given that 
market participation is not restricted to electricity production. Ancillary services were 
bundled within the integrated generation and transmission services in the vertical integrated 
industry. Instead of being bundled with generation and transmission, the individual services 
are now uniquely identified in the competitive markets. In this new market environment, the 
decision making process can be seen as an activity analysis problem. Market participants will 
need to determine the most probable and profitable future market actions based on the last 
known market data and market projection. 
 
Index Terms—Activity Analysis, Ancillary Services.  
 
I. NOMENCLATURE 
The following nomenclature will be used throughout the present work: 
i, j = 1…m regions 
s = 1…r fossil fuel types 
t
id = Demand in region i at period t 
hsf = Supply of fuel in region i at period t 
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ijg = Unit cost of power loss due to interchange transactions 
t
ijsk = Number of BTU’s of fuel s sent from region i to region j 
t
ijP = Active power transacted from region i to region j at period t 
t
isx = Amount of electricity for region i produced by burning fuel s 
ijsc = Per unit shipping cost of sending fuel s from region i to region j 
t
isa = Amount of fuel s need to produce one unit of electricity in region i 
isb = Unit operating costs for producing electricity in region i from fuel s 
t
isX = Upper bound of  
t
isx  
 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
With liberalization of fuel markets and the electric industry, the production-supply chain 
is almost fully decentralized. This new environment presents a wide range of opportunities 
for market sellers as well as market consumers. At the same time, this condition exposes 
producers and consumers to higher levels of risk.  
Risk does not only refer to physical problems eventually leading to an electricity shortage 
but also to price risk and therefore financial risk. 
The energy market has had been studied separately because the liberalization of the 
different markets (i.e. natural gas, coal, oil, etc) have had taken place in a sequential manner. 
Consequently, markets present different levels of maturity. The development of 
methodologies and tools developed in the former markets then has been applied to the new 
liberalized markets. 
The electric industry is the latest to be deregulated. This new environment is increasing 
pressure on generation companies to attain productive efficiency. The economic operation of 
a Generation Company (GenCo) requires that expenditures for fuel be minimized over a 
period of time. In today’s electric spot market, the time horizon is a day-ahead and the 
analysis is executed by each GenCo whishing to maximize profits. In the past, GenCos used 
to sign long term fuel contacts to prevent high variations due to unexpected events. Take-or–
pay contract probably was other financial option offered to producers to reduce uncertainty 
on fuel delivery. Fuel can be contracted for purchase in a number of ways, allowing the 
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generator to increase security of supply of primary fuel. The optimal contract length depends 
on market information, as future economic environment becomes more certain, the length of 
contracts decreases [1][3]. 
In addition to these new changes in the fuel markets, the electricity market is in the 
process of unbundling the ancillary services (AS). Ancillary Services are necessary to make 
electricity energy market reliable and transactions deliverable. AS were bundled within the 
integrated generation and transmission in the vertical integrated industry. Instead of being 
bundled with generation and transmission, the individual services are now uniquely 
identified in the competitive markets. 
 Many of these services can be traded on an exchange-based market. Thus, it is envisioned 
that an independent market exists for each one of the services or commodities offered. In 
fully unbundled electric market, market participants would be facing higher level of 
uncertainty than in current market models. 
Therefore, GenCos are immersing in a multi-market multi-product decision environment. 
GenCos will need to determine future market actions based on the last known market data. 
Extensive work has been done in the electric load forecast and spot fuel prices and its 
impact in the decision making process for GenCos [2]. On the other hand, substantial work 
has been done in scheduling fuel deliveries for the different fuel types (Coal, Natural Gas, 
Oil, etc.) in competitive and noncompetitive environments [3][4][5][6]. The decision making 
process for GenCos is constrained to operational minimum up/down unit’s times. Hence, the 
solution of scheduling units in the production of electricity is commonly solved by the 
traditional UC approach. Production costing models have been used in the electric industry to 
forecast the cost of producing electricity [7][8]. Real power is the commodity of interest. 
However, the economic principles governing the pricing of active power can be applied to 
reactive power. Other AS are taken into consideration since the probabilistic production cost 
consists of two components: operating cost and outage costs [7][9]. 
Energy models have been developed to support local energy planning and recently to 
observe interdependencies effects in case of terrorist attacks. However, analysis is focused 
manly on the interrelation between the energy sector and the rest of the economy in the long 
term. 
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In [10] the author presents a dynamic model for a GenCo involved in fuel and electricity 
market. The underlying problem is consumer heating problem -consumer demand is met 
either by fuel or electricity, while electricity is generated by fuel. In previous papers [11] the 
authors have described the use of Leontief model in the energy market in which GenCos 
have been the focus of analysis. The studies were done considering participation only in the 
electric energy market and observing the interrelationship with fuel markets. This work 
extends previous work by considering GenCos participation in the electricity unbundled 
market (energy and AS). Competitor’s reactions are not taken into account, instead 
cooperation among them is considered. 
By decomposing the energy market it is possible to observe other market’s effects in the 
final commodity price as well as to identify the sources of risk. To manage risk effectively, 
the market participant needs to insure that it has a transaction management infrastructure that 
captures accurate and timely information regarding the entire set of business activities 
performed. Incorrect, untimely, and improperly analyzed information often leads to 
suboptimal solutions for the profit-maximizing player. The financial implications of relying 
on outdated or incorrect information in bidding can be enormous. 
In this document we analyze market producers’ participation in the new unbundled energy 
market. Market producers will need to determine the most probable and profitable future 
market actions based on the last known market data. The market participants will use a much 
quicker analysis of the system’s status for next hour pricing. Forecasting the status of the 
system is necessary for the short term operation. Determining the value of the certain 
information can simplify some of the analysis by using concentrating on the most cost 
effective research. Then, they would extend the expected market participation for the next 
days (up to one week) and adapt their decision according new information is collected. 
In the problem formulation we assume that the demand for every service is constant over 
any given trading period. Some of these services need to be satisfied locally. The analysis is 
restricted to a single snapshot. Additional services, such transmission rights can also be 
traded in spot market, but these are beyond the scope of this paper. The 24 hours decision is 
accompanied with a UC in order to consider start up/down costs, min/max up/down times, 
and min/max on/off times. 
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The rest of the document is organized as follow: The next section discusses the 
decentralization production decision making in the new energy market with emphasis in the 
electric industry. The energy model is then presented. A static model is considered in this 
document considering discrete and sequential snapshots decisions in the spot market. The 
model is formulated and solved by using linear programming. A case of study is presented 
and discussed. Finally, conclusions are presented. 
 
III. DECENTRALIZED ENERGY MARKETS 
Under market completeness and perfectly competitive assumptions, centralized and 
decentralized designs attain the same result. This is the primal-dual equivalence of first-best 
implementations when competition makes the first best incentive compatible.  
In the electric industry and under the same assumptions of competitiveness, the traditional 
unit commitment (UC) schedule can be obtained by optimizing the self-commitment of each 
unit separately at market prices. The objective of the optimization is to schedule hourly 
generation such that generation costs are minimized. The traditional UC achieve units’ time 
coordination. In a new environment market, such coordination needs to be attained in a 
different fashion since each player is voluntarily participating. An illustrative representation 
of the above discussed issue is shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Seller Conventional UC solution 
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The spot market clearing price (MCP) for the day-ahead is shown in Figure 5.2. Even 
when centralized UC is executed, the existence of spark prices would be present. It can be 
seen that a substantial increment in price occurs during period 11 to period 15, as a result of 
unit’s operational time constraints. This represents a hockey-stick supply curve from period 
10 to period 11. Such effect would be present also when a generation or transmission line 
outage occurs. Additionally, there exist different marginal units along the day. By assuming 
that transmission system losses are not significant and there are no transmission constraints 
activated, the electric energy price would be strongly correlated to the marginal unit fuel 
cost. Electricity is typically stored in the form fuel inventories at power plants. For existing 
plants, the storage costs are usually less than or equivalent to the costs of storing other 
energy fuels; however, the addition of new storage capacity can be very capital intensive. 
The high cost of new capacity also means that there are disincentives to building spare power 
capacity. 
 
Figure 5.2 Hourly Market Clearing Prices 
 
In a competitive market, market participants will have the freedom to decide in which 
market to participate base on market price information. It implies that the market producer 
should seek to optimize its assets value in the spot market using all the various products that 
he can offer.  
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The power play may be made base upon the so-called Spark Spread a calculated value that 
compares wholesale electric prices to wholesale fuel prices to determine whether to operate 
the electric power plant or sell its fuel in the wholesale market. 
In this new competitive energy market, the decision making process from a GenCo’s 
viewpoint can be seen as an activity analysis problem [12][13].  
An activity consist of the combination of certain qualitatively defined commodities in 
fixed qualitative ratios as inputs to produce as outputs certain other commodities in fixed 
quantitative ratios to the inputs [13][14]. Any possible state of production can be represented 
by a linear combination of basic activities with nonnegative coefficients [15]. 
 
 
IV. THE ENERGY MODEL 
The optimal purchase of fuel is an important problem for electric power producers in the 
new liberalized energy industry. Producers pursue their private self interests by observing 
and achieving strategic decisions in the whole energy market, fuel and electricity market. In 
the present and evolving energy market, it is necessary to simultaneously, over time and over 
space, clears regional markets.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Energy market 
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The model takes into consideration fuel networks and transmission networks. The 
objective function takes the linear form  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
m r m m m m r
t t t
is is ij ij ijs ijs
i s i j i j s
min b x g P c k
= = = = = = =
+ +∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑∑                                                                          (1) 
 
In our case, the objective function to be minimized is the total production costs. The 
constraints are limitations on the unknown variables. 
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Constraints (2) represent the balance of each service within local markets and exchanges. 
Constraints (3) require that the amount of fuel s shipped in region i less the amount of fuel 
shipped out of region i is at most the amount of fuel that region i has. Constraints (4) and (5) 
represent the spinning reserve and reactive power balance in each region while constraints 
(6) are nonnegative conditions. 
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Figure 5.4 Network representation of GenCo’s participation in the energy market 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the network flow representation of the different activities/services in 
which the GenCo is involved. In this new environment, GenCos are able to sell fuel instead 
of producing electricity. GenCo compares wholesale electric prices to wholesale fuel prices 
to determine whether to operate the electric power plant or sell its fuel in the wholesale 
market. Regarding the electricity market, a GenCo would be able to participate in the 
provision of energy or any of the AS. Hence, the Generator unit is a multi-product device per 
se. GenCos will need to find a value for each of the products contributing to the net 
economic profit. The Gross operating profit is the sum of a series of multi-product revenues. 
The observation of information from each market would be essential in their decision-
making process. 
 
V. CASE OF STUDY 
A two areas interconnected systems is considered. Each area has three major markets 
within the electricity market: energy, reactive power, and spinning Reserve. The reactive and 
reserve markets must be met for the energy to be traded. The system has four GenCos 
competing for supplying the demand distributed in both areas (regions). Control areas are 
interconnected by a transmission tie line. The unit parameters are shown in Table I. The 
market demand per region, for each independent service is shown in the Table II.  
E
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Figure 5.5 Two areas interconnected system 
 
 
TABLE I 
Unit parameters 
 
Unit Fuel Pmax   (MW) 
Operating 
Cost 
(M$/MWh)
Rate of 
Transformation 
(TBTU/$MWh) 
Gen 1 Coal 260.0 8 0.01144 
Gen 2 Oil 180.0 6 0.01200 
Gen 3 Coal 120.0 10 0.01100 
Gen 4 Oil 80.0 8 0.01200 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
Markets demand per area 
 
 Energy 
(MW) 
Reserve 
(MW) 
Reactive Power  
(MVAr) 
Area 1 200 20 160 
Area 2 300 30 100 
 
 
Per unit fuel shipping costs and unit cost of power loss when sending from region i to j are 
displayed in Table III. 
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1 
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4
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TABLE III 
Shipping costs for fuel and transmission losses 
 
From To 
Oil 
(M$/TBTUs) 
Coal 
(M$/TBTUs) 
Electricity 
(M$/MWh) 
R 1 R 2 0.1 0.2 2.5 
R 2 R 1 0.1 0.2 2.5 
 
                 R1 = Region 1; R2 = Region 2 
 
For sake of simplicity, all units have the same real and reactive capability curve in 
percentages of real capability. The capability curve is shown in Figure 5.6.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Generating capability curve (real and reactive power) 
 
 
TABLE IV 
Supply of fuels 
 
From To 
Oil 
(TBTUs) 
Coal 
(TBTUs) 
R 1 R 2 0.90 2.55 
R 2 R 1 1.20 1.65 
 
 Q
maxP
minQ
P
Lag pf 
Lead pf 
maxQ
(85,70) 
(80,60) 
(100,0) 
(0,80) 
(0,75) 
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The electric energy price in R1 is 8.00 $/MWh whereas in R2 this is 10.5 $/MWh. Note 
that the imputed price in R2 is 8.00 + 2.5 = 10.5. This is the cost of generating electricity in 
R1 and shipping it to R2. Optimal service allocation of each generating unit is shown in 
Table V. 
 
TABLE V 
Market participants outputs 
 Energy 
(MW) 
Reserve 
(MW) 
Reactive Power 
(MVAr) 
Gen 1 222.902 160.000 
Gen 2 107.098
30.00 
- 
Gen 3 102.098 83.543 
Gen 4 67.902
20.00 
16.457 
Total 500.000 50.000 260.000 
 
 
From Table V we can observe that local demand will have to be satisfied in order to allow 
interchanges. Without transmission constraints between areas, the markets are integrated; 
cheap electric energy flows from Area 1 to Area 2 given that electricity is more expensive in 
Area 2. Gen 1 is participating in the three different services. Hence, the gross profit of Gen 1 
is the sum of cash flows.  
In addition of electricity transactions between areas, fuel is also transacted. This 
transaction in fuel is the result of fuel requirements from Gen 2. However, in this new 
environment, we will see more frequently fuel transactions between GenCos when selling 
fuel is more profitable than producing electricity. 
  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Market-based generation scheduling problems in different geographical markets were 
studied. Participation in additional market products was also studied. Competitor’s actions 
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were neglected in the analysis. A linear programming approach to the optimal activity 
analysis has been applied on a small system example. 
Modeling tools that take into account the complexities of the multiple services of the 
unbundled industry and the independent reactions of the participants in this environment will 
assist in efforts to manage for the present and plan for the future. The integration of 
optimization and financial models as well as managerial decision-making approaches would 
permit market participants to develop strategies for mechanisms that operate on a daily basis. 
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Abstract 
The interaction of markets and the power system network is stronger based on real options 
analysis than on traditional single event net present value analysis. The optionality of 
network restrictions due to congestion increases the importance of network information 
beyond the values found with traditional net present value for bidding. This paper 
demonstrates the importance of option analysis in the bidding process. The value of high 
volatility, due to network congestion and to network operating restrictions, leads to larger 
valuations. As always, larger uncertainty leads to larger values when opportunities can be 
recognized in advance. This paper shows how such information can be used in the bidding 
process. 
 
1. Introduction 
The deregulation of electric industry has created many changes and challenges in the 
complete energy sector. The industry is facing with the responsibility for many pricing 
decisions in an environment that is highly volatile. This new market-driven environment has 
originated the necessity of new economic institutions and the use of financial tools has been 
introduced to manage risks associated with the operation of the whole energy market. Real 
Options (RO) which can be evaluated in similar way to financial options, have been 
introduced in the energy market, because it explicitly accounts for the flexibility of 
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operating/investing real assets. RO, as well as financial option, is the right but not the 
obligation to buy or sell an underlying commodity [1][2].  
 
Traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methods cannot value management's ability to 
make decisions in the future. Strategic planning offers a view that values multiple 
opportunities and competitive issues [1][2]. The strategic approach appreciates the dynamic 
complexity of the future whereas the DCF approach is a passive management strategy [1]. 
 
The complex interactions and interdependencies among electricity market participants are 
similar to those studied in game theory. However, the different existing markets force 
Generation Companies (GenCos) to make strategic marketing decisions regarding the 
operation of the generating resources and the specific rules under which each different 
market operates will influence decisions made by market participants. 
 
The electricity market consists in several markets, i.e. one market for each ancillary service 
(AS). Some commodities/services are highly correlated either because they are good 
complements produced by the same provider or due to lack of market liquidity. 
 
Transmission access is imperative in the determination of bidding strategies. Frequently, 
transmission effect is neglected in bidding models and hence any solution given under such 
assumption is not optimal. According to [3][4] bidding strategies are affected by the 
interaction between operational constraints and other factors such as market design rules, 
price uncertainty, and non-convexity of costs. Reference [5] concludes that operational 
characteristics affect the valuation of a power plant to different extents depending of the 
operation efficiency of the power plant and the assumptions about electricity and fuel prices. 
 
The optionality of network restrictions due to congestion increases the importance of 
network information beyond the values found with traditional net present value for bidding. 
This paper focused on operational decisions due to network operating restrictions supported 
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by RO models. The bidding optimal decision takes into consideration the transmission 
system.  
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Multiple markets and interrelation between 
them are discussed in section 2. In section 3, uncertainty and correlation among different 
commodities or services in the electricity market is emphasized. Decision Support Systems 
(DSS) involve a number of analytical tools. Financial derivatives, RO, and the Porter’s five 
forces model are presented in Section 4. Information required for optimal bidding is 
discussed in section 5. Section 6 gives some observations about application of RO in 
transmission investment and its impact on bids. Finally, section 7 summarizes the problems 
involve in the electricity market. 
 
2. Multiple Markets 
The new electricity market is only one piece on the energy market. The energy market is 
composed by fuel markets, transportation markets, and pollution markets. The Figure 6.1 
shows in a matrix representation the different markets involve in the energy market. 
 
Oil 
Market   
  
 
 
Coal 
Market  
  
  Natural Gas Market 
  
   Environmental Market  
    Electricity  Market 
 
Figure 6.1 Matrix representation of the energy market structure 
 
Fuel markets and wholesale electricity market are linked trough electricity production 
companies. This link is physical as well as financial. In a market-oriented environment, such 
link is modeled financially rather than physically.  
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In the electricity market, additional services, needed to support a reliable delivery of 
electric energy are or can be traded on an exchange-based market since supportive services 
are unbundled in this new environment [6]. Thus, it is envisioned that an independent market 
exists for each one of the services or commodities offered. There are 24 independent hourly 
auctions for each service concurrent with the 24 independently energy auctions [6]. 
  Because of imbalances in the electric system a real time market is required. Real time 
market would improve the ability of electricity demand to respond to wholesale spot prices. 
Reduction in spot prices will decrease total costs of meeting demand and volatility of spot 
prices during critical periods. Forward market reflects short term future system conditions.  
In the forward market, prices are determined at the time of the contract but the transactions 
occur at some specific date in the future. The settlement of forward contracts can be either 
physical or financial. Physical contracts consider an obligation of the generation company to 
fulfill the specified amount of energy at the hours and network node arranged at the fixed 
price agreed. Financial Contracts do not imply a physical energy transaction but a cash flow. 
Futures contracts eliminate the credit risk of forward contracts. In a futures contract, the 
counterparty is always the exchange-clearing house. The exchange guarantees that the term 
of the contract would be honored at maturity [7]. In the swap market, contract position can be 
closed with an exchange of physical or financial substitutions.  The trader may find another 
trader who will accept delivery and end the trader’s delivery obligation. Figure 6.2 represents 
schematically the electricity-derivative markets. 
 
Figure 6.2 Electricity-derivatives market 
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The energy market is geographically distributed. Raw material and intermediate goods are 
bought from one location and used as inputs for activities in another.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Representative structure integration of the industries in the energy market 
 
In our context, fuels flow from fuel locations to the generation utilities, where electricity is 
produced and transmitted to demand centers towards transmission lines. Unit fuel costs 
consist of the market price of the fuel at the point of delivery plus transportation costs. 
Typical energy market structure is shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
Every market clears independently base on market forces. In the electricity market, 
auctions are used for finding the equilibrium price-quantity for the different products or 
services. The submitted bids are collected in a sealed order book and are sorted according to 
the price and aggregated to get a market demand and supply curve for every trading period. 
Every trading period may take several iterations to find the Market clearing price during the 
bidding process. This process is required in order to match the business transactions into the 
system. The market clearing price discovery is shown in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 Market clearing price discovery 
 
Figure 6.5 presents the spot market equilibrium for the 24 trading periods in the primary 
electricity market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Market Clearing Price for the 24 auctions 
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The CFD for a given generation unit participating in the primary market is shown in Figure 
6.6. Negative values in the CFD represent time off, banking generation status, or 
participation in other markets since availability of the unit implies certain variable costs. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Day-ahead Cash Flow Diagrams: (a) Revenues and Costs (b) Profit per period 
 
 
The Gross operating profit is the sum of a series of multi-product hourly revenues under 
the consideration of mutually exclusive services. 
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3. Uncertainty and Correlation 
The decomposition of several markets in the electricity market itself is not well accepted 
and such decomposition has not been fully implemented in a decentralized fashion either 
because of the high correlation among the different services or due to lack of market 
liquidity. Instead, complementary mechanisms to quantify associated costs in the short-term 
have been implemented. 
 
One of these complementary mechanisms is the opportunity costs for the reactive power 
service provided by a generator. Technically, reactive power support must achieve two 
objectives: voltage regulation and reactive spinning reserve in order to preserve adequate 
quality and security margins. Both services can be traded independently. However, these 
services are highly correlated with the energy market when the same device is the provider. 
In such case, those services are seen as substitutes by the device. 
 
Reserves present similar conditions with the previous case. Reserve, as well as reactive 
power, is traded in advance and the use of it depends on the later system conditions. 
Generator can participate concurrently in several markets from which it can have additional 
revenues. 
 
The correlation among the different services involve in the electricity market are nonlinear. 
Therefore prices in the different commodities are influenced by uncertainties associated to 
the electric system state variables which defined its operating point. Monte Carlo simulation 
seems viable to model plenty of probabilistic scenarios as way to include uncertainties in the 
power system [8]. 
 
Figure 6.7 represents the inference diagram for GenCos market participation selection. A 
generator can participate concurrently is several markets. However, such participation is 
limited by the operational constraints either of the unit itself and/or the power system. 
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Figure 6.7 Inference diagram for Market Participation selection 
 
4. Decision Support Tools 
Competitive wholesale electricity markets are complex, with multiple interdependent 
products sold on different time frames and differentially priced at different geographic 
locations. Modeling tools that take into account the complexities of the multiple products of 
the unbundled industry and the independent reactions of the many participants in the new 
industry, Decision Support Systems, will assist in efforts to manage in the present and plan 
for the future. 
 
A DSS involves a number of analytical tools Conventional optimization techniques, 
statistical econometric and statistical analysis, financial tools, and data system, among others. 
Financial tools, Real Option Analysis, and Input-Output model are presented in this section. 
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4.1 Financial Tools 
Over the past two decades, the financial markets have experienced an impressive expansion 
in terms of securities issued and traded. Additionally, financial markets have become more 
and more interconnected allowing almost continuous trading.  Derivatives products such as 
options, futures or swap contracts have become a standard risk management tool that enables 
risk sharing and thus facilities the efficient allocation of capital to productive investment 
opportunities [7]. The new restructured electric industry is using these financial tools to 
hedge against the risk involve in the spot market. 
 
Trading has been executed in the electricity market without standardized contracts. Trading 
was firstly introduced by bilaterally where the two parties decide the contractual 
arrangements. Nowadays, markets do not have a standardized contract as other exchanges 
have [9][10][11]. This lack of standardized contracts makes difficult the trading process. 
 
Salient features of the commodity traded have to be clearly specified as the contract for any 
commodity that is openly traded [9][10][11]. Four basic terms are commonly included in a 
contract: 
 
1. Description of the goods: type, quantity, and quality 
2. Delivery time 
3. Price 
4. Time and means of payment 
 
These terms are considered essential because they cannot be easily implied by law they are 
the necessary parameters to the contractual relationship. Every contract should provide for 
these terms. Standardizing contract will help the market by increasing liquidity and 
transparency.  
 
Long-term contracts (forward or bilateral) have been used to lock prices; price risk is 
removed, in absence of options and other financial derivatives. However, but before entering 
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into long-term contracts, the company must evaluate the benefits that it expects to obtain 
from it. The optimal contract length reflects an economic trade-off between the marginal cost 
and marginal benefits of extending the length of the benefit. The optimal contract length also 
depends on market information, as future economic environment becomes more certain, the 
length of contracts decreases [12]. 
 
4.2 Real options 
The application of RO to valuing managerial flexibility has been critical to gains made in 
many risky ventures. There exist a number of methods that can be used to value RO. One 
method is to value a security relative to the value of a portfolio of other traded securities 
[1][2]. Another approach is using a binomial option value method [1][2]. Monte Carlo (MC) 
simulation is another method to model a statistically significant number of logically 
constructed future scenarios. Embedded decision rules can make choices in the simulated 
scenarios, playing the role of active managers who would be making decisions based on 
information available at the time. Imperfect or delayed decision-making can also be modeled, 
limiting potential overestimates of achievable returns.  
 
The following are some of many RO  
 
• Option to abandon. The possibility to stop investing and liquidate existing assets 
• Option to switch. Redistribute resources or change inputs 
• Option to contract. The flexibility to reduce the rate of output  
• Option to expand. An option to defer part of the scale of investment. 
 
These options can also be rolled into a consolidated framework that allows for the many 
alternatives to be analyzed in a complimentary fashion. 
 
Example: 
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Consider a decision maker is faced with an opportunity to invest Io = $ 104 in a given 
project whose value in each period will either move up by 60 % or down by 20 % depending 
on market price underlying variations.  A year later the project will have an expected value 
of $160 if the market price moves up or $80 if it moves down. There is an equal probability 
that the price of the underlying commodity will move up or down in a period t. Let S be the 
price of twin security that is treated in financial markets and has the same risk characteristic 
with the real project under consideration. The project and the twin security have an expected 
rate of return of 20 %. The risk free interest rate is of 5 % 
 
Assume that the value of the project, Vt, and its twin security price, St, move through the 
time as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Option valuation tree 
 
The pair (Vo, So) represents a current gross project value of $ 100 million and a spot 
commodity price of $ 18. Under Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, the current gross project 
value would be obtained first by discounting the project’s end-of –period values using the 
expected rate of return of the project’s twin security as the appropriate discount rate, i.e., Vo 
= (0.5x160 + 0.5x80)/(1+0.2) = 100. The project’s NPV is given by: NPV = Vo - Io = -4  
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The same solution can be obtained from its expected future values discounted at the 
riskless rate, r. In such a risk-neutral world, the current value of the project, E, is given by: 
 
( )1
1
pE p E
E
r
+ −+ −= +   
 
where ( )( )
1 r S S
p
S S
−
+ −
+ −= −  
 
( )
( )
1.05*18 14.4
0.3125
28.8 14.4
p
−= =−  
 
Observe that the value for p is distinct from the actual probability q, and can be used to 
determine expected cash flows which can be properly discounted at the risk free rate. For 
example: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
0.3125*160 0.6875*80
100
1.05o
V
+= =  
 
We next illustrate how RO can enhance the value of the opportunity to abandon the project. 
Abandonment options analysis not only provides and estimates the value of optimal 
abandonment, but it also indicates when the abandonment should be implemented. 
Continuing with the example, now let the project’s current savage value $90. 
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Figure 6.9 Abandonment option valuation tree 
 
Figure 6.9 shows the binomial lattice calculation. If prices decline substantially or the 
operation does poorly for some reason, management does not have to continue incurring the 
fixed cost, abandon may be the best option.  
 
4.3 Porte Five Forces Model 
In the market oriented environment aggressiveness will depend on different factors such as 
number of competitors, competitor’s strategies, market substitutes, among others. Those 
factors are represented in the Porter’s five forces model [13][14]. 
 
 The Porter’s model brings the big picture to evaluate the potential profit of an industry in a 
competitive environment. These five forces are: 
 
1) Barriers to entry 
2) Rivalry among existing competitors 
3) Substitutes 
4) Power of Buyers 
5) Power of Suppliers 
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Each of those five forces collectively impacts the potential profit and jointly determines the 
intensity of the industry competition and profitability. In order to analyze the specific 
activities through which firms can create a competitive advantage, it is useful to model the 
firm as a chain of value-creating strategies taking in consideration the five forces. The goal 
of these strategies is to create value that exceeds the cost of providing the product or service, 
thus generating a profit margin. 
 
Evidently, there is a need for a mechanism through which these five forces can be 
integrated together. Supply chain management is a strategy through which such integration 
can be accomplished. The value chain describes the full range of required activities to bring a 
product or service from conception, through the intermediary phases of production, delivery 
to final consumers [15][16].  
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Porter’s five forces 
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The value of high volatility, due to small change to transmission congestion and to network 
operating restrictions, leads to larger valuations. 
 
Strategic market decision is usually performed towards optimal bidding process. 
Transmission effects are frequently neglected in bidding models. The optimal bidding 
strategy is function of several factors: generator status, commodity/services market prices, 
transmission constraints, participants’ strategies, force outages, and operational market rules.  
 
Some of the abovementioned factors are independent of market reaction and participants’ 
strategies. Market uncertainty is represented by commodity prices whereas transmission 
constraints and forced outages generally are technical uncertainties. Generation status is a 
self-dependent constraint that must be considered in order to avoid physical operational 
inconsistencies. These market and technical uncertainties will impact GenCos’ bidding 
strategies. 
 
Investing on information will reduce uncertainty. Reduction on uncertainty can be 
quantified in present value and added up. After new information is brought, the GenCo’s 
decision is driven by the new expectation. This new expectation is conditional to the kind of 
new information. Lack of information tends to perform suboptimal operation and 
development decisions. 
 
Market information provided by exchanges is displayed in the commodity prices. Different 
prices exist on the extraction/delivery points due to transmission costs and constraints. The 
trading of forward contracts distorts partially commodity prices, imperfect information.  
 
The organization of the market itself would play an important role in market information. 
Spot market equilibrium, price and quantity, is provided by the power exchange, additional 
information such as the aggregate supply and demand curves can also by provided. Market 
information would or would not be part of the exchange fees [17]. 
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As an example consider the following case. A Generation Company is competing to sell 
energy and reactive power support. As long as the transmission system becomes congested 
reactive power is positively correlated to energy as well as the other supportive services (for 
sake of simplicity considerer just Energy and Reactive Power). Suppose that prices will 
either move up or down by 20 % in period one and 30 % in period two, depending on market 
price underlying variations and transmission operational conditions. 
 
The up and down factors are different over the two time periods. Consequently the 
binomial lattice will not longer be recombined as it is shown in Figure 6.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Lattice evolution of the underlying 
 
Under the assumption of mutually exclusive services, the two graphs will be independent; 
the net profit is then the sum up of the different services provided by the GenCo.  
 
Consider the spot price of $ 40.00 and $ 5.50 for energy and reactive power respectively. 
Additionally, assume the risk free interest rate is of 10 %. 
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Figure 6.12 Lattice option valuation 
 
Figure 6.12 shows the option valuation binomial tree. The binomial option valuations 
results to be greater than the NPV for both commodities providing an additional value. 
 
energy bid added value = 6.16 - 5.00 = $1.16  
reactive power added value = 0.97 - 0.50 = $0.47  
 
6. Observations 
Nowadays, transmission network remains highly regulated in almost all the markets. In the 
vertical integrated industry the decisions of new investments in generation and transmission 
were made jointly attaining reliability and social welfare issues. However a decentralized 
market model such investment must be done independently. Generation location will be 
persuaded to install new capacity close to consumer centers delaying new investment in 
transmission lines. On the other hand, expanding the transmission system would decrease 
generator profits. When new investments are made in generation, although it would modify 
system’s power flows, transmission would reallocate revenue costs among participants. 
Modification on power flows would modify revenue costs of the transmission system. 
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Investors in generation can evaluate a potential project at a particular location, estimate 
expected economic profits, and then decide whether it is attractive to risk its capital. After 
the power plant is placed in operation, profits will depend on how the plant is operated. 
Transmission is inherently different. The extent to which a transmission element is used in 
real-time depends on the electrical parameters and the overall system flows, not the price 
charged for the service. 
 
Incorporation of Flexible AC Transmission (FACT) devices could be an alternative for 
expansion in the transmission system. Investments in generation rather than transmission 
seem more attractive for market participants. Transmission improvements would remove the 
natural monopoly character of the wholesale power market in most locations or would not. 
Distributed Generation (DG) is a clear example of expansion in the generation sector. The 
lack of reactive power support of DG, i.e. reactive power for voltage control, will open the 
door for investment in reactive power devices needed to maintain real power transactions. 
 
The growth of transmission grid requires transmission companies to make ex-ante contracts 
based on the expected usage to finance projects. Transmission expansion investments would 
underwrite the usage of equipment subject to the long term commitments to which 
distribution and generation companies are bound by the rules of network expansion to 
maintain a fair market place. 
 
 
7. Summary 
In this document we have discussed different aspects that must be considered for GenCos 
competitive bidding under liquid energy market condition. 
 
Two of the main sources of uncertainty in the electricity market are market and technical 
uncertainties. Lack of information would jeopardize firms’ goal, profits maximization, in a 
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market-oriented paradigm. Consideration of technical uncertainties in a real option modeling 
would be capture in the adaptive bidding process. 
 
Operational real options are a flexible tool for real assets able to enhance GenCos strategic 
decisions in multiple markets. Generators are a multi-product investment project per se. 
Hence, GenCos will need to find a value for each of the products contributing to the net 
economic profit. Additivity of individual option values is feasible when market 
decomposition participations are independent and options do not rely on the same 
underlying. 
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Abstract 
With the electricity market aperture, Energy Market is becoming every day more unified. 
Nowadays, there is a volatile market price at which electricity is provided. Price volatility is 
increasing for fuel inputs due to market restructuring. This means that Generation Companies 
(GenCos) under deregulated market structure faces a lot more uncertainty than under the 
traditional vertical integrated structure. But the new environment also offers benefits to the 
GenCos. Under the assumption that a liquid market exists, GenCos can decide the amount of 
electricity to produce to maximize profit according to the risk desired. Daily operation for 
maximizing expected profits for generation assets in a dynamic competitive electricity 
market still relies on the traditional Unit Commitment (UC) solution. In this document we 
formulate the real option optimal self-scheduling for a GenCo market participant. 
Participation in the electricity market is focused on two spot markets: energy and reserves. 
According to the fuel prices, GenCos would decide level of participation in the electricity or 
fuel markets. Stochastic UC is considered for scheduling different units using different fuel 
inputs. It is also shown that by participating in the environmental market, GenCos would be 
able to increase level of production. 
 
 
I. NOMENCLATURE 
Through this paper, we use the following notation: 
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T = Total umber of periods 
n = Total number of units 
t = Hour index 
itu  
= Binary decision variable indicating whether the unit i 
   at period t is up or down 
itx  
= State variable indicating the length of time that the unit 
   i has been up or down at period t 
iπ  = Gross expected profit of GenCo i 
E
tP  = Energy spot price at period t 
S
tP  = Spinning reserve spot price at period t 
F
tP  = Fuel spot price at period t 
tS  = Spinning reserve at period t 
tD  = Demand required at period t 
iZ  = Maximum power ramp-up increment of unit i 
iW  = Maximum power ramp-down decrement of unit i 
tR  = Revenue of unit i at period t 
ty
+  = Amount of purchased allowances at period t 
ty
−  = Amount of sold allowances at period t 
EA = SO2 maximum hourly emission allowances ( )itSu u  = Start-up costs of unit i at period t  
( )itSd u  = Shutdown costs of unit i at period t 
,i tPg  = Active power generation of unit i at period t 
( )t itC Pg  = Operation cost of unit i at period t 
( )t itH Pg  = Heat rate of unit i  
min
itPg , maxitPg  = Lower and upper generation limit of unit i 
( )( ),,t t i tE R C Pg  = European production option 
 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
With deregulation of the electric industry different market models have been 
implemented. Three groups of market models are identified [1]: centralized, decentralized, 
and hybrid models.  Centralized models were favored initially because they imitate vertically 
integrated operations, being a natural step towards more decentralized market design. Under 
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this framework, a System Operator (SO) wields a rigid control over the wholesale electricity 
market.  Due to the complexity of the bulk power system, the SO is also responsible for 
providing supportive services. Decentralized models are based on an Exchange where a 
Market Operator (MO) is in charge of market activities. A single entity may execute System 
and Market activities or two independent entities would be responsible to separately handle 
the responsibilities of market-making and network operations. Under market completeness 
and perfectly competitive assumptions, centralized and decentralized designs could attain the 
same result. This is the primal-dual equivalence of first-best implementations when vigorous 
competition makes the first best incentive compatible [1]. But this primal-dual equivalence 
fails in practice since markets are imperfectly competitive and poorly synchronized. On the 
other hand centralized designs request accurate data, which private market participants are 
reluctant to provide creating market inefficiencies. Hybrid models are created to alleviate 
previous concerns. 
The tendency of wholesale electricity markets keeps moving towards a decentralized 
market structure.  Decentralized market economies characterized by price-taking consumers 
and firms are supported by price systems. Price summarizes part of the information. 
Knowing the price, consumers are supposed to know how to choose their consumption 
bundle, without knowing others’ behavior or the set of scarce resources. In real-world 
decentralized market economies, price is not enough for coordinating the supplies and 
demands of private agents since many of them in such markets are price setters. Market 
protocols, market institutions, and supportive policies to reduce the number of multiple 
market equilibrium, play an important role for establishing rules through a collaborative 
process to ensure that the markets operate fairly and efficiently. 
In the electric industry, power exchange (PX) is a centralized market that trades energy as 
Power Pool does. These two entities play market roles in the decentralized and centralized 
models mentioned above. However, differences between them exist in the way they constrain 
market participants’ strategies. Indeed, participants’ market strategies in Pool model are 
more restricted given that an overall optimization of operational decisions is executed. On 
the other hand, PX completes reliance on “voluntary participation.”  
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The criticism against PX is that it does not consider the Unit Commitment (UC) problem. 
Hence, it is argued that self-scheduling does not fully internalize inter-temporal 
considerations. But, inter-temporal effects are not exclusive of electricity markets and these 
can be controlled by using additional markets likewise in agricultural commodities. In 
addition, SO remain wary of reliance on markets to ensure reliability. From the SO’s point of 
view reliability seems precarious because voluntary participation could jeopardize real-time 
operations.  
In electricity markets, instantaneous supply and demand must always be in balance. This 
creates the need to hold reserves to balance instantaneous variations in load. The existing 
market models handled this problem in two different ways with possible variations. 
 
1) Obligatory participation in the provision of the spinning reserve service.  
2) An independent market exists wherein the spinning reserve is traded. 
 
The mathematical formulation in a centralized model (obligatory participation) calls for 
spinning reserve as an additional constraint. This constraint can be treated as a global 
constraint or indexed to each unit. The latest would result in a better reserve distribution over 
the system, but not necessarily at the minimum cost. The earlier formulation ties both 
services: energy and reserve. 
On the other hand, when an independent market exists, each supplier is responsible for its 
own decisions on what and how to bid into the energy and AS markets. Bidders bear all the 
risks of poor decisions and might be faced with suboptimal or even impossible operation of 
their units.  Given that the SO does not control or direct dispatch of generation units, the SO 
would decide to purchase more AS, i.e. reserves, than centralized systems do. As 
consequence additional costs are incurred unless mechanisms for allocating different levels 
of security exist. 
In this document we formulate the real option optimal self-scheduling for a GenCo market 
participant. Participation in the electricity spot market is focused on two different markets: 
energy and reserves. GenCos offer power in block contracts in hourly independent trading 
periods for each commodity; this implies that the market supply curves have the form of a 
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step function. The intersection of the aggregate supply and aggregate demand curves 
determine the Market Clearing Price (MCP). All bids accepted at prices lower than the MCP 
are paid at the MCP instead of their bid prices. The used spinning reserve is fully paid the 
same as unused. Therefore, the optimization program is formulated as a set of European 
options. Environmental constraints are included in the formulation. It is also shown that by 
participating in the environmental market, GenCos would be able to increase profits.  
The reminder of the document is as follows. In the next section, the constrained UC is 
briefly reviewed. In Section IV the UC problem is formulated on the Real Options 
framework. The formulation considers operational constraints. Numerical examples are 
presented in the subsequent section. The last section presents the conclusions of the present 
work. 
 
III. CONSTRAINED UNIT COMMITMENT 
The economic operation of an electric power system requires that expenditures for fuel be 
minimized over a period time. When there is limitation on energy resources, it can 
complicate the short-term unit scheduling. In response, a short term fuel constrained UC 
need to be executed [2]. UC must take into account what happened in the past and what will 
happen in the future. In order to prevent high variations in prices due to unexpected events, 
GenCos used to sign fuel contracts with the fuel supplier. 
In the past, the take-or–pay contract probably was the simplest financial option offered to 
producers to reduce uncertainty on fuel delivery. Take-or-pay fuel contract is an agreement 
in which utility agrees to use a specified minimum amount of fuel during a given period of 
time or failing to use the specified amount it agrees to pay the minimum penalty. Another 
alternative was to get involved in long-term contracts. This was an option for base-load 
generation units. Nowadays, long-term contracts have been used to lock prices; price risk is 
removed, in absence of options and other financial derivatives. But before entering into long-
term contracts, the company must evaluate the benefits that it expects to obtain from it. The 
optimal contract length reflects an economic trade-off between the marginal cost and 
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marginal benefits of extending the length of the benefit. A graphical representation of 
optimal length contracts is shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 Optimal Length Contract 
 
With the liberalization of fuel markets, the merit-order for the scheduling of generating 
units is not any longer guaranteed. Fuel can be contracted for purchase in a number of ways, 
allowing the generator to increase security of supply of primary fuel. However, there are 
limits to the flexibility of supply that a generator can achieve. The optimal contract length 
also depends on market information, as future economic environment becomes more certain, 
the length of contracts decreases [3]. Take-or-pay contracts and limitations associated with 
the gas delivery system are explicitly considered in determining the short-term UC strategy. 
A method for coordinating multiple constraints fuels which compete with one another is 
presented in [4]. The proposed method is general enough such that it can be used to solve 
many fuel constrained decision problems often encountered by the utility industry in its 
operation/planning activities.  
The market permits GenCos to make more optimal decisions in committing to often 
expensive solutions. Hence, given that GenCos wish to maximize profits in the new 
restructured electric industry, it is necessary to redefine the UC problem. Richter et al. [5] 
formulate the UC problem as maximization profit program. Buyers purchase reserves per 
contract. Samer et al. [6] presents a stochastic model for scheduling the generation units of 
an electric utility while taking power trading and fluctuations in fuel and electricity prices 
into consideration. The model accounts for fuel constraints. 
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The emission allowances trading gives flexibility to generating units on the treatment of 
pollution constraints. In this document we treat these constraints as European options. 
 
IV. UC: REAL OPTIONS FRAMEWORK 
UC has been used in the vertical integrated electric industry for scheduling units to meet 
the demand at minimum cost. For day-ahead market, the total profit maximization with all 
the technical and economic constraints becomes generation scheduling program for GenCos 
in the deregulated environment with impacts of competitor’s decisions and market 
conditions. Hence, UC will be a key tool for GenCo’s optimal marketing decision. 
Real options (RO) have become an important tool in valuation of generation assets in the 
electric industry [7][8][9]. RO is a term that has been created to identify the value inherent in 
a physical asset that is derived from some future contingent decision. RO is an extension of 
financial options to tangible assets [10]. Therefore, RO like financial options, give an owner 
the right but not the obligation, to take action [10][11]. The optimization program is 
formulated as a set of European options since they are exercised at maturity time t, where t 
represents the hourly trading period. 
Electricity market prices are an important input to the profit-based UC algorithm; they are 
used to determine the expected revenue. The forecast of remaining demand and forecasted 
spot prices are calculated for each hour by another routine not described here.  
The optimization program is to maximize the expected profit from the generation assets, 
energy and reserve, subject to operational constraints, over a period of time. Then, the UC 
program in the real option framework is formulated as the following mixed-integer 
programming problem: 
 
Maximize the expected profits 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ },max ,n ti t i t it itE E R C Pg Su u Sd u⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦∑                                                                (1) 
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where  
 
( )( ) ( )( ), , , ,, E St t tt i t i t i t t i t itE R C Pg P Pg P S C Pg u= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅  
 
subject to the following constraints. 
 
Demand constraint: At every period the residual demand would be estimated, so 
 
1 , 1,...,
n
i i t it tPg u D t T= ⋅ ≤ ∀ =∑                                                                                 (2) 
 
Spinning Reserve: reserve residual demand would be estimated at every period, then 
 
1 , 1,...,
n
i i t RS S t T= ≤ ∀ =∑                                                                                      (3) 
 
Ramp-up constraints: From one time instant to the next the unit cannot increase its output 
above a maximum increment; this yields 
 
,, 1 1,...,i t ii tPg Pg Z t T+ − ≤ ∀ =                                                                                  (4) 
 
Ramp-down constraints: A unit cannot decrease its output power above a maximum 
power decrement. Therefore 
 
, , 1 1,...,i t ii tPg Pg W t T+− ≤ ∀ =                                                                                 (5) 
 
Unit capacity constrain: Any unit at any time should operate within operational limits, 
then 
 
, ,
min max
,i t i ti tPgPg Pg≤ ≤                                                                                                             (6) 
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State transition constraints: The length of time the unit has been off or on-line. 
 
( )
( )
1
1
min , 1 1
max , 1 0
on
i
off
i
itt
it
itt
t x if u
x
t x if u
+
+
⎧ + =⎪= ⎨ − =⎪⎩
                                                                                         (7) 
 
Unit status constraint: The unit can be either on or off, then 
 
, 1
, 1
1 1
0 1
on
i
off
i
i t
it
i t
if x t
u
if x t
−
−
⎧ ≤ <⎪= ⎨ − ≥ > −⎪⎩
                                                                                                (8) 
 
The power production cost function is given by: 
 
( ) ( )2, , ,, ,
,
0
0 0
F
t i i i t i i t i t
i t i t
i t
P a b Pg d Pg if Pg
C Pg
if Pg
⎧ ⋅ + + >⎪= ⎨ =⎪⎩
                                                         (9) 
 
where { }, , .F Oil Coal N Gas∈  
 
In the following section emission allowances is discussed. The emission constraint and 
how it is relaxed with the use of the emission market is also presented. 
 
 
V. EMISSION ALLOWANCES 
Emission markets arose as a consequence of the imposition of controls on nitrogen and 
sulfur oxides (NOx, SOx) through the Clean Air Act. The Act established nationwide limits 
on SO2 emissions and allocated emission credit to generators. The Act permits the free 
exchange of allowance credits while meeting environmental restrictions. A method for 
coordinating sulfur dioxide emission allowance trading, energy and spinning reserve 
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transactions, and consumption of take-or-pay fuels in the context of generation dispatching is 
presented in [12]. 
Environmental constraints would be relaxed by getting involved in pollution rights market 
[13]. The GenCo will have to take positions in the emission market and decide whether to 
exercise it or not depending on the marginal benefits at given period of time. In this 
document, we are modeling the pollution rights as European options as well, given that the 
trading period for electricity is considered hourly. 
A convex function for trading allowance is considered for the local system. The 
incremental cost function of emission allowances is shown in Figure 7.2 in 
where 0y > represents local system purchases allowances from the external market and 
0y < denotes the local system sells emission allowances to the external market [12]. The sales 
of emissions represent extra revenue. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Incremental cost emission allowances function 
 
The emission constraint included in the formulation is given by: 
 
( )t titH Pg y EA− ≤                                                                                                                (10) 
 
When a generating unit is scheduled to dispatch based on spot market and the emission 
constraints are activated, the trading of emission allowances would allow them to increase 
Sales Purchases 
y 
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production level if the marginal benefit of producing is greater than the value of the pollution 
right. 
In this work, the previous condition is represented as European option, which 
mathematically is described by: 
  
( )max ,0TS X−                                                                                                                      (11) 
 
This reflects the fact that the option will be exercised if .TS X> A graphical representation 
of previous situation is depicted in Figure 7.3.  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Representation of the emission constraint and emission option 
 
The effect on the optimal commitment decision will be determined by the dependence 
between the prices of electricity and the prices of fuel and emission rights. 
 
 
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
In this section simple examples are presented. In these examples, the time horizon is 3 
hours with hourly trading periods. The generation system has 3 units. Three different fuels 
are available for consumption by the 3 generating units. The unit parameters are given in 
Table I.  
MWh 
Emission constraint 
Option exercising 
$/
M
W
h 
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TABLE I 
Unit parameters 
Unit 1 2 3 
Fuel Coal N. Gas Oil 
a  ($/h) 300.00 200.00 5.00 
b  ($/MWh) 21.75 12.01 1.22 
c  ($/MW2h) 0.002400 0.001956 0.00001685 
Pmin  (MW) 50 20 50 
Pmax  (MW) 300 50 420 
Min up (h) 2 3 2 
Min down (h) 1 1 1 
Max Ramp up 100 100 50 
Max Ramp down 100 100 50 
 
Developing the forecasted data is an important topic, but beyond the scope of this paper. 
For the results presented in this section, the forecasted load and prices are taken to be those 
shown in Table II. The transmission system is neglected in the optimization program. Fuel 
prices are considered to follow a random walk and are shown in Table III. 
 
TABLE II 
Forecasted demand and prices 
Period tD  tS  
E
tP  
S
tP  
1 508.70 50.87 24.22 21.5 
2 531.70 53.17 26.60 23.2 
3 523.20 52.32 25.31 22.9 
 
TABLE III 
Forecasted fuel prices 
 Fuel Type 
Period Coal $/Ton 
N. Gas 
$/MMBTUs 
Oil 
$/bbl 
1 0.978 2.116 27.731 
2 1.027 2.073 26.899 
3 1.078 2.033 27.705 
 
The first example illustrates the self-scheduling real option approach. The impact of 
trading allowances is neglected. The second example takes into consideration trading 
emission allowances and shows the effect on firm’s profits improvements. 
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The unit scheduling neglecting environmental constraints is presented in Table IV. 
 
TABLE IV 
Unit status 
Period Coal N Gas Oil 
1 1 0 0 
2 1 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
 
The generation outputs produced at every period are displayed in Table V.  
 
TABLE V 
Units’ output committed 
Period U1 U2 U3 
 D S D S D S 
1 100 0 0 0 0 0 
2 100 0 0 53.17 0 0 
3 50 0 0 0 0 0 
 
From Table V it can be observed that Unit 1 is restricted to produce 100 MW in the first 
and the second period due to the Ramp Up constraint. The Spot price covers its average 
costs. Units 2 and 3 are not producing given that the Spot price is very low. However, they 
may decide to participate in the reserve market. In order to evaluate the participation in this 
market, they need to forecast the probability of being call. Assume that the probability to be 
call is 70%, just in period 2 the U2 will be willing to sell in the reserve market.  
 
TABLE VI 
Unit profits 
Period U1 U2 U3 
1 63.5145 0.0 0.0 
2 603.5375 1233.5 0.0 
3 2.8020 0.0 0.0 
Total 669.8540 1233.5 0.0 
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Additional profit can be obtained if during the periods of non emission violation those are 
sold to the emission markets or are swapped with other market players.  
 
In this second example, it is assumed that coal-fired unit emits SO2 at rate of 0.001 
Ton/MBTU and the SO2 emission of the gas-fired and oil units are neglected. The results are 
shown in Tables VII and VIII. 
 
TABLE VII 
Unit status 
 
Period Coal N Gas Oil 
1 1 0 0 
2 1 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
 
 
TABLE VIII 
Units’ output committed 
 
Period U1 U2 U3 
 D S D S D S 
1 100 0 0 0.00 0 0 
2 100 0 0 53.17 0 0 
3 50 0 0 0.00 0 0 
 
 
In the second case, the constraint in emission does not allow that the Coal unit produces 
its maximum capacity. This constraint is relaxed by trading emission allowances. In our 
formulation it implies to exercise an option. Definitely, even when the solution in production 
is similar profits are higher in the first case, this, because emission constraints were not 
considered nor the cost of emission options. In order to producers increase their output, the 
exercise of pollution options were required. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The optimal UC program has been formulated in Real Option Framework. The market 
participation was considered in the provision of two different services: Electric Energy and 
Reserve.  
The formulation of the optimization program is simple but consistent with the hourly 
sequential auctions in the spot market. 
The use of emission rights would allow GenCos to relax emission constraints. These rights 
are also model as European options. 
Electricity markets have been maturing and a growth in the use of financial derivatives is 
expected. Thus, a better understanding of financial and economic theory would be helpful to 
manage risk. 
The effect on the optimal committed decision will be determined by the dependence 
between the prices of electricity and the prices of fuel and emission rights. 
Real Options can dynamically adapt while operational constraints are considered since it 
can be seen as dynamic optimization portfolio. 
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Abstract 
The fundamental Walrasian model of resource allocations can be replaced by a 
decentralized dynamical model. In a decentralized dynamic model, price plays the role of 
control and coordination of players’ actions. Economic market dynamics is commonly 
studied from the stability viewpoint. Market price over a period of time is determined by the 
interaction of the market supply and market demand. Movements between equilibrium must 
be explained utilizing comparative static analysis. But, when time is explicit in the system, 
dynamic analysis must replace the latter method. The ability of the system to successfully 
navigate between points of equilibrium is known as dynamic stability. In this document, 
price market dynamics is emphasized as the bidding iterative process associated to each 
trading period. Additional properties can be studied under the dynamic framework in order to 
achieve market efficiency. Controllability, observability, and reachability may help to 
monitor market dynamics. Market monitoring covers financial and physical market activities. 
Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the market dynamics properties. Finally, some 
related issues are discussed and conclusions are presented 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental Walrasian model of resource allocations can be replaced by a 
decentralized dynamical model. In a decentralized dynamic model, price plays the role of 
control and coordination of non-cooperative players’ actions. 
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Economic market dynamics is commonly studied from the stability viewpoint. Under pure 
perfect competition condition, market price over a period of time is determined by the 
interaction of the market supply and market demand [1]. However, this may require several 
rounds before the aggregate demand and aggregate supply intersects [2]. 
Movements between equilibrium must be explained utilizing comparative static analysis. 
But, when time is explicit in the system, dynamic analysis must replace the latter method. 
The movement between equilibrium points is a function of time. The ability of the system to 
successfully navigate between points of equilibrium is known as dynamic stability [3]. 
System theory has been used for economists to study inter-temporal resources allocation 
on competitive market environment since system theory studies transitions and changes in 
variables with time. Controllability, from the System Operator (SO) viewpoint, makes him 
able to adjust market performance by adjusting market system state variables. On the other 
hand, observability is associated with market information. In this context, controllability and 
observability system’s properties may help to identify market dynamic behavior, monitoring 
the market, in order to prevent market inefficiencies or market abuse. 
Currently, electricity markets are composed of multilateral and spot markets. Multilateral 
contracts are direct agreements between participants, whereas spot trading is executed by 
using exchanges, similarly to other commodities. Then, the market is not completed 
informed. The market may be observable or may not. In either case, it is convenient that 
market participant actions be verifiable, market monitoring. 
Effective market monitoring is needed to prevent gamming, market power, or market 
inefficiencies. FERC Order 2000 and FERC Order on standard market design (SMD) identify 
market monitoring as a basic function [4].  
Market monitoring can be sorted on financial and physical market activities. Financial 
monitoring includes monitoring of supply and demand conditions and market performance, 
monitoring of market power exercise, and monitoring of market participants’ activities and 
transactions. Physical monitoring takes account of generation and transmission outages, 
availability indices (generation and transmission), among others [4]. 
Little work on electricity market dynamics is reported in the literature. Power system 
market modeling by differential algebraic equations and eigenvalue techniques is reported in 
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[5]. In references [7][8] market dynamics is modeled by using a discrete linear system model. 
The model is a closed-loop dynamic system in which previous and current information are 
use as a feedback signal. Two types of suppliers’ decision making processes are presented: 
decision making under weighted moving average expectation and decision making under 
adaptive expectation. In [9] the authors developed a dynamic game base on a dynamic 
system in which generators are players. Generators learn the market and evaluate their next 
bids by using available market information, past prices, and private information. 
Several assumptions constitute the framework of the present document: Market partial 
analysis, the market equilibrium price-quantity is defined only for the spot market, market 
demand is negatively-sloping linear function, and the transmission system is neglected. 
This work studies the electric price spot market dynamics. The cornerstone of market 
dynamics is control theory. Price market dynamics is emphasized as the bidding iterative 
process associated to each trading period. Common definitions in the jargon of system 
theory, such as controllability, observability, and reachability are introduced in section III. In 
this document, market controllability and observability are seen from the Market 
Operator/System Operator (MO/SO) point of view. If the market is controllable, then it is 
possible to adjust market system state variables in order to adjust market performance. 
However, to adjust the market involves costs, intervention costs. If the market is observable, 
the MO can know the transition process of the market state variables. Market structure is 
described in section IV. Numerical examples are presented in section V to illustrate price 
market dynamics. Market Monitoring issues are briefly discussed in section VI. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn in section VII. 
 
III. MARKET DYNAMICS: CONTROL THEORY 
In decentralized markets, the information on the allocation problem is split over the 
system. Price summarizes part of the information. Knowing the price, consumers are 
supposed to know how to choose their consumption bundle, without knowing neither the 
others consumers behavior nor the set of scarce resources. 
  
129
System theory has been used for economists to study intertemporal resources allocation on 
competitive market environment. One of the advantages of the system theory approach is that 
it can be more easily adapted to explain noncompetitive commodity markets. 
In the discrete form, system state space model is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1X k A k X k B k U k
Y k C k X k D k U k
+ = +
= +                                                                                       (1) 
 
A. Controllability 
A linear system is said to be controllable if, for initial state ( ) 00x x=  there exists some 
input sequence of finite length that drives the state vector to any final state 1x . Controllability 
of the system is determined by matrices A and B [10]. Controllability can be determined by 
testing if the controllability matrix (CO) has rank n, where n is the dimension of the state 
space. 
 
1nCO B AB A B−⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦K                                                                                                    (2) 
 
( ) ( )CO Rank CO nρ = =   controllable→  
 
B. Observability 
Analogously, a linear system is said to be observable if, for any unknown initial state 
( )0x  there exists a finite integer 1 0k >  such that the knowledge of the input sequence and 
output sequence ( )y k  from k=0 to 1k suffices to determine uniquely the initial states. 
Observability involves the matrices A and C [10]. The system is observable, if and only if the 
observability matrix (OB) has full rank (Rank (OB) = n) 
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1n
C
CA
OB
CA −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
M                                                                                                                           (3) 
 
C. Reachability 
A state is said to be reachable from the origin, if given ( )0 0x =  there exist a finite time 
interval [ ]0,T and an input ( ) [ ]{ }, 0,u t t T∈  such that ( )x T x=  
 
IV. MARKET STRUCTURE 
The complex interactions and interdependencies among electricity market participants are 
similar to those studied in game theory [11][12]. However, the different existing markets: 
day-ahead and forward, force Generation Companies (GenCos) to make strategic marketing 
decisions regarding the operation of the generating resources. The specific rules under which 
each different market operates will influence decisions made by market participants. 
In what follows, dynamic Cournot model under naïve and forward expectations is 
considered. Players adjust their bids depending upon the “state” of the market. The MO is the 
auctioneer who collects supply bids, update prices and send it back to suppliers. Suppliers 
adjust bids and pass them to MO. This process is repeated until demand is satisfied for every 
trading period. Agents’ flow information is schematically represented in Figure 8.1. GenCos 
are the suppliers whereas Distribution Companies (DisCos) and Energy Management 
Companies (EMCos) are the consumers. 
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Figure 8.1 Agents’ flow information in a decentralized electricity market 
 
Consider the linear market-demand function given by: 
 
( ) ( )( )p Q k a bQ k= −                                                                                                         (4) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )1 2Q k q k q k= +  
 
At period k, the profit of the GenCo i is: 
 
( )( )( )( ) ( )i i ik p Q k c q kπ = −                                                                                               (5) 
 
Without loss of generality assume equal production cost and initial conditions equal to 
zero.  
Solving for each GenCo their optimization problem, under the assumption of players 
behave naively, we obtain the industry output: 
 
( ) ( )2
3
a c
Q k
b
−=                                                                                                                      (6) 
 
and the market price is: 
 
AUCTIONEER Gi 
MW
$ 
Gj
MW
$ 
MW
$ 
EMCO
MW
$ 
DISCO
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( ) 11 1
Ng
i tc i
t
g
a c p
p
N
−=+ −= +
∑                                                                                                              (7) 
 
There exists only one steady state equilibrium point given by: 
 
( )* 11
Ng
ii
g
a c
p
N
=+= +
∑                                                                                                                       (8) 
 
Similarly, for the forward expectation case, we set up their optimization problem and 
solve for players’ outputs, it yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
2 2
j
i j
a cq k q k
b
λ−−= − −                                                                                            (9) 
 
The reaction functions are given by: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
j j i
i i
a cq k q k
b
λ λ λ+ −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠                                                               (10) 
 
Change in output at period k with respect owns expectations are negative, except when 
other agent’s expectation coefficient equals 1. The change in output at period k with respect 
past output, is always positive, except when own expectation coefficient equals 1. 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) { }11 0 1 1
1 2 2
ji i
i
q k
q k
λλ λ λ−∂ −= > ∀ ∈ − < <∂ −                                                            (11) 
 
When the expected coefficients are all equal to 1 the Bertrand outcome is achieved. On the 
other hand, when expected coefficients are all zero, the Cournot outcome is reached. For 
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0 1i iλ λ λ≠ ∈ ≤ ≤  the Leader-Follower are attained. Figure 8.2 portrays the different possible 
outcomes with 115, 2,a b= =  and 0.c =  
 
 
Figure 8.2 Expected agents’ impact on market equilibrium 
 
The generalized steady state equilibrium industry output and market price under naïve and 
forward expectations for n players and different production costs are given by the 
expressions shown in Table I. 
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TABLE I. 
STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM MARKET 
N A I V E F O R W A R D  
P 
R 
I 
C 
E 
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Whether central optimization models or centralized auction mechanism are use to clear the 
market, it is known the difficulties of allocating units with exact cost or bids results on 
degenerated solutions [13][14]. From the dynamics point of view, this represents that the 
market is not controllable neither observable. However, the market reaches the equilibrium 
which is also a Nash Equilibrium [11][12]. 
Under the current market-rules of the day-ahead market, price is determined at the 
beginning of every period (24 periods). The price prevails constant in each of these periods. 
Graphically, this is represented in Figure 8.3 for three succeeding periods. 
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Figure 8.3 Multi-period dynamic market clearing price 
 
The dynamics represents the necessary bidding rounds between players and auctioneer, in 
order to reach market clearing price. 
Figure 8.4 presents the dynamic price discovery for a given trading period under a naïve 
expectation. This is the dynamic effect shown in Figure 8.3 on supply-demand curves 
representation. The quantity supplied in the initial period is short, producing a relative large 
price where it intersects the demand curve. This large price intersecting the supply curve 
calls forth in the next period a large supply. The production and price keep moving until 
equilibrium is reached. 
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This process is carried out every trading period. GenCos’ actions become strategically 
linked. 
 
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
This section presents some numerical examples of the models above described. This 
version is for a single period and single market without generation upper limits. With out loss 
of generality this idea could be extended to cover the energy market, as well as fuel and 
environmental markets. Nevertheless, we will concentrate only in the electricity sector. 
For sake of simplicity two players compose the market. First, GenCo 1 and GenCo 2 
compete to supply the market under Cournot naïve expectation. Subsequently, Cournot under 
forward expectation is simulated.  
Three cases are considered under agents’ naïve expectations. Production costs are equal in 
case I. In cases II and III production cost of GenCo 2 had increased. Demand and production 
cost parameters are shown in Table II. Simulation results are presented in Table III. 
 
TABLE II 
DEMAND AND PRODUCTION COST PARAMETERS 
Parameters CASE I CASE II CASE III 
a  115 115 115 
b  2 2 2 
1c  4 4 4 
2c  4 6 8 
 
TABLE III 
MARKET DYNAMICS PROPERTIES UNDER NAÏVE EXPECTATIONS 
1q (MW) 18.50 18.8333 19.1666 
2q (MW) 18.50 17.8333 17.1667 
Controllable No Yes Yes 
Observable No No No 
Stable Yes Yes Yes 
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From Table III, we can observe that the system market is stable. When cost are equal, 
market equilibrium is reached, but the system is not controllable. On the other hand, when 
costs are different the system market is controllable. However, in both cases the market is not 
complete observable. Price dynamics is shown in Figure 8.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5 Market dynamics clearing price (naïve expectations) 
 
GenCos under forward expectations is studied next. Four cases are considered. 
Combination of production costs and forward expectations constitutes the four-case analysis. 
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TABLE IV 
DEMAND AND PRODUCTION COST PARAMETERS 
Parameters CASE I CASE II CASE III CASE IV
a  115 115 115 115 
b  2 2 2 2 
1c  4 4 4 4 
2c  4 6 6 6 
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2λ  0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
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Table V shows the market equilibrium under different conditions. From the same table, we 
can observe that in first column the equilibrium market is the same as naïve expectation 
outcome, shown previously in Table III. 
 
TABLE V 
MARKET DYNAMICS PROPERTIES UNDER FORWARD EXPECTATIONS 
1q (MW) 18.50 19.3452 19.9725 20.9574 
2q (MW) 18.50 18.5119 19.2582 18.9628 
Controllable No Yes Yes Yes 
Observable No No No Yes 
Stable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Figure 8.6 shows the dynamic price for all cases. From the same graph, we observe that as 
long as the forward expectation is adjusted through their coefficientλ price dynamics 
converges faster, reaching different industry output between Cournot-Bertrand market 
equilibriums range. Consequently, the market presents multiple equilibriums based on the 
agents’ expectation. Some of these are socially better than others. 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Market dynamics clearing price (forward expectations) 
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From the same Figure 8.6 we observe that market clearing price converge faster as 
coefficient factors get close to 1 which from market point of view, players are price takers 
instead of prices setters. 
 
VI. MARKET MONITORING 
In a decentralized market, prices do not only just clear market but fulfill additional 
functions under the new information economics.  
From the simulations previously shown, important market monitoring information is 
obtained from the dynamic modeling. The system is most of the time complete unobservable. 
Because the system consists of two state variables, one state is observable. These dynamic 
properties need to be evaluated by SO/MO to decide whether intervention is necessary. On 
the other hand, there are few cases in which the system is not complete controllable. One 
case result when GenCos have same production costs, besides the forward expectation is 
zero, becoming the classical Cournot market equilibrium. Additional results showed that this 
condition prevails when forward expectations and production costs are the same for both 
GenCos. Market outcome is stable in all the cases reported. However, the system is unstable 
when both expected coefficients reach -1, becoming oscillatory. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reports dynamic market price discovery in a decentralized energy market. 
Two-GenCo market was considered for dynamic simulation and analysis. 
 Market dynamics price discovery represents the bidding process in a closed loop dynamic 
system. In a decentralized market, price dynamics depends on strategic agents’ bids. Agents’ 
decisions are made base on current available information, public and private. 
Forward expectations incorporate private past information to the strategic decision of 
GenCos during the bidding process. GenCos also are able to incorporate other agents 
expected behavior into the reaction functions. 
The dynamic properties should be considered by MO/SO in short term market monitoring. 
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Abstract 
Market dynamics have been studied with emphasis on price stability. Dynamic market 
pricing in a purely competitive environment for a given trading period is determined by the 
interaction of the supply and demand with the information available to each. The scheduling 
of a generation is determined according to a Generation Company’s (GENCOs) perception of 
the expected future conditions. Future conditions include equipment availability and 
competitor play. These decisions, which attempt to maximize profits, and the resulting 
interactions represents a major source of electric market dynamics. Profits in any period 
depend on level of efficiency as well as on the levels of efficiency of other competing 
GENCOs. Incorrect, untimely, and improperly analyzed information often lead to suboptimal 
solutions for the profit maximizing player. This paper analyzes market price dynamics by 
using Markov Process (MP) modeling. An example application is presented as would be 
conducted by information seeking players to maximize profit. Key issues with applying 
Markov chains to different market conditions are identified. The key economic pricing 
signals, representing different forces, are examined as a basis of influencing these key 
decisions by each player. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background  
Dynamic market pricing in a competitive fluctuating business environment is determined 
by the interaction of the supply and demand with the information available to each player. 
Demand is highly dependent on changes in basic variables that describe the state of the 
economy. To model demand processes, the use of a set of states of the world has been 
suggested in where each state includes the relevant information about demand [1]. 
The sellers’ goal is to follow a dynamic market strategy that brings the best expected total 
profit over a given period of time. Sellers’ dynamic market strategy involves implicitly a 
dynamic pricing policy. Hence, they need to balance the trade-off between current and 
futures revenues in setting the prices. Incorrect, untimely, and improperly analyzed 
information would lead to suboptimal solutions. The financial implications of relying on 
outdated or incorrect information can be enormous. Signals from the market must be 
processed by the seller as time progresses to choose actions that increase profits.  
 
B. Literature  
Decentralized price systems can lead to efficient allocation of resources. Electricity 
market design trends toward a decentralized self-scheduling model. A centralized auctioneer, 
Power Exchange (PX), is seen as the fictitious Walrasian Auctioneer in the Walrasian 
General Equilibrium model [2]. PXs normally provide bidding trading in contracts for power 
delivery during a particular hour of the next day, called day-ahead or spot market. The usual 
trading method varies from a daily single-side auction to double-side auction for every hour 
to match transactions at a uniform price [3]. In decentralized markets, price is adjusted 
dynamically based on the response of market supply-demand. GENCOs offer energy into the 
market at prices offered based on estimated future conditions. As market participants, 
GENCOs in single-side or double-side decentralized models, are not price takers but price 
setters. The aggregate quantity of electricity offered is a nondecreasing function of price. 
Depending on market rules, GENCOs may offer power in block contracts. This implies that 
the market supply curve has the form of a step functions. Similarly, buyers may make bids 
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into the market at prices that they are willing to pay. The aggregate demand curve is a 
decreasing step function of price. The market clearing price is commonly determined by the 
intersection of these demand-supply curves. In addition, the market clearing price must 
incorporate consideration of any transmission constraints. When the bulk system does not 
have transmission constraints, the spot market price of electricity can be computed by 
successively dispatching generation with the lowest price until the demand is met. 
Price dynamics can be analyzed from the bidding strategy that each player develops to 
maximize profits. A bidding decision is formulated as a Markov Process as reported in [4]. 
Those authors used bidding decisions to determine the price and amount of electricity for a 
supplier assumed to be risk-neutral. The same authors in [5] developed a systematic method 
to calculate transition probabilities and rewards for the Markov Decision Process model. All 
other suppliers are modeled by their bidding parameters with corresponding probabilities. 
The optimal strategy is calculated to maximize the expected reward over a planning horizon. 
The authors considered a simplified market in where the suppliers’ bids are chosen from the 
cheapest until the load in that period is met. For all units that are called into operation, the 
last selected bid price defines the spot price in that load period. Security constraints and other 
market characteristics are neglected. The no-arbitrage-pricing principle is applied to the 
pricing of flexible electricity contracts in [6]. Pricing of flexible contracts involves a 
scheduling policy. By representing the spot price with an appropriate stochastic process, the 
scheduling policy can be found using stochastic dynamic programming. The mathematics of 
finding optimal bidding strategies in multi-period electricity market auctions of energy and 
reserve markets is presented in [7] and [8]. Generator costs, operating constraints, and 
exogenous price uncertainties are fully taken into consideration within the approach. These 
authors studied strategies for generators making offers into wholesale electricity markets 
when both demand and competing generators behavior is unknown but represented by a 
probability distribution in [9]. Their analysis is restricted to markets in which the supply of 
power in a given time interval is defined by generators of power in the form of offers of 
energy blocks. Market dynamics with interaction among participants is modeled in [10] by 
using a discrete linear system model. The model is a closed-loop dynamic system in which 
current and previous information are use as a feedback signal into decision support systems. 
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Price market dynamics is emphasized as the bidding iterative process associated to each 
trading period in game theory framework by using difference equations [11].  
 
C. Paper Contribution and Structure 
This paper analyzes market price dynamics by using a Markov Process (MP).  A single 
snap shot is considered in order to identify not only the different scenarios but also the 
various services (products) that a GENCO might consider selling when determining the 
optimal scheduling of units. 
The following section presents the market assumptions. Then, the Discrete Time Markov 
Process is presented. Key issues with applying Markov chains to different market conditions 
are identified. Key economic pricing signals, representing different market forces, are 
examined as a basis of influencing these key decisions of each player. The incorporation of 
demand side bidding introduces more uncertainty to the suppliers. Demand side bidding for 
electric energy is presented next. Finally, problems involved in the market price dynamics 
are summarized. 
 
II. MARKET FRAMEWORK: ASSUMPTIONS 
Several assumptions set up the framework of the present model. Model assumptions 
follow. The market is operated as an open auction. Each hourly auction is independently 
solved by the central agency. There are 24 sequential auctions that constitute the day-ahead 
spot market. A discrete-time model is considered given the hourly trading periods of the 
electricity spot market. The discrete nature of the model is well suited to study the day-ahead 
market dynamic trading process. Future demand and possible competitors’ actions, including 
price and quantity for each period, are forecasted by each player. For sake of simplicity, but 
without loss of generality, energy is the unique commodity traded in the market. Supply-side 
bidding for energy is assumed in this paper. Demand side bidding for energy is included. It is 
noted that service operations are typically interested in customer retention. Additional 
services are also mentioned as the various markets form a complex interaction of services. 
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Several assumptions follow. Sequential decisions are made at the beginning of each 
trading period. The system successfully moves between equilibrium points (market 
equilibrium exists for every trading period). The ability of the system to successfully move 
between points of equilibrium is an assumption of dynamic stability [12]. Figure 9.1 shows 
graphically this condition, as the supply and demand curves at two trading periods are 
explicitly represented. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Market Price Dynamic Stability 
 
Form Figure 9.1, observe that price fluctuations occur. This is common as the real time 
supply and demand balance. In this analysis, the transition between one point and another is 
assumed to be a straight line. Once the equilibrium is reached at given trading period it 
remains constant until new trading period is started. 
 
III. MARKOV PROCESS: DISCRETE TIME 
A Markov Process is a stochastic process characterized by the Markov property that the 
distribution of the future process depends only on the current state, not on all of the historical 
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function, including the conditional probabilities. The generality of the MP framework makes 
it attractive for engaging in sequential decision-making problems under uncertainty. 
Consider a process, observed at time periods 0,1,...,t n=  to be in one of the states .i S∈  
The transition probability between state i to state j at time n-1 is the 
probability [ ]1n nP X j X i−= | =  where nX denotes the process at time n. 
The one step probability transition matrix P is defined as: 
 
0,0 0,1 0,
1,0 1,1 1,
,0 ,1 ,
j
j
i i i j
p p p
p p p
P
p p p
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
K
K
M M O M
K
                                                                                                     (1) 
 
Each row of the probability transition matrix represents the transition flow out of the 
corresponding state. Each column of it represents the transition flow into the state. As the 
accumulative transition flow out of each state must be 1, the rows of matrix P must sum to 1. 
When the market dynamic environment is unknown, the transient probabilities can be 
estimated by using Decision Analysis, Monte Carlo Simulation or Reinforcement learning 
algorithms [14]. 
The optimal expected profit generated at period k moving from state i to state j is given by 
  
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }, ,, max k k kk Gi E Gii j si j P P p C Pπ = −                                                                                 (2) 
 
where ( ), ,i j sP  is the transition probability of state s from state i to state j, 
k
GiP is the amount 
of active power generation of unit i at period k, kEp is the energy spot price at period k, and 
( )ki GiC P represents the production costs of unit i. 
This is a dynamic optimization program, over a specific time horizon, given by: 
 
( )* 1 ,T kk i jπ=Π =∑                                                                                                                   (3) 
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where T is the horizon period of interest and *Π is the total expected profit over the desired 
horizon. 
The players data mine market behavior of competitors by comparing actual market 
outcomes with forecasted outcomes. The estimated information is updated each period [15]. 
The players expect a reinforcement signal from the environment indicating whether or not 
the latest move was in the right direction. The optimal prediction about the market is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Two types of uncertainties, common in electric markets, are embedded in the transient 
matrix. These uncertainties are market uncertainty and system uncertainty. Market 
uncertainty is linked corresponding to different electricity market clearing prices and market 
demand. It is assumed, in this paper, that each player observes the demand process. At the 
beginning of period i, each player has exact information about the history of the market 
demands and prices. However, to include market condition uncertainty, the player does not 
necessarily know the exact state of demand at each period. Technical uncertainties, related 
directly with the bulk system such as transmission constraints, transmission lines outages, 
and generation outages, are included. Other technical uncertainties could be included. 
Transmission capacity is the only technical uncertainty considered in this presentation. A 
graphic representation of both uncertainties considered in our model is depicted in Figure 
9.2. 
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Other market information has to be observed and forecasted by market participants (i.e. 
fuel market prices, weather). Fuel is the main price factor in the production of electricity. 
Fuel price alter the market strategy for a market participant at a given period of time and may 
be embedded in the transition probability between states. Even though spot fuel prices are 
public information, a player has to decide the fuel price to index in the bid as part of their 
market strategy as many fuel contracts are only loosely indexed to the spot market. 
Ancillary services (AS) play an important role in a player’s decision in decentralized 
markets. The lack of reactive power will reduce the amount of energy transferred through the 
power system is a common example. If such information is mined by a player, that player 
may make additional revenues, by probably exercising market power based on the locational 
characteristic of reactive power. 
 
IV. MARKET STATES 
Key economic pricing signals are a basis of influence on key decisions of each player. 
The scheduling of a generation unit, for a GENCO, is based on a perception of expected 
future conditions, including equipment availability and competitors play. Profits in any 
period depend on the level of efficiency of the individual players as well as on the efficiency 
levels of other competitive players. The simple rule is that it is profitable to sell if the spot 
market price is higher than the production costs. Thus, the production costs for each block of 
electric energy has to be estimated. The production costs have to include all available 
information about each unit and all technical requirements. 
Each player’s goal is to follow a dynamic market strategy that brings the best expected 
total profit over a given period of time. This is a highly demanding task. The player needs to 
balance the trade-off between present and future revenue in setting all prices. Each player has 
to account the state of market demand and transmission system operation. 
Players need adaptive mechanisms that respond to the information revealed by agents 
through all markets. The different market states are represented in the transition matrix in 
which the market state is strongly dependent on the past state. Changes in market state may 
include both market and technical uncertainties observed by each market participant. 
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In a decentralized market design, price summarizes this information. Transmission system 
capacity information is embedded in the Locational Marginal Price (LMP). Market 
participants should have access to transmission system information. This information is 
needed to forecast the market state. Perfect information is not available as the contractual 
(trading) information is not revealed. LMP provides more than locational information based 
on transmission system losses and congestions. LMP provides insights to production fuel 
type dominance. Observing fuel prices in their respective markets and the price of electricity, 
enable a player to identify price at a given point of time. Such a dependency is shown by 
spark contracts. Such contracts are beyond the scope of this paper [16]. 
Generally, high demand conditions drive high prices, not only because the transmission 
system is more congested, but also because more expensive units are operating. 
 
 
Figure 9.3 Hockey-stick supply curve 
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A price signal from the markets indicating whether the latest strategic moves were in the 
right direction is expected by players in order to make the next decision. This is a 
reinforcement signal. When this reinforcement signal is not observed in the current 
information or it is not assimilated, a player may end with a bad outcome. It is necessary to 
distinguish between a bad outcome and bad decision. Bad outcome does not necessarily 
imply that a bad decision was chosen. It may happen for instance when a market “hockey-
stick” supply curve is observed.  A “hockey-stick” curve is an abrupt change in the demand in 
either a severe increase or decrease of demand.  Then, a GENCO might expect a similar 
demand curve in the next period. The hockey-stick supply curve may be the result of a unit 
outage or transmission congestion, just to name two common causes. Such changes in price 
signals require all players to know in detail the reason behind supply curve change. An 
example of the effect of unit outage supplying the demand is depicted in. This outage leads to 
a shrinking of the supply curve and by consequence an increment in the market clearing 
price. It can be observed that the price is below $40 in (a) and then it goes around $50 in (b). 
Information in the electricity markets as well as fuel markets must be updated between 
each equilibrium points. It is necessary, in more rigorous studies, to model the actual trading 
frequencies when the markets and the information are not synchronized as in these first order 
models.  This paper extends the decision analysis approach to a Markov Model approach.  
 
  
Figure 9.4 An example of a discrete Markov Chain 
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As depicted in Figure 9.4, when transitioning from period t to period t+1, there is a chance 
of transitioning to state A, B, C, or D. Each one of the states may represent the expected 
outcome which can be obtained by using Decision Analysis or Monte Carlo Simulation 
[17][18]. In State A and C the system is not congested. But in state A the LMP is higher than 
the GENCOs bid whereas in state C the opposite is true. Similar scenarios are defined for 
states B and D. 
The transient probability matrix, according with these 4 states shown in the previous 
graph is given by: 
 
, , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
A A A B A C A D
B A B B B C B D
C A C B C C C D
D A D B D C D D
p p p p
p p p p
P
p p p p
p p p p
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                                             (4) 
 
The LMP is strongly dependent of the market participant prices and the transmission 
system congestion. At the moment of congestion, occurs the price increases abruptly. The 
price and the respective density function (PDF) for a fictitious GENCO expectation on LMP 
due to congestion effect is shown in Figure 9.5. Because we are considering discrete 
variables instead of continuous, the probability mass function (PMF) is also shown in Figure 
9.5 (b).  
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Figure 9.5 Expected delivery energy price considering congestion effect (a) and the associated PDF 
and PFM (b) 
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analysis. In these simulations, other uncertainties were modeled such as line and generation 
outages. The expected market information is listed in Table I.  
The 4 states summarize a series of feasible scenarios to occur. The respective probability 
associated to each state is the transient probability. The state probabilities are displayed in 
Table II. 
 
TABLE I 
EXPECTED: DEMAND, SPOT PRICES, AND POWER COMMITED 
Current Demand Low Demand High Demand 
350 MW 340 MW 370 MW 
19 $/MWh 18 $/MWh 21 $/MWh 
50 MW 45 MW 60 MW 
 
 
TABLE II 
STATE AND ASSOCIATED TRANSIENT PROBABILITY 
State Transient Probability 
A 0.678 
B 0.152 
C 0.094 
D 0.076 
 
 
The transient probability displayed on Table II represents the market clearing price 
likelihood at given state in the next trading period. Therefore, state A is 67.8 % likely 
expected while state C has a 9.4 % probability of occurrence. Both cases consider that the 
transmission system is uncongested.  Similarly, the other two states, B and D, have 15.2 % 
and 7.6 % probability of occurrence respectively. In addition these two scenarios consider 
the effect of transmission congestion. In these scenarios, transmission congestions blocks the 
optimal strategy given that this unit does not have market power. If it were possible for 
market power to be achieved because of transmission congestion, a GENCO would be able to 
manipulate the locational marginal price resulting in a substantial increment in profits. 
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VI. DEMAND SIDE BIDDING 
Some of the existing markets do not allow the buyers to bid. Hence, demand is inelastic 
and the market equilibrium is achieved by successively dispatching generation with the 
lowest price until the demand is met.  
The incorporation of demand side bidding introduces more dynamics components into the 
market model but may lead to more stable market operation. Buyers face similar 
uncertainties to what supplier face. Hence, buyers would be able to decide how much to 
consume based on the observed price. This could avoid or reduce the possibility of a hockey-
stick supply curve and, consequently, prices spike. 
A market participant, seller or buyer, has a choice of multiple markets into which different 
services could be bought, sold, or resold. Specifically, a GENCO could decide to allocate its 
output to the energy market or to one of the operating reserves markets. The observation of 
information from each market would be essential in the decision-making process for every 
market participant. For instance, an increase in electric prices could entice the buyer to 
respond by decreasing consumption. 
 
VII. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS 
This paper focuses on analyzing market price dynamics by using Markov processes an 
observing the different market states. The analysis was carried out from the supplier’s 
viewpoint in where players face the problem of setting the right price for services that would 
maximize gross profits. Nevertheless, buyers face similar problems and consequently the 
analysis can be easily extended. 
A single snapshot was considered for this analysis. Sequential analysis would be repeated 
for a given time horizon to more accurately depict market play. Market participants need to 
adaptively adjust market strategies as soon as each new piece of information is gathered and 
understood.  
Given that MP is based on current information the existence of bad outcomes, not bad 
decisions, may result when market information is not properly digested. This is true for all 
good decision whether computed using extensive models, or simple closed form solutions. 
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CHAPTER 10 ELECTRICITY MARKET DYNAMICS: 
OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION  
 
A paper published in the Electric Power Systems Research 
 
G Gutiérrez-Alcaraz, Gerald B. Sheblé 
 
Abstract 
Presently, electricity markets are characterized by a small number of suppliers with 
distributed resources. These market suppliers can easily be identified because their 
geographic location is known. Essentially, two or three of them compete for leading the 
market whereas the rest of them follow. Hence, it is necessary to study the market structure 
as ologopolistic competition rather than perfect competition. This paper studies market 
producer decisions in a dynamic sequential framework by using discrete event system 
simulation (DESS) also known as discrete control theory. Two-player ologopolistic market 
structure is presented in this paper. 
 
1. Introduction 
Electricity markets are at the core of restructuring process. The traditional electricity 
supply or value chain is altered by restructuring with the same activities as when it was 
vertically integrated: transmission, generation, distribution, and commercialization. 
However, the new structure has revolved the way of making business. 
Risk for market instability is one of the main concerns in a dynamic market. Market 
instability may result from disruption in any physical infrastructure, i.e. electricity, natural 
gas, petroleum, of the supply chain or any market inefficiencies. 
Several methods have been utilized to model electric market economic dynamics. 
Decision analysis, game theory, stochastic simulation, adaptive agent systems, and systems 
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theory are some in the list. Decision analysis, DA, allows a decision maker to focus on what 
is important rather than what is already known. DA is an iterative process of gaining insight 
and promoting creative alternatives to help decision makers make better decisions [1]. Game 
theory has been extensively applied to study dynamic economic and political conflicting 
situations [2]. Stochastic simulation uses computer techniques to imitate a model numerically 
in order to estimate the desired true characteristics of a system having random input 
components. Adaptive Agent Systems distinguished by its ability of learning as time 
progress can simulate very complex decision making process. Discrete event system 
simulation (DESS) also known as discrete control theory has also been applied to study 
economic models in dynamic framework [3]. However, the potential of DESS has not fully 
investigated. This paper studies market producer decisions in a dynamic sequential 
framework by DESS. 
Market dynamics focused on power market instability is presented in [4, 5]. The paper 
shows a situation where the removal of congestions makes the market unstable. The impact 
of various policies on the dynamic behavior of power system markets is also reported. In [6] 
and [7] a closed-loop dynamic system in which previous and current information are use as a 
feedback signal for modeling market dynamics. A model of an electricity generation bidding 
system has been analyzed in [8]. The model is formulated as a control problem. A dynamic 
game base on a dynamic system in which generators are players is developed in [9]. 
Generators learn the market and evaluate their next bids by using available market 
information, past prices, and private information. In [10] a generalized approach for a two-
player market model under naïve and forward expectations is analyzed. In this document the 
authors extend the previous work reported in [10]. Generation capacity limits and 
contingency effects, partial o total loss of generation, are included in the model.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  in the next section market dynamics is 
established in a DESS framework. A two-GENCO model under quantity competition is then 
presented. A set of simple numerical examples are presented to illustrate the points at hand. 
Finally, conclusions are listed. 
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2. Market dynamics: discrete event system simulation 
Control theory has become a standard mathematical tool for economists. Optimal control 
theory and dynamic programming are two sides of the same coin and lead to equivalent 
solutions for deterministic analysis [3]. Dynamic programming is used to solve problems of 
sequential decision making as optimal control does [14]. The process of making decisions 
can be seen as to find an optimal control policy. 
A decentralized spot electricity market based on auctions, exhibit characteristics of 
discrete system problems [13]. The Market Equilibrium, price and quantity, it is found every 
training period. It implies that every trading period GENCOs will need to make a new 
decision. These decisions would be supported based on forecasted market information and 
current available information. Thus, the market is modeling by using difference algebraic 
equations [11]. 
 
3. Market dynamics under quantity competition 
3.1. Market equilibrium 
Consider the linear market-demand function given by: 
 
( )( ) ( )p Q k a bQ k= −                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where ( )( )p Q k  is inverse market demand, ( )Q k  is the total market output, a  and b are 
constants. Total market output is ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2G G
Q k P k P k= +  where ( )
iG
P k  is the GENCOs i’s 
contribution. At period k, the profit of the GENCO i is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )1 2 ii G G i Gk a b P k P k c P kπ = − + −                                                                           (2) 
 
where ic  is the production cost of GENCO i. 
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The first order condition to maximize profits is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 0
i j
i
i
i G G
G
k
a c bP k bP k
P
π∂ = − − − =∂                                                                                (3) 
 
GENCO i should set output to maximize profit considering the output decision of 
competitor. Under naïve expectation, GENCO i believes that GENCO j will not change its 
output such as: 
 
( ) ( )1
j jG G
P k P k= −                                                                                                                  (4) 
 
Therefore at period k GENCO i setups its output as: 
 
( ) ( )1
2
j
i
Gi
G
P ka cP k
b b
−−= −                                                                                                     (5) 
 
The market system can be represented by the following 2nd-order system: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )1 1
2 2
1
2
1 20 1 2
1 21 2 0
G G
G G
P k P k a c b
P k P k a c b
⎡ + ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ − ⎤−⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ −−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                                                         (6) 
 
( ) [ ] ( )( ) [ ]1
2
1 GE
G
P k
p k b b a
P k
⎡ ⎤+ = − − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                                                      (7) 
 
where ( )1Ep k + is the electricity price at period k+1. 
Under naive expectation, market system is always stable, even though A has one 
eigenvalue with real part. 
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3.2. Generation upper limits 
In traditional Cournot analysis players choose quantities simultaneously. In addition, each 
firm presumes no reaction on the part of the other firms to a change in its output. Now, 
considering that GENCO j has a capacity constraint max
jG
P   
 
( )
max
2
j
i
Gi
G
Pa cP k
b b
−= −                                                                                                             (8) 
 
The capacity-constrained price game potentially will appear if players get informed [12].  
 
3.3. Contingency: loss of generation 
The step system response is considered in this work for modeling generation contingency 
-partial or total loss of generation. The step response is defined as the response of a system to 
a step input [11]. 
By simulating loss of generation, market vulnerability is studied. Market vulnerability 
problems means the activities of the market participant, market mechanism, and rules 
problems in the power market that lead to market failure, make the power market inefficient, 
instable or even crash. 
In terms of electric system operating states, the first objective of system operation is to 
keep the system running all the time. Least cost operation was secondary to this primary 
objective. From economic perspective this implies new market equilibrium with additional 
costs. 
 
3.4. Real time market 
The real time electricity market under normal conditions requires satisfying the demand-
supply balance at any moment. It implies that some generators will be modifying its output to 
follow demand variations. 
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As restructuring of the electric industry unfolds, GENCOs decide individual whether, or 
when, they wish to produce. The generation company decision making process includes 
forecasting of demand and competitors actions. This forecasting is stochastic and is modeled 
as random variable. 
 
3.5. Numerical examples 
This section presents some numerical examples. The demand parameters for all the cases 
reported are 115,a = and 2.b =  
 
Table 1 
Production costs and market equilibrium 
CASE PRICE ($/MWh) 1GP (MW) 2GP  (MW) 21 GG PP + (MW) 
I 421 == cc  41.0000 18.500 18.500 37.000 
II 46 21 =>= cc  41.6667 17.833 18.833 36.666 
III 421 == cc  44.5000 15.0000 20.2500 35.250 
IV 46 21 =>= cc  44.5000 15.0000 20.2500 35.250 
V 64 21 =<= cc  45.5000 15.0000 19.7500 34.750 
VI 421 == cc  49.0000 15.0000 18.0000 33.000 
VII 46 21 =>= cc  49.0000 15.0000 18.0000 33.000 
VIII 64 21 =<= cc  49.0000 15.0000 18.0000 33.000 
 
 
 
The two first cases presented in Table 1 do not consider capacity limits. Hence these cases 
represent the traditional Cournot equilibrium with two players and linear demand function. 
Case I considers similar marginal production cost, whereas in case II an increase of GENCO 
1’s marginal cost is represented. Figure 10.1 shows the GENCOS’s reaction functions. The 
effect of increasing the marginal cost of GENCO 1 in the quantity market equilibrium is also 
depicted. The intersection of the two reaction functions represents a Nash Equilibrium if each 
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firm believes the other firm will not change output regardless of what that firm does (Table 
2). 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 Effect of an increase in GENCO 1’s marginal cost and capacity limit 
 
 
Observe that increasing GENCO 1’s marginal cost results in reaching new market 
equilibrium, this is consistent with the result presented in Table 1. The standard Nash 
equilibrium is also reached even when maximum generation limit is reached. It happens even 
when one of the GENCOs reaches its maximum limit, under the assumption that other player 
does not have full information. If it was not the case, the other player will exercise market 
power. 
Cases III to V show the effect that GENCO 1 reaches its maximum limit, 
1
max 15 .GP MW=  
In case III and case IV the same market equilibrium is obtained. The effect on increasing the 
marginal cost of GENCO 1 does not change the market equilibrium. However, when the 
increment in marginal costs occurs on GENCO 2, new market equilibrium is found. The new 
market equilibrium shows higher price and lower quantity.  
The last three cases consider the effect when both GENCOs reach their maximum 
production limits. GENCO 2’s maximum limit for these cases is 
2
max 18 .GP MW=  In Figure 
10.2 the market equilibrium is depicted when both GENCOs reaches their upper generation 
limit. The price is always determined by the total market generation. 
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Figure 10.2 Effect of both GENCO’s maximum capacity in the MCP 
 
In all the cases when marginal productions are the same, the system is not observable 
neither controllable. On the other hand, when GENCOs’ marginal production costs are 
slightly different the system becomes controllable but remains unobservable. 
Table 2 summarizes the system’s properties, controllability and observability for all the 
cases. 
 
Table 2 
Production costs and market equilibrium 
CASE LIMITS CONTINGENCY DEMAND PRICES 
I NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
II YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
III NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
IV YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
V YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
VI NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
VII YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
VIII YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
PROPERTY C O C O C O C O 
O=Observability; C=Controllability 
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The following example portrays a contingency effect on market equilibrium. The 
contingency is simulated as a step function after the market reaches equilibrium. Only four 
out of the eight previous cases are presented in Figure 10.3.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.3 Effect of generation contingency 
 
 
Observe a change in market equilibrium in Figure 10.3. When upper limits on generation 
are neglected, as in case I, a longer transitory oscillatory process is observed. The examples 
reported consider full loss of generation as well as partial loss.  
When total generation is lost from GENCO 1, two possible scenarios can happen: 
GENCO 2 does or does not reach its upper generation limit. In the first scenario, monopoly 
equilibrium is found. In the second scenario, depending on the GENCO 2’s upper limit, the 
new market equilibrium will be above the monopoly equilibrium. 
Given the demand responsiveness, new market equilibrium is reached in any of the two 
different scenarios. Hence the use or derivative markets would play an important role for 
producers and consumer. The demand responsiveness can be interpreted as part of demand 
side programs. Derivative markets and demand side response may prevent market 
vulnerability problems. 
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The next example considers the demand variations over time and the response of market 
suppliers. Four cases are considered for explanatory purposes. Market equilibriums are 
shown in Figure 10.4.  
 
 
Figure 10.4 Effect of real time load variation 
 
Generation outputs for each case are depicted in Figure 10.5. 
Figure 10.5 Effect on generation 
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Given that both GENCOs have equal production marginal costs and generation limits are 
neglected, both are producing the same amount of power which is displayed in Figure 
10.5(a). Unlike Figure 10.5 (a) and (b) exhibits GENCO’s output when GENCO 2 has a 
higher marginal production costs. In Figure 10.5 (c), the effect of GENCO 1’s upper limits is 
presented. GENCO 2 is the marginal unit and it supplies the remained market demand. 
Figure 10.5(d) additionally simulates, with respect Figure 10.5 (c), a substantial increment in 
demand. Hence, we observe a jump on generation after period 12. The net generation in each 
case above presented implies different demand.  
The next simulation considers fuel price variation. Fuels during some time interval are 
positively correlated and then become negatively correlated as it can be observed in Figure 
10.6. 
 
 
Figure 10.6 Input prices 
 
 
Due to fuel price variations, change in GENCOs’ outputs and market equilibrium is 
expected.  Figure 10.7 presents the GENCOs’ output for time simulation.  
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Figure 10.7 Effect of real time generation 
 
Because of prices’ negative correlation, it is clear than cheap generation offset expensive 
generation. In this particular example, it can be observed how GENCO 2 increases 
production while GENCO 1 decreases it. This effect is more visible during the last periods.   
The market clearing price is displayed in Figure 10.8. The price does not remain constant 
due to changes in GENCOs output. Nevertheless, the electricity price does not experience 
spark ups/downs, even when fuel prices are very volatile (Fuel 1 increases around 80 % 
whereas Fuel 2 decreases around 70%). The overall effect of fuel high volatility on 
electricity price results in smooth price performance.  
Figure 10.8 Real time market clearing price 
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Previous simulations have shown the traditional Cournot model neglecting players’ 
adaptive and learning strategies from the dynamic market. The system’s properties, 
controllability and observability [11], do not change when a generation limit is reached, 
neither when a contingency occurs. In any case, the system economy is stable. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper reports market dynamics in a two-GENCO market model. The market clearing 
price is defined by the output they players are committed to the market. 
When GenCos’ marginal production costs are equal, the system is unobservable and 
uncontrollable. However, if these are different, the system becomes controllable but not 
observable. In all the cases reported, the system’s properties, controllability and 
observability, do not change when a generation limit is reached, neither when a contingency 
occurs.  
In all the simulations, the standard Cournot Nash equilibrium is found. It happens even 
when one of the GENCOs reaches its maximum limit, under the assumption that other player 
does not have full information. If it was not the case, the other player will exercise market 
power. 
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CHAPTER 11 SEQUENTIAL TIME-STEP GENERATION COMPANIES 
DECISIONS IN OLIGOPOLISTIC ELECTRICITY MARKET  
 
A paper published in the Electric Power Systems Research 
 
Guillermo Gutiérrez-Alcaraz 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the production decisions of Generation Companies (GENCOs) which 
are fully engaged in oligopolistic electricity markets. The model presented is based upon the 
static equilibrium model solved sequentially in time. By decomposing the problem in time, 
each time-step is solved independently using a Cournot-like market model. The time 
dimension is divided into discrete, one-hour time-steps. The model also incorporates the 
effects of technical and temporal constraints such as time on/off and ramp up/down. Since 
GENCOs tend toward repetitive decision-making, they can more easily learn from the 
market. The concept of forward expectations and the lessons derived from the market are 
introduced, and several numerical examples are provided. 
 
Keywords: Cournot Model, Electricity Markets, Oligopolistic Competition. 
 
1. Introduction 
In a market-driven environment, a power generating utility solves the self-unit 
commitment problem to obtain an optimal bidding strategy [1]. Ideally, its optimal policy is 
designed to reap the maximum expected profit. In reality, however, the environment in which 
decisions (and decision-making policies) are made is often defined by the operational and 
technical constraints of the utility’s generating units, its short-term financial requirements, or 
other restrictions. 
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The easiest way to model the dynamic behavior of market players is to replicate static 
snapshot of single periods [2]. The single-period models then provide the basis for multi-
period models. In the single-period Cournot model each firm wants to maximize profits by 
deciding its optimal decision output. In the multi-period extension of the Cournot model, 
each firm wants to maximize its discount profits by selecting the optimum output levels for 
each time period [2, 3]. 
Most of the work applied to the electricity market analysis reported in the literature 
covered a single period. At the beginning most of these models were constructed as single-
node generation-only models [4]. Later, basic representations and linear DC transmission 
network were introduced for modeling spatiality [5,24-26]. Recently, AC network 
representation has been incorporated in a non-linear programming problem in order to 
systematically study for the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium [6]. 
Since GENCOs operate in a sequential-period market where, in each period, simultaneous 
output decisions are made, in most market scenarios, it may not be enough to maximize gain 
in the current and next period. Therefore, the GENCOs will seek to maximize total gain over 
the next several periods. However, not knowing (or being unaware of) their competitors’ 
future output decisions will make it difficult for any one GENCO to predict its rivals’ 
behavior [7,8]. Faced with this difficulty, a GENCO may adjust its own output expectation of 
the current period according to both the output of the last period and the expected output in 
the next subsequent period. In addition, each GENCO will probably rely upon other 
information it gathers over time, especially the data which will most likely influence its 
present choice. In other words, when the same bidder plays the same opponents multiple 
times, we would expect that the bidding agents will adjust their own behaviors to maximize 
their profits [8]. A procedure to identify multi-period equilibria in an electricity market is 
important for market regulators who may use it for market monitoring [9]. A multi-period 
equilibrium in a pool-based electricity market that may include minimum profit constraints 
for on-line generating units is analyzed in Ref. [23]. An oligopoly with spatially dispersed 
generators and consumers and with multiperiod demand is modeled in Ref. [4]. A dynamic 
sequential framework by using DESS is reported in Ref. [10]; that analysis focuses on the 
dynamics within a single period. 
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We can also expect that forward expectations will accompany the learning process 
[11,12]. This integration is crucial for two reasons: forward expectations teach a GENCO 
how its current stock valuation is affected (since stocks are the physical link between 
successive periods, and the valuation will transform expectations about future trading into 
desires to exchange current goods), and they are based on available information, i.e., the 
stream of past and present price-quantity signals [13]. In today’s competitive, volatile 
markets, accurate modeling of both the operational and temporal constraints of all of its 
generating units may give a GENCO the “edge” over its competition. Conjectural variation 
method has been widely applied to estimate the strategic behavior in game-theoretical 
contexts in terms of imperfect information [14]. A conjectural variation-based learning 
model that can be used by a GENCO to improve its bidding performance is reported in Ref. 
[15]. Each firm learns and dynamically regulates its conjectures based upon the reactions of 
its rivals to its bidding according to the available information published in the electricity 
market. Unfortunately, these conjectural variation models have been criticized for the 
drawbacks of logical consistency and the possibility of abundant equilibria. The existence 
and uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in electricity markets is 
investigated in Ref. [16].  
Even what appears to be an insignificant constraint can quickly alter a GENCO’s market 
strategies [17]. For example, the strategic use of ramp rates beyond elastic limits in 
generation dispatch has been investigated in Ref. [18], because they incur ramping costs and 
also widen the possible range of energy delivery. A detailed formulation to model the power 
trajectories followed by a thermal unit during start-up and shut-down processes, as well as 
the ramping limitations when increasing or decreasing power is reported in Ref. [19].  
The Cournot model still does not analyze significant electricity market issues including 
intertemporal considerations. In Ref. [20] intertemporal decisions related with maintenance 
decisions are reported. In an electricity market with only a few major competing GENCOs, 
maintenance plays a critical role that goes beyond traditional least-cost analysis. In this 
document the authors extend the previous work reported in Ref. [12]. A rigorous formulation 
of the ramping constraints reported in Ref. [11] has been implemented to analyze the effect 
of intertemporal constraints on a GENCO’s decision-making process. The learning aspect, 
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represented by forward expectations, is compared with the Cournot model without learning. 
A sensitivity analysis is performed to observe how the solution of the short-term equilibrium 
problem varies with the generation cost parameters, the demand parameters, and the 
adjusting coefficients. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the electricity spot market model. 
Section 3 presents a set of numerical examples to illustrate the points at hand. Section 4 
presents a parameter dependency analysis. Finally, our conclusions are given in Section 5. 
 
2. Electricity market model 
 In this paper we consider a spot market operated on an hourly basis where each time-step 
is solved individually using the Cournot market model. A representation of this electric 
market is shown in Figure 11.1. 
 
 
Figure 11.1 Electricity spot market model 
 
Since GENCOs tend to make repetitive decisions, it is expected that they will learn from 
the market [22]. For each time period, GENCOs must form an expectation of their rivals’ 
output in the subsequent period in order to determine their own corresponding profit-
maximizing quantity for period k+1, and so on. The sequential decision-making process of 
GENCO 1 is depicted in Figure 11.2. 
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Figure 11.2 Sequential decision-making for GENCO 1 
 
Consider the inverse linear market-demand function at period k given by: 
 
( ) ( )P Q a bQ k= −                                                                                                                   (1) 
 
where ( ) ( )
1
n
i
i
Q k q k
=
=∑  and a and b are the market-demand function parameters. 
We assume that a GENCO knows the inverse demand function, and that it must estimate 
the demand when it does not know the actual demand function. Its optimization program is to 
maximize the expected profit from its generation assets, energy and reserve, subject to 
operational constraints, over time. Mathematically, this can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆi i i j i i iq kMax k P q k q k q k C q kπ = + −                                                                  (2) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ 1 1 ,j j j j jq k q k q kλ λ= − + − ( )ˆ jq k represents GENCO j’s expectation of the 
decisions made by GENCO i, ( )1jq k − is GENCOs j’s decision output at period ( )1k − , jλ is 
the adjustment coefficient for GENCO j, and [ ]2 21 1λ λ∈ − < ≤ . 
Subject to the following constraints: 
 
Period k Period k+1
-1 
-1
0
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
1
0
-1
0 
1 
Period N 
l 
Market 
equilibrium 
Market 
equilibrium 
l
l
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Ramp-up constraints: From one time instant to the next the unit cannot increase its output 
above a maximum increment; this yields 
 
( ) ( )1 1,...,i i iq k q k Z k K+ − ≤ ∀ =                                                                            (3) 
 
where iZ is the maximum power ramp-up increment of unit i 
Ramp-down constraints: A unit cannot decrease its output power above a maximum 
power decrement. Therefore 
 
( ) ( )1 1,...,i i iq k q k W k K− + ≤ ∀ =                                                                           (4) 
 
where iW is the maximum power ramp-down decrement of unit i 
Unit capacity constraint: Any unit at any time should operate within operational limits, 
then 
 
1, ,MIN MAXi i iq q q i n≤ ≤ ∀ = K                                                                                        (5) 
 
MIN
iq and 
MAX
iq are the lower and upper generation limit, respectively, of unit i 
 
State transition constraints: The length of time the unit has been off or on-line. 
 
( )
( )
1
1
min , 1 1
max , 1 0
on
i
off
i
k ik
ik
k ik
t x if u
x
t x if u
+
+
⎧ + =⎪= ⎨ − =⎪⎩
                                                                                        (6) 
 
where ikx is a state variable indicating the length of time that unit i has been up or down at 
period k, and iku  is a binary decision variable indicating whether unit i at period k is up or 
down. 
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Unit status constraint: The unit can be either on or off, then 
 
, 1
, 1
1 1
0 1
on
i
off
i
i k
ik
i k
if x t
u
if x t
−
−
⎧ ≤ <⎪= ⎨ − ≥ > −⎪⎩
                                                                                               (7) 
 
The GENCO i production cost function is given by: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )2 1, 2i i i i i i iC q k d e q k f q k i= + + ∀ = K                                                              (8) 
 
where  , ,i id e and if are the production cost factors. 
Temporarily ignoring operational and temporal constraints and solving the problem as if 
they did not exist, then: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2ˆi i i j i i i i i iq kMax k P q k q k q k d e q k f q kπ = + − − −                                                (9) 
 
The first-order condition is:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2 0i i j j j j i i ii a bq k b q k b q k e f q kq k
π λ λ∂ = − − − + − − − =∂                             (10) 
 
For the two players, in matrix form we have: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )1 2 1 1 2 21 2 2 2 1 1
2 1 1
1 2 1
b f b q k a e b q k
b b f q k a e b q k
λ λ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − − −=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− + − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                                                       (11) 
 
A representation of this electric market is shown in Figure 11.3. 
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Figure 11.3 Two-GENCO electricity market equivalent 
 
Solving for ( )1q k and ( )2q k  yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )2 1 2 2 2 2 1 11 21 2 1 2
2 1 1 1
4 1 1
b f a e b q k b a e b q k
q k
b f b f b
λ λ λ
λ λ
+ − − − − − − − −= + + − − −                            (12) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )1 2 1 1 1 1 2 22 21 2 1 2
2 1 1 1
4 1 1
b f a e b q k b a e b q k
q k
b f b f b
λ λ λ
λ λ
+ − − − − − − − −= + + − − −                            (13) 
 
If the GENCOs do not know the inverse demand function, they must estimate the demand. 
Assume that GENCO i’s estimate is ( ) ( )i iP Q a b Q k= − , 1, , 2i = K . Then, the system 
becomes: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 22 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 1 1
1 2 1
b f b q k a e b q k
b b f q k a e b q k
λ λ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − − −=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− + − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                                                   (14) 
 
2.1 Generation upper limits 
If GENCO 1 has a capacity constraint, its profit maximization decision becomes: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1
1 1.
MAX
Max k P Q k q k C q k
S to q q
π = −
≤                                                                             (15) 
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We construct the new function: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1MAXL P Q k q k c q k q k qμ= − − −                                                                (16) 
 
where μ is a Lagrange multiplier. 
 
The first-order conditions are:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 21 2 0
L a e b f q k bq k
q k
μ∂ = − − + − − =∂                                                                 (17) 
 
( ) ( )1 1 0MAXL q k q kμ
∂ = − =∂                                                                                                     (18) 
 
In the two-player market model, the resulting set of equations is: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 2 1 1
1
2 1 1 1
1 2 0 1
1 0 0 MAX
b f b q k a e b q k
b b f q k a e b q k
q k
λ λ
λ λ
μ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− + = − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                                             (19) 
 
A similar procedure is applied when the lower limit is bounded. 
 
The intersection of the two reaction functions, equations (12) and (13), determines the 
market equilibrium in the Cournot model. This equilibrium represents a Nash equilibrium if 
each GENCO believes the other will not change output regardless of what its competitor 
does. The standard Nash equilibrium is also reached even when maximum generation limit is 
reached (which we can observe in a situation where one GENCO reaches its maximum limit 
under the assumption that its competitor lacks complete information). If this was not the 
case, the other GENCO will exercise market power. 
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Figure 11.4 portrays the reaction functions for the two GENCOs at specific period. Here 
we observe that the upper generating limit of any unit is not reached given that such limits 
are above the market equilibrium, 1 141.53q =  and 2 143.83q = . If a generating upper limit is 
reached, the new market equilibrium is determined at the intersection point between the 
reaction function and the generating unit’s upper limit. Therefore, the limit will restrict the 
pure Cournot equilibrium.  
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Figure 11.4 Effect of capacity limit in market equilibrium 
 
From Figure 11.4, we also observe that the upper limit will never be reached under 
demand and cost production parameters: if the upper limit is 100 MW instead of 150 MW, 
the new equilibrium is 1 100q =  and 2 164.53q = , as shown. 
 
2.2 Time on/off and ramp up/down constraints 
The increment or decrement of the generation level of a unit over any two successive on-
line periods (excluding start-up and shut-down periods) is bounded by the ramp-up (RU) and 
ramp-down (RD) limits respectively as shown in Figure 11.5. Temporal constraints and ramp 
up/down are incorporated in our model from [19]. 
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Figure 11.5 Seller Illustration of ramp up/down and maximum/minimum constraints 
 
 
3. Numerical examples 
This section presents three numerical examples of the model described above. In each case 
the Cournot model is executed twice: without and with learning. The production cost data 
shown in Table 1 has been taken from Ref. [1] and modified. 
 
 
Table 1 Producers’ data 
GENCO 
id  
($) 
ie  
($/MW) 
if  
($/MW2) 
MIN
iq  
(MW)
MAX
iq  
(MW) 
On
it  
(h) 
Off
it
(h) 
MAX
iRampUp  
(MW) 
MAX
iRamp Down  
(MW) 
1 820 9.023 0.00113 0 150 16 6 40 30 
2 400 7.654 0.00160 0 300 12 4 50 30 
 
The expected demand function parameters for each period of the day-ahead market are 
listed in Table 2. The same demand function is retained for the three cases. 
 
 
 
 
24 
Time (h) 
P 
P 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
On On      Off 
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Table 2 Expected demand function parameters for the day-ahead market  
Period a  b  Period a  b  
1 185 0.42 13 148 0.22
2 190 0.35 14 330 0.5 
3 210 0.46 15 135 0.25
4 120 0.34 16 180 0.43
5 130 0.40 17 168 0.35
6 140 0.62 18 160 0.36
7 195 0.34 19 198 0.49
8 150 0.20 20 175 0.30
9 180 0.37 21 190 0.48
10 240 0.42 22 140 0.60
11 230 0.99 23 150 0.52
12 160 0.28 24 130 0.20
 
The forward expectation adjusting factors for each period of the day-ahead market are 
listed in Table 3 (obtaining the adjusting coefficients is an important topic, but beyond the 
scope of this paper). These parameters must be estimated for each GENCO; they can be 
found utilizing several methods (e.g., data mining, neural nets, and forecasting approaches) 
[21]. 
Table 3 Forward expectation adjusting coefficient  
Period 1λ  2λ  Period 1λ  2λ  Period 1λ  2λ  
1 0.0 1.0 9 0.6 1.0 17 0.0 -1.0
2 -1.0 1.0 10 0.8 0.7 18 0.0 0.7 
3 0.0 0.0 11 -0.7 -0.4 19 0.9 0.2 
4 -1.0 0.9 12 1.0 1.0 20 0.4 1.0 
5 -0.9 1.0 13 0.3 0.2 21 -0.3 -0.1
6 -0.3 0.3 14 0.8 -0.8 22 0.0 0.7 
7 -0.8 0.5 15 -0.9 -0.9 23 -0.4 1.0 
8 0.7 0.5 16 -0.4 0.4 24 -0.6 0.8 
 
 
  
183
Case A. In this case, operational and temporal constraints are omitted. The market 
equilibrium is found for each trading period individually. The expected market supply and 
the expected outputs of the two GENCOs for each period of the day-ahead are reported in 
Table 4 and graphically depicted in Figure 11.6.  
 
Table 4 Expected GENCOs’ outputs: Case A  
PERIOD GENCO 1 GENCO 2 GENCO 1 GENCO 2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
138.51 
 170.95 
 144.58 
 107.40 
  99.62 
  69.66 
 180.88 
 232.44 
 152.71 
 182.14 
  73.93 
 177.97 
 208.30 
 212.98 
 166.01 
 131.42 
 150.01 
 138.45 
 127.57 
 182.77 
 124.67 
  71.98 
  89.46 
 199.14 
141.60 
174.62 
147.40 
111.26 
102.92 
 71.81 
184.64 
238.69 
156.21 
185.18 
 75.27 
182.54 
214.04 
215.51 
171.14 
134.44 
153.71 
142.05 
130.23 
187.03 
127.39 
 74.20 
 92.00 
205.47 
209.21 
 205.05 
 144.58 
  89.33 
  77.20 
  59.89 
 230.30 
 270.24 
 113.98 
 198.02 
  65.87 
 206.43 
 205.35 
 209.90 
 193.04 
 118.98 
 151.73 
 134.37 
 127.40 
 212.63 
 118.22 
  45.31 
  91.70 
 256.29 
106.32 
159.69 
147.40 
147.82 
119.55 
 79.28 
 91.98 
233.79 
128.75 
210.81 
125.51 
238.43 
215.35 
218.87 
165.23 
155.44 
152.85 
144.09 
127.19 
189.13 
144.75 
 87.51 
 81.62 
127.83 
 
 
By comparing columns 1 and 2 with columns 3 and 4 in Table 4, we observe that each 
GENCO’s contribution to the market is the same when both adjusting coefficients equal 0 
(this occurs at period 3). Hence this case represents the traditional Cournot equilibrium with 
two players and a linear demand function. The equilibrium is more competitive when both 
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coefficients are positive; the opposite occurs when both coefficients are negative [17]. Each 
market equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium since neither GENCO will change its output if the 
other does not change, given the current information.  
 
 
Figure 11.6 GENCOs’ expected outputs (a) without learning and (b) with learning: Case A 
 
From Figure 11.6 (a) we can observe that the GENCOs’ outputs differ slightly. The 
differences between their outputs are due only to different production costs. We see that 
GENCO 1 is more costly and therefore its output is lower. However, when learning is 
introduced, the outputs of the two GENCOs differ because of production costs and because 
of the adjusting factor involved in each one’s decisions as shown in Figure 11.6 (b). 
The market price for each period as displayed in Figure 11.7 is determined by the total 
market generation. 
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Figure 11.7 Market-clearing prices (a) without learning and (b) with learning: Case A 
 
From Figure 11.7 (a), the lowest market price occurs at period 5 and at period 13 in Figure 
11.7(b). In the first case, it is due only to the market demand and production cost parameters. 
In the second case, the adjusting factors play an important role such that the market 
equilibrium reaches the perfect competitive outcome in that specific period. 
Figure 11.8 shows the profits for each GENCO at each period. Figure 11.8(a) shows that 
profits are quite similar (the differences occur because the GENCOs’ outputs differ slightly). 
However, profits vary more when the learning effect is considered. Moreover, in some cases 
(i.e. periods 1, 2, 7, 8, and 24), GENCO 1’s profits are higher due to the adjusting factors. 
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Figure 11.8 InProfits per period per GENCO (a) without and (b) with learning: Case A 
 
 
Table 5 summarizes the total revenues, total costs, and net profits over the 24 periods. 
 
Table 5 Total revenues, total costs and net profits: Case A  
GENCO Total Revenue 
($) 
Total Cost 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
1 232080 52207 179873 
2 237410 38257 199153 
1 231610 54149 177461 
2 220000 38094 181906 
 
From Table 5 we observe that net profits are higher for both GENCOs when learning is 
not included. This indicates that the traditional Cournot outcome is even greater because the 
coefficients selected were not the optimum values. 
 
Case B. In this case, maximum/minimum on/off times and operational limits are 
considered. The new expected market supply and the new expected GENCOs’ outputs for 
each period of the day-ahead are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Expected GENCOs’ outputs: Case B 
 NO LEARNING LEARNING 
PERIOD GENCO 1 
(MW) 
GENCO 2 
(MW) 
GENCO 1 
(MW) 
GENCO 2 
(MW) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
138.51 
150.00 
144.58 
107.40 
 99.62 
 69.66 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
 73.93 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
 89.46 
150.00 
141.60 
185.07 
147.40 
111.26 
102.92 
 71.81 
200.04 
279.75 
157.56 
201.22 
 75.27 
196.49 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
228.54 
211.12 
193.91 
278.17 
189.63 
110.14 
 92.00 
229.95 
150.00 
150.00 
144.58 
 89.33 
 77.20 
 59.89 
150.00 
150.00 
113.98 
150.00 
 65.87 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
 0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
 80.40 
150.00 
135.87 
214.61 
147.40 
147.82 
119.55 
 79.28 
164.08 
251.75 
128.75 
215.60 
125.51 
238.43 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
228.54 
211.12 
193.91 
278.17 
189.63 
110.14 
 80.47 
209.15 
 
Here we can see that GENCO 1 reaches its upper limit of generation in several periods 
and that market equilibrium is found for each period even when GENCO 1 reaches its upper 
limit. Table 6 also shows that there is one shut-down for each GENCO. Each time that a 
GENCO goes “off,” the market supply becomes the GENCO’s online output. Maximum up 
and minimum down times are met throughout the timespan. The remaining operational 
constraints are satisfied. 
By comparing Table 4 with Table 6, we observe that the GENCOs’ outputs differ only for 
the periods in which the upper limit is reached, in addition to the shutdown periods. A 
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graphic representation of the two outputs with and without the learning effect is shown in 
Figure 11.9.  
 
 
Figure 11.9 GENCOs’ expected outputs (a) without learning and (b) with learning: Case B 
 
Figure 11.9 shows that each time a GENGO is off, the market supply becomes the 
GENCO’s online output. In addition, we observe that GENCO 1 reaches its upper generating 
limit in several periods even when GENCO 2 is off.  
 
 
Figure 11.10 Market-clearing prices (a) without learning and (b) with learning: Case B 
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Figure 11.11 Profits per period per GENCO (a) without and (b) with learning: Case B 
 
During those periods when only one unit is on and it reaches its upper limit, the learning 
aspect affects the market equilibrium. The market equilibrium is still a Nash equilibrium. The 
capacity-constrained price game potentially will appear if the players become informed.  
 
Table 7 Total revenues, total costs and net profits: Case B 
GENCO Total Revenue Total Cost Net profit 
1 205480 41463 164017 
2 256490 36698 219792 
1 199530 40614 158916 
2 256840 37221 219619 
 
Similar to Table 5, the net profits are higher when learning is not considered. However, 
GENCO’s 2 profits increase substantially while GENCO’s 1 profits decrease. Changes in 
profits occur because the units went off for several periods. During periods when only one 
unit is supplying the market, a GENCO’s profits at day’s end are higher than when all of its 
units are online for all the periods.  
 
Case C. This case accounts for temporal and operational constraints. The expected 
GENCOs’ outputs for the day-ahead are presented in Table 8. 
 
0 5 10 15 20 250 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
4 
Time
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Time
(a) (b) 
  $    $
  
190
Table 8 Expected GENCOs’ outputs: Case C 
 NO LEARNING LEARNING 
PERIOD GENCO 1 
(MW) 
GENCO 2 
(MW) 
GENCO 1 
(MW) 
GENCO 2 
(MW) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
138.51 
150.00 
140.74 
110.74 
 99.62 
 69.11 
109.11 
149.11 
150.00 
150.00 
120.00 
150.00 
120.00 
 90.00 
 60.00 
 30.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
 40.00 
 80.00 
141.60 
 185.07 
 155.07 
 125.07 
 102.92 
  72.92 
 122.92 
 150.00 
 120.00 
  90.00 
  60.00 
  30.00 
   0.00 
   0.00 
   0.00 
   0.00 
  50.00 
 100.00 
 150.00 
 200.00 
 189.63 
 159.63 
 129.63 
 179.63 
150.00 
150.00 
125.99 
 95.99 
 77.20 
 54.53 
 94.53 
134.53 
113.98 
150.00 
120.00 
150.00 
120.00 
 90.00 
 60.00 
 30.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
 40.00 
 80.00 
135.87 
214.61 
184.61 
154.61 
124.61 
 94.61 
213.89 
150.00 
120.00 
 90.00 
 60.00 
 30.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
  0.00 
 50.00 
100.00 
150.00 
200.00 
189.63 
159.63 
129.63 
264.92 
 
 
Here we observe that the commitment schedule differs from the two previous cases. There 
is one shut-down for each GENCO. In addition, ramp up and ramp down constraints occur 
(seen in the GENCOs’ outputs). In Case B above, once the unit reached its maximum time 
online, it goes off (this also occurs when it reaches its maximum offline time). However, in 
Case C, before the unit goes off, the ramp down constraint begins working so that the unit 
decreases its output for several periods before it finally goes off.  
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Figure 11.12 GENCOs’ expected outputs (a) without learning and (b) with learning: Case A 
 
As seen in Figure 11.12, the commitment schedule differs with respect to the two previous 
cases. There is one shut-down for each GENCO. The market-clearing price as displayed in 
Figure 11.13 differs considerably due to the ramp up and ramp down constraints. 
 
 
Figure 11.13 Market-clearing prices (a) without learning and (b) with learning: Case C 
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Figure 11.14 Profits per period per GENCO (a) without and (b) with learning: Case C 
 
 
Table 9 Producer’s revenues, costs and profits: Case C 
GENCO Total Revenues 
($) 
Total Costs 
($) 
Net Profits 
($) 
1 186360 37608 148752 
2 214070 29419 184651 
1 172330 36494 135836 
2 225600 31903 193697 
 
 
In the situation depicted, GENCO 2 makes the highest profits with and without learning. 
Moreover, GENCO 2’s profits are higher when the learning aspect is considered via the use 
of adjusting factors. However, the inclusion of ramp up and ramp down reduces its profits 
with respect to Case B. 
 
Table 10 summarizes total expected revenues, total expected costs, and net expected 
profits for each GENCO for each case.  
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Table 10 Producers’ revenues, costs and profits 
GENCO 
Total Revenues 
($) 
Total Costs 
($) 
Net Profits 
($) 
 
CASE 
1 232080 52207 179873 
2 237410 38257 199153 
1 231610 54149 177461 
2 220000 38094 181906 
A 
1 205480 41463 164017 
2 256490 36698 219792 
1 199530 40614 158916 
2 256840 37221 219619 
B 
1 186360 37608 148752     
2 214070 29419 184651 
1 172330 36494 135836 
2 225600 31903 193697 
C 
 
Table 10 reveals that net profits differ from case to case. In all cases, GENCO 2 earns 
higher profits, with Case B resulting in the most favorable conditions. The table also shows 
that the benefits differ with the incorporation of additional constraints, operative generation 
limits, and ramping constraints.  
 
4. Parameter dependency 
A different choice of parameters will influence market outcomes. Market equilibrium 
depends on all system parameters except fixed-cost parameters.  
Adjusting factors assume a key role in the determination of market equilibrium since they 
modify the reaction functions. By changing the adjusting factors, we can find a factible 
region. The factible region is determined by the extreme maximum values reached by the 
adjusting factors. For instance, when both factors equal 1, it represents the maximum market 
quantity which is in essence the Bertrand outcome. The intersection of reaction functions still 
determines the market equilibrium. On the other hand, when both factors approach -1, the 
lower market quantity bound is established. Graphically this factible region is represented by 
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the shadowed area depicted in Figure 11.15. We note that any combination of adjusting 
factors will fall within the factible region.  
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Figure 11.15 Equilibrium market factible region 
 
It is well known that changes in market-demand function parameters will increase or 
decrease the factible region. For instance market demand “shifts up” when increasing 
parameter a and keeping everything else constant. Consequently, the factible region 
increases. If parameter b decreases, and everything else is kept constant, the market demand 
also shifts up and therefore the factible region increases. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies the production decisions of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity 
market solved by sequential market equilibriums. The formulation of sequential market 
equilibriums is represented by an independent linear set of equations with unique solutions 
when temporal constraints are omitted. Operational and temporal constraints have been 
included in the model. Once the temporal constraints are considered, the independent time-
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steps solutions are coordinated by the supervision of the maximum/minimum on/off time 
constraints.  
The model elaborated in this paper was reduced to a two-player model to facilitate the 
analysis and make it relatively easy to identify the results derived a priori. The model can be 
extended to an n-player model in a single-node. Under this condition, the problem can be 
reduced to a two-player model. To reduce a two-player model we can use a composite of the 
generation production cost curves, and reduce our own generation units and the rival units to 
one composite unit. The Cournot game results if all the adjusting coefficients equal zero, 
0λ = . When all of the GENCOs’ adjusting coefficients are equal to 1, the market 
equilibrium moves to the Bertrand outcome; monopoly is reached when they tend to -1. 
The solution of the short-term equilibrium problem varies with the generation cost 
parameters, the demand parameters, and the adjusting coefficients. A numerical example that 
illustrates the impact of the ramping process shows that the benefits will differ with the 
incorporation of ramping constraints.  
Modeling the repetition of static snapshot with learning effect in the decision-making 
process is an alternative method to analyze the dynamic behavior of the market players. We 
incorporated learning by using forward expectations. In the examples given, these 
coefficients are assumed to be known. However, they must be estimated for each GENCO 
utilizing methods such as data mining, neural nets, and forecasting.  
The issue of transmission network effect merits further research. Currently, we are 
applying it to our model and will report the results in further publications. 
 
 
Appendix A. List of symbols 
k  Index for the number of time intervals in hours  
i  Index for the number of GENCOs 
( )P Q = Inverse linear market demand at period k 
( )Q k = Total market output at period k 
( )iq k = Output from player i at period k 
( )ˆ jq k  GENCO j’s expectation of the decisions made by GENCO I at period k 
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( )i kπ = Profit of GENCO i at period k 
( )( )i iC q k = Production cost function of GENCO i  
MIN
iq = Minimum output of the GENCO i 
MAX
iq  Maximum output of the GENCO i 
Off
it = Minimum time off of the GENCO i 
On
it  Maximum time on of the GENCO i 
,a b = Market-demand parameters 
, ,i i id e f = Coefficients of production cost function ( )( )i iC q k  
jλ = Adjustment coefficient for GENCO j 
iZ = Maximum power ramp-up increment of unit i 
iW = Maximum power ramp-down decrement of unit i 
ikx = 
State variable indicating the length of time that the unit i has been up or down at 
period k 
iku = Binary decision variable indicating whether the unit i at period k is up or down 
μ = Lagrange multiplier 
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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the future cash revenue flows required for an expected stock profile.  
It is these future cash flow requirements that determine the bidding strategy implemented by 
a Generation Company, GENCO. Based on forecasted information of competitors’ product 
consumptions, forecasted demand, forecasted fuel prices, and expected transmission 
capabilities, each GENCO makes output decisions. Two cases of study are presented. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the expansion decision process is to maximize the profit in future periods 
commensurate with the risk and return expected by each company within an industry 
window. Each generation company, GENCO, has a given production cost, market niche and 
competitive advantage as a portfolio to maximize its profit in future periods. As it is the 
GENCOs’ production that drives the risk and return profile, each competitive player needs to 
know the other competitor’s strategic decisions to set bidding profiles and thus, maximize 
profit. Each GENCO potentially uses different techniques to forecast the competitor’s 
decisions (product mix) when trying to determine its own production mix. 
The input consists of forecasts of competitor’s products based on historical consumption, 
the forecasted demand, the forecasted prices of each fuel type, and the expected transmission 
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capabilities. While not all information has an impact in each future period, some, such as 
transmission capability, have a dramatic impact for a short period with profound price 
movements. 
The dynamic simulation focuses on the interactions between competitors and the resulting 
option value of the generation asset. Each GENCO in the market starts with an initial state 
based on the type of asset owned, the capital requirements, and the operational costs. Each 
GENCO then finds output decisions based on expectations of the major factors as listed 
previously. Each GENCO adjustments its bidding decisions accordingly. There may be or 
may not be equilibrium after interactions occur.  The uncertainties of these factors are 
modeled as real options to properly value the assets into the future periods.  
Real Option Analysis, ROA, has been use for valuating generation assets in a market 
environment. First models neglected operational unit’s constraints, such as ramp up/down 
and maximum time on/off, becoming a pure financial modeling. Neglecting operational 
constraints may have a significant impact on value the generation assets [1]. When these 
constraints are taken into consideration, the valuation problem is path-dependent. Hence, the 
decision to turn on or off the generating unit not only depends of fuel and electricity prices 
but also on unit’s status. Several methodologies have been proposed for handling the 
technical unit’s constraints. Tseng et al. [2] apply Monte Carlo simulation in the option 
pricing. Doug Gardner and Yiping Zhuang [1] use stochastic dynamic programming instead. 
These, as well as other reported papers make emphasis in modeling the electricity price and 
fuel prices [3][4]. 
Considering operational characteristics seems similar to the traditional unit commitment, 
which finds the optimal scheduling strategy. However, what ROA does, is to determine the 
optimal bidding strategy rather than the optimal schedule. Under specific conditions, these 
two objectives can be equivalent. 
With the unbundling of the electric power industry, the generation unit has become a 
multi-product device. Generation owners may have additional means of generating revenues. 
Rajaraman et al. in [5] describes the multi-period optimal bidding strategy for a generator 
under exogenous uncertain energy and reserve prices. Finding the optimal market-responsive 
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generator commitment and dispatch policy in response to exogenous uncertain prices for 
energy and reserves is analogous to exercising a sequence of financial options [6]. 
The optimal bidding is deficient if additional factors are neglected, for example 
transmission congestion and competitor’s behavior. Rajaraman et al. in [5] treats 
transmission congestions by modeling locational prices that are consistent with the structure 
of the transmission congestion and the transmission network. Shi-jie et al. in [7] and [8] also 
use locational prices for valuating transmission assets. They refer to price difference between 
two points as locational spreads.  
This paper focuses on the future cash revenue flows required for an expected stock profile 
[9] (as determined by Capital Assets Pricing Model, CAPM, Arbitrage Pricing Theory, APT, 
etc.). It is these future cash flow requirements that determine the bidding strategy 
implemented by a GENCO. For simplicity’s sake, the future cash flows are dependent on a 
single commodity, electric energy, although a generating unit is a multi-product device. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the CAPM. Next, 
ROA in the electric power industry is introduced. A linear programming mathematical model 
is then presented. Numerical example follows. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
II. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING METHOD (CAPM) 
CAPM is an important tool used to analyze the relationship between risk and rate of return 
[9][10]. An average-risk stock is defined as one that tends to move up and down in step with 
the general market as measured by some index such as the Dow Jones Industrials, the S&P 
500, or the New York Stock Exchange Index [11]. 
If a stock is in equilibrium, then its required rate of return, r , must be equal to its expected 
rate of return, rˆ . Further, its required return is equal to a risk free rate, fr , plus a risk 
premium, whereas the expected return on a constant growth stock is the stock's dividend 
yield 1 ,oD P plus its expected growth rate, .g  
 
( ) 1 ˆf m f
o
Dr r r r g r
P
β= + − = + =                                                                                              (1) 
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Figure 12.1 shows the security market line, SML, as a function of risk (β).  The riskless 
return has a β=0, where the SML crosses the expected return axis. 
 
 
Figure 12.1 The security market line 
 
β indicates how sensitive a security’s returns are to changes in the return on the market 
portfolio. If a security’s β=1.0, its return tend to track the market portfolio. 
 If the market portfolio increases/decreases by 10%, the stock also tends to move up/down 
by 10%. If a stock has a β < 1.0, it will tend to rise/fall less than the market. For instance, 
assume a stock has a β=0.5. If the market portfolio increases by 10%, the stock will tend to 
move up only 5%.  
A stock with β > 1.0 will rise/fall more than the market. For example, a stock with a β=1.5 
will tend to rise/fall by 15% when the market portfolio increases/decreases 10%. 
The utility’s forecasted market clearing price is essential in its market strategy. Price 
variations are the result of competitors’ interaction and system conditions. Competitors’ 
decisions are strongly correlated with input price variations. Even when the forecasted prices 
reflect the normal stochastic variations in system operating conditions, the forecasted prices 
may not be accurate enough to guarantee a winning decision. The producer has to live with 
the uncertainty of negative profits. Possible losses may occur due to the difference between 
the spot price at delivery time and the forecasted price. 
Risk ( )β  
Ex
pe
ct
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n 
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fr  
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There exist two basic models that can be used to determine the risk management benefits 
of alternative strategies. The first is to conduct a historical analysis and determine how a 
given strategy would have performed had it been employed in the past. Historical 
information would be used to simulate the future cash flows. The second method would be 
conducted a forward-looking analysis by forecasting future system and market variables. 
The planning of scheduling for a GENCO will determine the future cash flows. These 
need to recover costs, fixed and variable, plus an additional expected return. 
Operational constraints of the generating units, the interest rate, forecasted electricity and 
fuel prices error deviation, among others, will create a SML bandwidth instead of a strict 
SML, as depicted in Figure 12.1. 
 
 
III. REAL OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
Real options have become an important tool on valuation of power generation asset. Real 
options represent opportunities to act which provide their holder with the right, but not the 
obligation, to exchange the value of the cash flow stream of underlying asset against the 
value of the cash flow stream of an exercise asset [12]. 
The financial concepts applied to the electricity market results in the spark spread option. 
The spark spread option is based on the difference between the electricity price, tEp , and the 
price of a particular fuel, tFp , used to generate it [8]. The spark spread payoff associated with 
a specific heat rate, H  is defined as: 
 
t t
E Fpayoff p Hp= −                                                                                                                  (2) 
 
A generation asset’s value over a period of time is commonly estimated by a series of 
European call spark spread options.   
 
( ) ( )1 1, , max ,0T Tt t t tE F E Ft tE p p T p Hp= == −∑ ∑                                                                          (3) 
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Each period has an associated cost and revenue. It is common practice to distribute the 
fixed costs within the existing periods. It means that fixed costs are periodized over its useful 
economic life. Fixed costs as well as variable costs must be covered during the periods when 
bids are accepted by the market. For instance, when the fixed costs are covered during the 
fist periods seems more favorable, but this is disputable given that profits strongly depend on 
spot prices, which may be higher in later periods. However, selling during the earliest period 
with a lower profit provides additional flexibility since they have extra periods to adapt their 
strategy base on new market information. Hence there exists a trade-off of when to 
scheduling output becoming a timing problem.     
Real Options could be used to take the uncertainty due to different factors such as 
uncertainty about an opponent’s bid, uncertainty about future demand, and uncertainty about 
future failures and inefficiencies in power plant operation, and uncertainty about congestion 
on transmission lines, and reduce all these uncertainties to a single number. 
 
 
IV. MODEL AND SOLUTION 
How can a GENCO gauge the expected cash flows of revenue that would result from a 
specific strategy? These cash flows are not exogenous at all. The future cash flows depend 
upon future scheduling decisions, however the fixed cost are certain to be incurred and those 
have to be recover.  
Consider that any quantity produced can be sold in the spot market in the subsequent 
periods as long as it is priced competitively. The optimization problem is formulated as a 
maximizing linear program. 
 
( )( ) ( )1 1t
G
T tt t t
G E GtP
Maximize P p C P r= − +∑                                                                               (4) 
       . 1,...,t tGS to HP D t T≤ ∀ =                                                                                  (5) 
                1,...,t tE FP H p t T≥ ⋅ ∀ =                                                                                   (6) 
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                   0 1,...,tGP t T≥ ∀ =                                                                                     (7) 
where the tGP is the electric power generated at period t, ( )tGC P  represents the fix and 
variable cost, tD is the demand at period t, and  ( )1 tr+ is the time value of money, and H a 
matrix of output coefficients. It is assumed a linear relationship between input and output 
transformation. This assumption permits to model GENCO’s bid in block contracts. The 
formulation also assumes that there is no limitation on fuel supply. 
The cost function is given by the equation: 
 
( )t tG GC P a bP= +                                                                                                                      (8) 
 
where a represents the fixed cost and b is the variable costs of production.  
A network flow interpretation of the mathematical model is depicted in Figure 12.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.2 N-periods production decision network flow 
 
The previous diagram portrays the spark spread option. This option adds value to the 
power generation assets when the contracted fuel is sold back to the fuel market or swapped, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
It is possible to include additional inputs in the described model permitting to market 
participants adaptively adjust market strategies as soon as each new piece of information is 
available. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
In this section numerical examples are presented. A GENCO is designing the bidding 
strategy for the next 4 periods. Fixed cost, variable production cost, and an expected rate of 
return must be recovered. Historical market information was taken from a random electric 
utility [13]. 
For the purpose of this example, forecasted electricity spot prices for the upcoming 
periods are assumed known. Except as noted elsewhere, all other parameters values used are 
listed in Table I and Table II. Fuel price is assumed constant for all the periods. 
 
TABLE I 
EXPECTED DEMAND AND EXPECTED ELECTRICITY PRICES 
Period Demand (MWh) Price 
1 500 20.0 
2 600 24.3 
3 550 26.5 
4 580 28.0 
 
 
TABLE II 
BASE CASE PARAMETER VALUES 
Parameter Value 
MAX
GP (MW) 50 
a  ($) 120 
b ($/MWh) 1.0 
fr (%) 8 
Mr (%) 12 
β  1.2 
Fuel ($) 21 
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The expected rate of return is calculated as follows: 
 
( )ˆ 8% 12% 8% *1.2r = + −  
ˆ 12.8%r =  
 
With the previous information, the optimization program gives the results shown in Table 
III: 
 
TABLE III 
OPTIMAL FORWARD POWER COMMITTED 
Period Power (MWh)
1 0 
2 50 
3 50 
4 50 
 
Prices, committed power, and revenues are shown in Figure 12.3. 
 
   
Figure 12.3 Expected price of electricity and committed power: case I 
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From Figure 12.3, we can observe that expected price of electricity is lower than the 
production costs at period 1. It implies that GENCO is not selling energy in such period. The 
subsequent periods, expected prices seem more favorable allowing him to sell its energy. No 
selling power in period 1 generates negative profits which are transfer to next periods.  
In order to recover the cost acquired at those periods, GENCO will need to raise the 
bidding price in subsequent periods. This can be done basically in two different ways: 
distributing in two or more periods or in a single period. Distributing in more than two 
periods seems more credible which also distribute the risk. However, such decision will 
depend much on market information. The most disruptive factor that leads to violation of 
theoretical predictions is information uncertainty on the part of market participants. 
From the same  we also observed the price difference between the electricity expected 
market price and the expected selling price. This information is also provided for the 
optimization program and is presented in Table IV. 
 
TABLE IV 
PRICE DIFFERENCE AT EACH PERIOD 
Period 1 2 3 4 
Difference ($) - 2.549 3.832 4.324 
 
 
Note that the values take in consideration the time value of the money. For instance, the 
expected market price at period 2 is $24.3  
In this case, it was possible to allocate forward contracts such as the future cash flows 
recover all the cost and the expected return. However, there exists always the possibility that 
this condition does not happen. Two alternatives need to be considered: To reduce the 
expected return or to increase bid prices.  
Now, consider that the price in period 1 = $23.6 and in period 2 = $20.3. The optimal 
solution is shown in Table V. 
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TABLE V 
OPTIMAL FORWARD POWER COMMITED WITH NEW EXPECTED PRICES OF ELECTRICITY 
Period Power (MWh) 
1 50 
2 0 
3 50 
4 50 
 
 
From Table V we can see that due to lower expected price of electricity at period 2, 
GENCO’s decision is not to sell. Thus, GENCO is incurring in negative profits at that period. 
The negative profits are essentially the periodized fixed costs. Form the unit’s operational 
viewpoint, it can be said that the unit is banking. Prices as well as committed power and 
revenues for the 4 periods are shown in Figure 12.4.  
 
 
Figure 12.4 Expected price and committed power: case II 
 
The future profits per period for both cases are shown in Table VI.  
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TABLE VI 
FUTURE EXPECTED PROFITS 
Period Case I ($) Case II ($) 
1 - 115.248 
2 129.678 - 
3 191.604 191.604 
4 216.188 216.188 
NPV 10.526 10.78 
 
 
From Table VI we observe that the NPVs are different. The difference is due to time value 
of money between selling today (period 1) and selling tomorrow (period 2) since the values 
at period 3 and 4 are the same. In both cases, the fixed costs are fully recovered. 
 
VI. UNCERTAINTY 
Simple capital budgeting analysis, based on the assumption of a given time flows of 
receipts, is perfectly valid if future production plants are known. However, this assumption 
neglects futures events introducing substantial uncertainty in the decision making process. 
Uncertainty is best thought of as representing a spectrum of unknown situations, ranging 
from perfect knowledge of the likelihood of all the possible outcomes at one end to no 
knowledge of the likelihood of possible outcomes at the other.  
By taking in consideration uncertainty, the company will gain a flexibility option allowing 
him to modify operations depending on how conditions develop as time progresses. 
Decision trees have been a traditional tool for analyzing and valuating embedded options 
when uncertainty is considered. Setting up a decision tree forces the GENCOS´s decision 
maker to consider embedded options.  
In this document we basically are evaluating a single path of the decision tree. The branch 
at each new node, assumes the same rate of return and external variables are forecasted with 
accuracy, price of electricity. 
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Our approach, LP optimal committed power for multiple time periods can be expanded by 
using the decision tree. For each path, we form a LP problem to forecast the optimal decision 
that maximizes profits. 
The introduction of uncertainty for fuel and electricity price for a given period t can be 
graphically represented as follows: 
 
 
Figure 12.5 Expected fuel and electricity price at period t 
 
Other exogenous variables can be modeled similarly to fuel or electricity price variables 
depending whether it is a input or output variable. Additionally, different rate of return inter-
period would also be simulated 
 
VI. SUMMARY 
GENCOs operational planning is not only constrained for its technical operational limits 
and fuel inventory, but also for the financial requirements.  
A GENCOs financial requirement is the expected rate of return within a specific period of 
time. According with CAPM in order to increase the expected rate of return, GENCOs 
portfolio will be exposing to higher risk. 
By committing forward contracts in the earliest deadline, the company will gain a 
flexibility option allowing him to modify operations depending on how conditions develop as 
time progresses. One of these options is to modify financial requirements, expected rate of 
return, in order to obtain a higher profit. 
Fuel price
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t 
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In order to reduce risk in the allocation on forward contracts a less expected return may be 
chosen otherwise the expected electricity price must be higher.  
Another alternative would be to increment the number of periods. This generally is an 
option for investment decisions. However, for operational decision this condition is not 
available; bookkeeping time is fixed usually quarterly. 
The previous analysis can be applied to any price taker forward contract, intermediate 
load unit, or contracts within a bandwidth at the money from financial option viewpoint. 
Peak generators need as well as any other unit to recover the full cost in a certain period of 
time. This justify why for some periods electricity prices experience sparks unless other 
allocating mechanism helps GENCOs to recover all the costs smoothly. 
An intertemporal LP optimization program has been proposed in this document. The 
problem is formulated as deterministic optimization problem since a single path of a decision 
tree is evaluated. However, the incorporation of uncertainty was discussed and it is issue of 
future work. 
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CHAPTER 13 THE VALUE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN THE 
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Abstract 
For many years, the electric power industry treated electricity as a unique commodity sold 
to costumers. Nowadays, the new electricity industry has identified several key ancillary 
services. Under this new scenario, the producer’s primary goal is the selection of services in 
which to participate via assessing the potential profits as part of the decision-making. 
Purchasing additional information can help reduce uncertainty and identify the optimum 
market scenarios. However, it will require market participants to analyze both perfect and 
imperfect information. The price that the decision maker may be willing to pay to resolve an 
uncertainty depends on the value of the information. This paper will investigate the 
identification and value of technical system information available for purchase from system 
operators. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a fully unbundled electric market, market participants (MPs) consumers and/or 
producers- face a higher level of uncertainty than in current market models. MPs need to 
forecast both the residual demand for electric energy and the residual demand for each 
ancillary service (AS). These unbundled markets provide opportunities for MPs to observe 
the different services, selecting those that will be most profitable at a given time. 
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Many AS can be traded on an exchange-based market. It is envisioned that an independent 
market will exist for each service or commodity offered. Twenty-four independent hourly 
auctions for each service will concur with the twenty-four independent energy auctions [1]. 
When an independent market exist for each AS, MPs are solely responsible for their 
choice of product and bids. Therefore, a primary objective is to quantify the potential profits 
of the service selected. MPs may reduce uncertainty and risk by purchasing additional 
information from the system operator (SO). The potential flexibility gained directly relates to 
the information’s value. Value is defined as the maximum amount a decision-maker will pay 
to resolve an uncertainty [2]. 
The SO’s technical information is available for purchase by all MPs. The technical data 
includes: line impedances and capacities, real and reactive power nodal demands, and the 
parameters of switch capacitors and reactor banks. This paper investigates the expected value 
of the SO’s technical information from the perspective of the producer MP. We calculate the 
value of system information using a production costing approach. The model considers fuel 
price fluctuations indexed by the total MP bid probability density function. The overall 
model simulates typical generation and network scenarios to assess the technical and 
financial risks associated with the range of possible market decisions. We use Decision Tree 
Analysis (DTA) to compute the value of the information available for purchase.  
Production costing models are used in the electric industry to forecast the cost of 
producing electricity [3][4][5]. Real power is the commodity of interest. However, the 
economic principles governing the pricing of active power also apply to reactive power. 
Other AS must be considered since the probabilistic production cost approach consists of 
operating cost and outage costs [3][6][7]. However, this issue is questionable since customers 
would be able to select the level of reliability in the unbundled electric market. In [8] the 
production costing approach was employed to analyze the risk of short-term system 
operational planning in the presence of electric load forecast uncertainty and in [9] to 
forecast electricity price statistical information necessary in the valuation of future and other 
electricity derivatives. Production costing models have been also used to forecast the 
electricity system’s marginal costs [10].  
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In this paper a producer MPs (Generation companies –GenCos) offer power or any other 
service in block contracts; this implies that the market supply curve has the form of a step 
function. Similarly, buyers may make bids into the market at the prices they are willing to 
pay. The aggregate demand curve is a decreasing step function of price. The market clearing 
price (MCP) is commonly determined by the intersection of these demand-supply curves. 
 
II. VALUE OF INFORMATION 
A decentralized market environment presents a wide range of opportunities for sellers and 
consumers while at the same time it exposes them to higher levels of risk. 
In essence, risk is subject to empirical measurement, while uncertainty is non-quantifiable. 
Thus, in a risk situation it is possible to indicate the chances of the realized value of a 
variable falling within stated limits. Stated limits can be described by the fluctuations around 
the average of a probability distribution function (PDF). In situations of uncertainty, the 
fluctuations of a variable are such that they cannot be described by a PDF. Hence, risk and 
uncertainty are best thought of as representing a spectrum of unknown situations ranging 
from perfect knowledge of the likelihood of all the possible outcomes at one end to no 
knowledge of the likelihood of possible outcomes at the other [11].  
We observe that it is not the real-world situation itself which is either risky or uncertain, 
but simply the information available to decision-makers which defines it as such. All actual 
project outcomes are unknown since they occur in the future and are subject to influence by 
any number of variables, each of which may take different values. 
Analysis of energy sales in a decentralized market may be undertaken in terms of 
optimistic or pessimistic assumptions about power demand levels. There are two approaches 
used to consider the associated returns. The first is based on prediction of future power 
demands under different scenarios. The second is based on modeling the outcomes through a 
PDF of future power demand. In both approaches, there is nothing inherently different about 
the circumstances of the decisions; only the data available to the MP making the decisions is 
different (i.e. the decisions have different levels of risk). The longer the forecasting period of 
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participation the higher the uncertainty involved. This condition can be represented by the 
cone of uncertainty shown in Figure 13.1. 
 
 
Figure 13.1 GenCos’ cone of uncertainty on the day-ahead market 
 
It is possible to reduce this staggering range by obtaining additional information. A 
cost/benefit comparison can decide whether or not to purchase the additional information.  
The value of additional information under different scenarios is determined by using 
DTA. DTA is a sequential representation of decisions and uncertainties which represent all 
paths the decision-maker might follow through time [2][11]. The outcome of the decision 
tree is the expected value. The expected value of the decision tree with uncertainty is the sum 
of all the potential consequences multiplied by their associated probabilities: 
 
( )1 Probnji j jEV val== ⋅∑                                                                                                        (1) 
 
where i = Node to be evaluated  
 j = Index of nodes connected to i 
 n = Number of nodes connecting node i 
 Prob = Probability of the branch connecting node j and i 
 val = Valuation of node j 
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When one or more services are provided for the same GenCo the correlation of these 
services should be modeled. The correlation among the different services offered in the 
electricity market is nonlinear. For instance, from a generator point of view, reactive power 
is a complement output of active power, which makes complex to decompose those 
commodities 
A schematic representation of the decision tree for 24 periods is shown in Figure 13.2. 
The different uncertainties modeled concern only operational uncertainties. 
 
 
 
Figure 13.2 Multi-product Electricity market decision tree 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation is applied given the simplicity of adding multiple uncertainties 
and viability of model plenty of probabilistic scenarios [2]. The simulation process should 
include a reasonable number of samples, each representing a system-operating state. 
In the real world each producer sorts the probabilities and alternatives chronologically or 
by other criteria (i.e. level of risk). A number of uncertainties are displayed in Figure 13.3. 
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Figure 13.3 Decision tree for valuating information at period t 
 
For illustrative purposes, consider the case of a GenCo that bids into the energy market 
and assume that the forecasted residual demand for energy has been estimated. The GenCo 
wants to discover whether the amount of power at the willing price to sell can or cannot be 
delivered. It bids 100 MWh at $26/MWh on peak demand. It is able to sell more, but 
transmission congestion is a concern. The expected profits are $2,600. However, the 
expected profit could be $2,800 if the GenCo knows that 120 MW is the maximum power the 
system can handle without any congestion. Thus, the value of perfect information (VOPI) is: 
 
 (VOPI) is: $2,800 $2,600 $200.VOPI = − =  
 
Transmission access is imperative in the determination of electric energy delivery. The 
optionality of network restrictions due to congestion increases the importance of network 
information. 
The PDFs associated with electric energy demand in each bus differ due to network 
parameters, load conditions, non-linear correlation between services, etc. For the sake of 
simplicity but with loss of generality, assume there is no correlation between these PDFs at 
each bus. Thus, each bus has a different PDF for each service, as represented in Figure 13.4. 
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Figure 13.4 Probability distribution system at bus i for the different services 
 
Normal PDF is considered for active and reactive power demand. Since a line can only be 
in two states, “in” or “out”, the uniform PDF is considered. Transmission congestion PDF 
depends on the state of the system and the network configuration. This implies that each 
GenCo may face different PDFs for transmission congestion.  
The MP’s task is to discover the most important variables affecting the decision outcome. 
The usual form of representing the impact on outcome value and choice of policy is a 
tornado diagram [2]. 
 
 
 
Figure 13.5 Example tornado diagram 
 
For each of the most significant uncertainties, it is necessary to assess a PDF. The 
probability for uncertain represents the best state of knowledge about uncertainty. 
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It is helpful to think of the SO as the “container” of system operation information (nodal 
demand, status of transmission lines, maintenance records, etc.) available for sale. As the 
holder and seller, the SO must assess the willingness of MPs to buy its information. In turn, 
MPs must weigh the value of the SO’s information against the alternatives. Often, specific 
new information about key uncertainties will alter GenCo’s production decision. If this is the 
case, the new information has a value which can be calculated prior to making its final 
decision.  
Due to the spatial distribution of the power system, not all MPs will be willing to buy the 
SO’s information. Therefore, the SO must consider the possibility of selling different 
information especially to players that do not have market power. 
The existence of other AS and operating changes in units supplying demand introduce 
nonlinearities in electricity prices. Because of the lack of information on AS prices, MPs 
must use historical data to disaggregate and estimate them. One alternative is to use 
conventional optimization tools. For instance, in the case of reactive power ancillary service, 
Optimal Power Flow can be used for solving past scenarios along with the information 
purchased from the SO. 
 
III. ILUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY 
Case studies were performed using the modified five-node system [12] depicted in Figure. 
13.6. The test system bid data is given in Table I. Additional data is provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 13.6 Five-nodes System 
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The simulation process uses 1,000 samples to obtain a PDF. Each sample represents one 
power system operating state. This sampling set was generated considering as random 
variables nodal loads, availability of generating units, and transmission lines. The only 
constraints on transactions are transmission limits.  
  
TABLE I 
NODAL LOADS’ BID AND SUPPLY’S BID DATA 
 
 Demand Supply  
Node MWh @ $/MWh MWh @ $/MWh  
1 - @ 28 170@34 GenCo1 
2 20 @ 41 110@29 GenCo2 
3 195 @ 37   
4 140 @ 45   
5 60 @ 36  140@25 GenCo3 
 
The nodal PDF for the active power demand is displayed in matrix form in Figure 13.7. A 
similar matrix exists for reactive power demand. 
 
 
Figure 13.7 Nodal active power demand PDF 
 
The SO solves the auction given the information submitted by both parties. 
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When transmission congestion does not exist we observe that demand is fully satisfied by 
the supply side. The transmission losses are also covered by the existing supply. The reserve 
is settled in an independent market. 
The power flows through the system are shown in Table II. 
 
TABLE II 
REAL POWER FLOWS 
Element MW Max (MW) 
1 101.21 100 
2 63.07 100 
3 52.76 100 
4 168.78 150 
5 -32.56  30 
6 -55.07  80 
7 -44.69  40 
Losses 29.29 MW 
 
 
 
Nodal voltage magnitudes are within the ±10%. 
Now, let’s analyze the following two cases: 
 
Case 1: Consider the transmission limits  
Case 2: Assume the transmission limits in elements 5 and 7 are 33MW and 45 MW 
respectively. 
 
Having additional information about system operations may enable GenCo 3 to bid more 
accurately.  
When transmission limits are violated, the power produced by GenCo 3 cannot be sold. 
Indeed, the maximum power it can sell is 130 MW instead of the 140 MW it is bidding. With 
this information GenCo 3 may be able to save money by reducing the level of production and 
fuel consumption. 
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On the other hand, GenCo 1 and/ or GenCo 2 will also benefit by having this information 
and can bid greater amounts of power. The system overall will also benefit by operating 
more economically. 
The expected profit for GenCo 3 with perfect information is: 
 
( ) 130 *$35 / $4,550PE MWh MWhπ = =  
 
The expected profit without perfect information is: 
 
( ) 140 *$35 / $4,900E MWh MWhπ = =  
 
Then, the value of perfect information (VOPI) is: 
 
$4,550 $4,900 $350VOPI = − = −  
 
In the second case, the transmission limits have been relaxed and almost all the power 
from GenCo 3 can be delivered. Around 2 MW cannot be delivered. Then, the expected 
profit with perfect information is: 
 
( ) 138 *$35 / $4,830PE MWh MWhπ = =  
 
and 
 
$4,830 $4,900 $70VOPI = − = −  
 
Even when the costs of information are relatively low, the information may reduce 
uncertainty to such a minor extent that is not worth the investment. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
If the unbundled electricity market introduces more uncertainty, it also provides more 
ancillary services. Obviously, astute MPs can maximize profits but others will only stay in 
business by being able to observe the opportunities available from participation in all of the 
ancillary services. For example, a GenCo may well find it difficult to sell expensive active 
power, yet the same GenCo’s reactive power may be needed by the system.  
The identification and value of the SO’s technical information was analyzed using the 
concept of “value of perfect information”. We observe that the value of imperfect 
information can prove more useful since imperfect sources are more often available. The 
value can be calculated by adding an uncertainty to the decision tree. 
This paper only valued the technical information based on transmission constraints. 
However, the lack of ancillary services may also jeopardize GenCOs’ production deliveries. 
Reactive power and voltage control play critical roles in supporting the real power transfer 
across the grid. We will present these additional research results in a future paper.     
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
TABLE AI 
TRANSMISSION LINES DATA (P.U.) 
Element Sending  
Node 
Receiving 
Node 
R X y/2 
1 1 2 0.02 0.06 0.030 
2 1 3 0.08 0.24 0.025 
3 2 3 0.06 0.18 0.020 
4 2 4 0.06 0.06 0.020 
5 2 5 0.04 0.12 0.015 
6 3 4 0.01 0.03 0.010 
7 4 5 0.08 0.24 0.025 
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CHAPTER 14 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
14.1 Chapter overview 
The electricity economic markets are a complex area of study. Due to incomplete information 
and occasional irrationality on the part of market participants, they have the potential to careen wildly 
away form theoretical predictions. Electric markets in particular, having been regulated for so long, 
have had a bumpy re-entry into the atmosphere of de-regulated capitalism. For all entities vested in 
the electric power industry, with this re-entry comes the need to protect themselves from risk as well 
as new opportunities for profit. This research work presented additional aspects on information 
requirements for improving strategic decision-making in the electricity market by proposing and 
developing theories and ideas that can be applied directly in algorithms. The main 
contributions of this dissertation as well as the future work are listed in this chapter.  
.  
 
14.2 Contributions 
Today’s liberalized energy markets require the development of new methods and 
techniques in order to understand market prices, the impacts of fuel price volatility, and to 
design effective regulatory policies. Bearing these in mind, research on generation 
decisions/actions will assess and explain bidding strategies and their implications for asset 
valuation, developing sitting decisions, and contract strategies. This dissertation provide for 
in-depth analysis of strategic topics on generation asset management and energy markets. In 
depth studies and guidelines on these and other timely topics will result in robust insights for 
the generation asset managers concerned with advancing their understanding and response to 
critical strategic issues. The analysis was carried out from the supplier’s viewpoint in where 
players face the problem of setting the right price for services that would maximize gross 
profits. Nevertheless, buyers face similar problems and consequently the analysis can be 
easily extended. 
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The specific contributions of this research can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Because the electricity sector is interrelated with fuel and emission markets, it is 
necessary to consider them in the design of market actions for the market 
participants. Hence, the Input-Output model is considered to decompose/integrate 
the energy market. The model also allows to the SO to monitor the electric market 
which is an extremely important aspect to be considered in a decentralized market 
environment. 
2. The production decisions of GENCOs which are fully engaged in ologopolistic 
electricity need to be studied. A model based upon the static equilibrium model 
solved sequentially in time has been developed. By decomposing the problem in 
time, each time-step is solved independently using a Cournot-like market model. 
The time dimension is divided into discrete, one-hour time-steps. 
3. The value of information is analyzed in the fist instance by the SO stepping in to 
the foot of producers. In order to solve this problem, a probabilistic model is 
considered. The system value of information is calculated by the analysis of the 
electric network using a Decision Tree Analysis and Monte Carlo method. Using 
these tools in combination will help maximize profit while minimizing risk and 
losses.  
4. Decision support system (DSS) core tools are also proposed to help in the 
development of optimal market strategies for the different market participants. 
5. Two models of an integrated electricity and fuel markets are presented. The first 
formulation is a closed form solution of the Cournot model represented by a set of 
linear equations. The second formulation is an equivalent of the first in a Discrete 
Event System Simulation (DESS) framework. The main advantage when 
formulating the energy market by using DESS is the possibility to study market 
dynamics. 
6. In the electricity sector, our previous work has been extended by including a 
rigorous formulation of the ramping constraints has been implemented to analyze 
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the effect of intertemporal constraints on a GENCO’s decision-making process. 
Once the temporal constraints are considered, the independent time-steps 
solutions are coordinated by the supervision of the maximum/minimum on/off 
time constraints. The learning aspect, represented by forward expectations, is 
compared with the Cournot model without learning. A sensitivity analysis is 
performed to observe how the solution of the short-term equilibrium problem 
varies with the generation cost parameters, the demand parameters, and the 
adjusting coefficients. 
 
 
 
14.3 Future work 
As future work, the following issues are considered: 
 
1. The energy market models do not consider transportation costs and transportation 
networks, generating units’ operational and temporal constraints. We suggest that 
future research should incorporate these and other constraints. Supplementary studies 
on specific risk, standardized contracts, the dynamism taking place in fuel 
procurement, and other factors will be initiated to the extend they directly and 
transparently support fuel portfolio development 
2. In an unbundled electricity market, GENCOs may participate in the provision of 
different services. In this multi-product framework, a GENCO can be seen as a series 
of European call options or a combination of European and American options. The 
latter case is considering a market design for which services are compound of capacity 
and delivery payments. If each service is paid the same, even if not used, the resulting 
optimization program is expressed as a set of European options. Impulse control can 
be used for analyze the effect on the option exercise for the two-part bidding approach. 
3. Modeling tools that take into account the complexities of the multiple services of the 
unbundled industry and the independent reactions of the participants in this 
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environment will assist in efforts to manage for the present and plan for the future. The 
integration of optimization and financial models as well as managerial decision-
making approaches would permit market participants to develop strategies for 
mechanisms that operate on a daily basis.  
4. Market monitoring can be sorted on financial and physical market activities. Financial 
monitoring includes monitoring of supply and demand conditions and market 
performance, monitoring of market power exercise, and monitoring of market 
participants’ activities and transactions. Physical monitoring takes account of 
generation and transmission outages, availability indices (generation and 
transmission), among others. Market monitoring can be done under given conditions 
by using control theory for a two-player market structure. An extend need to be done 
in order to observe the power of control theory in market controllability and 
observability –market monitoring. 
5. An intertemporal LP optimization program has been proposed in this thesis. The 
proposed approach, LP optimal committed power for multiple time periods can be 
expanded by using the decision tree. For each path, we form a LP problem to forecast 
the optimal decision that maximizes profits. The problem is formulated as 
deterministic optimization problem since a single path of a decision tree is evaluated. 
Then, the introduction of uncertainty for fuel and electricity price must be included. 
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